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Setting Incorporationism Straight
In 1873, in the Slaughter-House Cases... the Supreme Court said
the phrase "privileges and immunities" had nothing to do with
applying the Bill of Rights to the states. The vote was a narrow
5-4--one vote switch might have changed the course of history.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision last Term in Saenz v. Roe' was, at once,
both run-of-the-mill and quite remarkable. There is nothing particularly
earthshaking about the result the Court reached-specifically, that
California could not constitutionally limit welfare payments to a new
resident during his first year in California to the amount provided by the
state from which he had moved.3 What makes the decision in Saenz truly
newsworthy-and potentially a watershed-is the way the Court arrived at
the result that it did: For the first time in sixty-five years, and only the
second time in history, the Court struck down a state statute on the ground
that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of the citizens of the United States." 4 Prior to Saenz, the Supreme Court
had relied on the Clause to invalidate a state statute only once, when, in the
1935 case of Colgate v. Harvey,' it invoked the Clause to set aside a state
income tax charged against in-state residents on interest and dividend
income earned outside the state. The Court's initial foray into the realm of
federal "privileges [and] immunities" was short-lived. Colgate was
overruled in 1940 by Madden v. Kentucky,6 and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has remained dormant ever since-at least until Saenz,
that is.
1. Stephen J. Wermiel, Rights in the Modern Era: Applying the Bill of Rights to the States. I
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 121,124 (1992).
2. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
3. This is certainly not to say that the outcome in Saenz was foreordained. As Laurence Tribe
recently pointed out, even the result in Saenz is "something of a mystery" in the following sense:
In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), it took a "far more liberal Court" two rounds of
argument to decide ultimately to invalidate a far more extreme California law-one that outright
denied new residents access to welfare benefits during their first year in the state-and, even then.
it struck down the statute only by a 6-3 margin. Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does
the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?.
113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 113 (1999). In Saenz, by contrast, a relatively conservative Court
invalidated a less burdensome California program by a comfortable 7-2 vote. See id. at 119.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
6. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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So, does Saenz signal an out-and-out "Privileges or Immunities
Revival" ?7 Only time will tell. At the very least, however, the decision
seems to indicate a willingness on the part of the current Court to
reconsider the role, if any, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause ought to
play in modem constitutional law. Even Justice Thomas, dissenting in
Saenz, acknowledged that he "would be open to reevaluating [the]
meaning" of the Privileges or Immunities Clause "in an appropriate case." 8
But before any meaningful reconsideration of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause's role can occur, the Court will have to grapple with several
important issues, two of which Justice Thomas specifically identified. First,
the Court should "endeavor to understand what the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought [the Clause] meant." 9 Second, the Court
will need to "consider whether the Clause should displace, rather than
augment, portions of [modem] equal protection and substantive due process
jurisprudence." "0 There is, in addition, a third, and ultimately even more
important, question the Court must address if it is serious about
resuscitating the long-dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause: What about
the Slaughter-House Cases?"
In contemporary constitutional discourse, Slaughter-House stands for
one simple truth: that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is utterly
incapable of performing any real work in the protection of individual rights
against state interference, and that any argument premised on the Clause is
therefore a constitutional non-starter. Novice students of constitutional law,
upon encountering the Privileges 'or Immunities Clause for the first time,
are told by their professors (pausing ever so briefly in the headlong rush
toward the real meat of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses): "Privileges or Immunities? Don't worry about
it. Justice Miller and the Slaughter-House Court decimated that provision
way back in 1873." Likewise, recent law-school graduates preparing for the
bar examination are instructed that "Privileges or Immunities Clause" will
never be a correct answer and can be eliminated out of hand. The fact is that
no one reads the Privileges or Immunities Clause anymore. For that matter,
no one reads the Slaughter-House Cases anymore. Today, "Slaughter-
House" is really just shorthand-a codeword of sorts-for something much
larger, namely, the complete evisceration of a significant part of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite its practical irrelevance, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
today enjoying something of a renaissance among constitutional scholars.
7. Tribe, supra note 3.
8. Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1538 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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During the past decade, a number of commentators-most notably, Akhil
Amar, Michael Kent Curtis, and Richard Aynes-have scoured the
historical materials surrounding the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
and have demonstrated that there was substantial consensus among
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who crafted the Fourteenth
Amendment that the Privileges or Immunities Clause (and not the Due
Process Clause, as is commonly assumed today) would serve as the primary
vehicle for protecting individual rights against state infringement. 2 More
specifically, and more importantly for our purposes, these scholars
conclude that the Framers of Section 1 intended the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to "incorporate" most, if not all, of the protections of
the federal Bill of Rights against state governments. 3
Potent as it may be, however, this argument from original intent only
half answers objections to an incorporationist interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. There remains the thorny issue of
Slaughter-House. This Article therefore seeks to pick up where Professors
Amar, Curtis, and Aynes have left off, and to advance the incorporationist
12. See AKH[L REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AM.ENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L. 1193 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment]; Akhil R. Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights
Against the States?, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Did the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against the States?]; Richard L Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57 (1993).
Of course, the giants upon whose shoulders Amar, Curtis, and Aynes stood should not be
overlooked. For earlier scholarship suggesting an enhanced role for the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 22-
30 (1980); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 415-26, and
§ 11-2, at 567-69 (1st ed. 1978); William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative
History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L REV. 1 (1954); and
Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972
WASH. U. L.Q. 405. Justice Hugo Black's considerable contribution to the cause of incorporation
should also be noted. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-92 & app. (1947) (Black.
J., dissenting).
13. See CURTIS, supra note 12, at 91 ("John Bingham, the author of the amendment, and
Senator Howard, who managed it for the Joint Committee in the Senate, clearly said that the
amendment would require the states to obey the Bill of Rights. Not a single senator or
congressman contradicted them.... Today, the idea that the states should obey the Bill of Rights
is controversial. It was not controversial for Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress."); Amar,
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at 1236 ("[James Wilson and
John Bingham] understood that the plain meaning of Section One was that henceforth, the federal
government would have explicit power to compel state compliance with all the 'privileges' and
'immunities' of 'citizens' set out in the Bill."); Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against the States?, supra note 12. at 447 ("John Bingham, who
authored Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment... made it clear that the Amendment would
apply the Bill of Rights against the States.... All the leading figures in the House and Senate--
Jacob Howard, James Wilson, and Thaddeus Stevens, for example-shared similar concerns.");
Aynes, supra note 12, at 103 C' [A] fair examination of the evidence reveals that Bingham held a
cogent theory and clearly expressed his intent that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment include the Bill of Rights.").
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understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause beyond its most
formidable nemesis: Justice Samuel Miller's opinion for the Court in the
infamous Slaughter-House Cases.
A number of prominent incorporationist scholars, including Curtis and
Aynes, as well as Laurence Tribe and David Richards, have expressly
called on the Supreme Court to overrule Slaughter-House.4 I must admit
that the thought of the Supreme Court overruling Slaughter-House is
enticing. But is it really necessary for the Court to take such a dramatic
step? In my view, the Framers' purpose of incorporating Bill of Rights
freedoms through the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be
accomplished without disturbing the Slaughter-House precedent. In this
Article, I argue, contrary to the almost crushing weight of conventional
wisdom, 5 that Justice Miller's majority opinion in Slaughter-House did not
14. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 216 (1993); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-6, at 1320-31 (3d ed. 1999); Aynes, supra note 12, at 103;
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 102-05 (1996). Recognizing that the Supreme Court has
"uniformly deferred for over a century to the interpretation given to the [Privileges or Immunitiesl
Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases" and that, therefore, "the most serious objection to any
attempt to restore to the Privileges or Immunities Clause its intended role in protecting individual
rights would be advanced under the doctrine of stare decisis," Laurence Tribe has mounted an
impressive argument why considerations of stare decisis do not require continued allegiance to
Slaughter-House and why the decision therefore ought to be forthrightly overruled. TRIBE. supra,
§ 7-6, at 1320.
15. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1538 (1999) (Thomas, J.. dissenting) ("The
Slaughter-House Cases sapped the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause of any meaning."); AMAR.
supra note 12, at 176 ("Miller's argument... seemed to resist, if not reject, total incorporation of
the first eight amendments."); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 180 (1990)
("[T]he privileges and immunities clause[] has remained the cadaver that it was left by the
Slaughter-House Cases."); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION 965 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953) (" [T]he privileges and immunities
clause [was] ... rendered a 'practical nullity' by a single decision of the Supreme Court rendered
within five years after its ratification."); CURTIS, supra note 12, at 175 (" [Bly its construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment [in Slaughter-House,] the Court effectively nullified the intent to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states."); 2 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION 423 (1907) (placing the discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases within a
chapter entitled "The Undoing of Reconstruction"); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 205 (commenting that Justice Miller's "opinion in the Slaughter
House Cases of 1873 ... set the pattern of narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment for
a long time"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1992) ("Through judicial interpretation.
the Court has rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause a nullity."); Curtis, supra note 14, at
76 (" [Slaughter-House] left protections of Bill of Rights liberties to the tender mercies of the very
states that had so recently made mincemeat of them."); Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great
Justice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892, in THE BACON LECTURES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES: 1940-1950, at 425, 458 (1953) ("Justice Miller. for
a bare majority of the Court, construed the Amendment narrowly .... The privileges and
immunities clause was virtually scratched from the Constitution."); Morton J. Horwitz. The
Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 84 (1993) ("Justice Miller's opinion...
virtually emptied the Privileges and Immunities Clause of content .... "); Kurland, supra note 12,
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foreclose the possibility of incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Not once in the decision did
the Court seriously suggest-much less hold-that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not incorporate Bill of Rights freedoms, as the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers had clearly said the Clause would. In
fact, to the extent that the Court's opinion in Slaughter-House says anything
about incorporation-and I, for one, believe that it does-it suggests that
core Bill of Rights freedoms are among the "privileges [and] immunities of
citizens of the United States" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.1
6
And although a handful of commentators have hinted at a belief that Justice
Miller's Slaughter-House opinion might be read to leave the door open to
incorporation,1" none has yet provided a sustained defense of an
incorporationist interpretation. Articulating such a defense is precisely what
this Article aims to do. My alternative, incorporationist reading of Miller's
Slaughter-House opinion, I hope to show, is not only strongly suggested by
both the text and the context of the decision itself, but is also firmly
supported by core tenets of Miller's own jurisprudential philosophy.
In Part II, I provide a brief sketch of the orthodox, anti-incorporationist
interpretation of the Slaughter-House opinion. For obvious reasons, I
expect to break no new ground in Part II. In fact, the unoriginality of my
Part II illustrates precisely the point I am trying to make about the
conventional reading: Part II chronicles an interpretation of Slaughter-
House upon which, as one scholar has put it, "virtually every modem
commentator is in agreement." "8 In Part III, I shift gears and delve deeply
at 408 ("The commencement of the judicial history of privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States lies in the Slaughter-House Cases, which provided both a beginning and an end."
(citation omitted)); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Inmmunities Clause, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1241, 1241 (1998) (observing that the Slaughter-House Court "read the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment out of the Constitution by construing it into
irrelevancy"); J. Harvie Willdnson III, The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 45 (1989) (" Hopes for a broad reading of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause were dashed by the famous Slaughter-House Cases of 1873." (citation
omitted)).
16. It is not my purpose in this Article to delineate the precise boundaries of the theory of
incorporation contemplated by the Court's opinion in Slaughter-House. Rather, my objective is
simply to demonstrate that there is nothing in Slaughter-House that forecloses incorporation of
Bill of Rights freedoms through the Privileges or Immunities Clause and that, in fact. Justice
Miller's opinion actually provides support for some not insubstantial theory of incorporation. As
to scope, -for reasons that will become clear in the remainder of the Article, Miller's opinion
probably calls for some version of what Akhil Amar has called "refined incorporation" -that is, a
theory of incorporation that means both less and more than a jot-for-jot absorption of the first
eight amendments. See AMAR, supra note 12, at 218.
17. See ELY, supra note 12, at 196 n.59; TRIBE, supra note 14, § 7-3. at 1307; Amar, The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amerzdment, supra note 12, at 1258; Robert C. Palmer, The
Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cnrikshank. and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 739, 744-48.
18. Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation-The Uses and Limitations of
Original Intent, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 275, 282 (1986); see also Richard L. Aynes, Constricting
the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases.
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into the circumstances surrounding the Slaughter-House litigation and
carefully dissect the opinions of Justice Miller and of the dissenting
Justices. I hope to show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is
nothing in Miller's opinion that negates a role for the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms against
the states, and that, in fact, a more plausible reading of Miller's opinion
specifically preserves such a role for the Clause. Miller's opinion
suggests-both on its own terms and, even more clearly, in the context of
the radical, freewheeling theories of the Fourteenth Amendment offered by
counsel for the plaintiffs and endorsed by the dissenting Justices-a
"compromise" interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Under
this compromise interpretation, the Clause serves as a vehicle for the
protection, not of all personal rights, but of what I will call "uniquely
federal" rights, a category that Miller seemed in Slaughter-House to
suggest included many of the freedoms enumerated in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution.
In Part IV, I take a step back to survey the "bigger picture." I hope to
show that my incorporationist interpretation of Miller's Slaughter-House
opinion is not merely a wrenching of the opinion's text or a manipulation of
ambiguous language, but is instead one that is confirmed by convincing
evidence relating to Justice Miller's own general jurisprudential philosophy
and that accords with Miller's voting patterns in other Reconstruction-era
cases. Finally, Part V concludes by tracing the practical implications of my
concededly unorthodox-though I believe ultimately correct-
understanding of Slaughter-House. Most obviously and importantly, my
reading would permit courts to lay aside the historically confused and
semantically untenable doctrine of "substantive due process," a doctrine
that has for years visited suspicion and disrepute on the judiciary's attempt
to protect even textually specified constitutional freedoms, such as those set
out in the Bill of Rights, against state interference.
In the end, I believe that by reconceiving the way we read Slaughter-
House, we might set incorporationism straight.
II. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES: THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
In this Part, I lay out in simple fashion the traditional interpretation of
the Slaughter-House Cases, relying very heavily, for obvious reasons, on
verbatim quotations from Justice Miller's opinion for the Court. This Part
seeks to demonstrate how easy it would be (and has been) for casual readers
to conclude, as they have for years, that Miller's opinion in Slaughter-
70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 627, 627 (1994) ("'[E]veryone' agrees [that] the Court [in Slaughter-
House] incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause .... ).
[Vol. 109: 643
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House rejected any significant role for the Privileges or Immunities Clause
in the protection of individual rights generally, and in the incorporation of
Bill of Rights freedoms more specifically.
A. The Facts
On March 8, 1869, Louisiana's Reconstruction legislature enacted a
law entitled "An Act To Protect the Health of the City of New Orleans, To
Locate the Stocklandings and Slaughterhouses, and To Incorporate the
'Crescent City LiveStock Landing and SlaughterHouse Company."" 9 The
statute conferred upon the newly created Crescent City Company "the sole
and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on the live-stock landing
and slaughter-house business" in and around the city of New Orleans and
"order[ed] the closing up of all other stock-landings and slaughter-houses"
in the area.20 Local butchers excluded by the monopoly sued, claiming an
"interest, a privilege, [and] a property, in their labor."'" The state-
sanctioned monopoly, they contended, denied them their right to work and
consequently violated, among other provisions, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.' The Slaughter-House Cases thus provided the
Supreme Court with its first opportunity to construe the Fourteenth
Amendment, which the states had ratified five years earlier in 1868.
B. Justice Miller's Majority Opinion
Justice Samuel Miller delivered the opinion for a bare 5-4 majority
denying the butchers' claims. At the very outset of his opinion, the
conventional account goes, Miller made perfectly clear his intention to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly. Referencing the history of
the Civil War, "fresh within the memory of us all," '3 Miller concluded that
each of the Reconstruction Amendments 2-and particularly the
19. Act of Mar. 8, 1869, No. 117, 1869 La. Acts 170.
20. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36. 59-60 (1873).
21. Slaughter-House Cases, 21 L. Ed. 395, 395 (1873) (argument of John A. Campbell on
behalf of plaintiffs).
22. See id. at 396-99. The butchers also argued that the monopoly created an involuntary
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and infringed their rights under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 396-97. The
Court's analysis, however, focused almost exclusively on the interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. See infra note 27.
23. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68.
24. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, were the Thirteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1865, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for a crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."), and the Fifteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1870, see U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United
2000]
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Fourteenth-was intended primarily as a measure to ensure the freedom of
the emancipated slaves:
[O]n the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of
each, and without which none of them would have been even
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.'
And, although Miller acknowledged that blacks were not the only persons
entitled to invoke the protection of the Reconstruction Amendments,26
conventional wisdom holds that his pointed reference to slavery clearly
suggested his inclination to read those amendments conservatively.
Turning to the substance of the butchers' claims, Miller focused almost
exclusively on their argument under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.27
Miller first turned to the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which defined for the first time in American constitutional history the
concept of national citizenship: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."2 8 Miller acknowledged
that by this provision the Fourteenth Amendment had overruled the
infamous Dred Scott case; 29 he concluded, however, that the "more
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
25. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71; see also id. at 67 ("The most cursory glance
at these articles discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the
times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their
true meaning.").
26. See id. at 72 ("We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in [the] protection
[of the Reconstruction Amendments].").
27. Miller dismissed both the due process and the equal protection arguments with little more
than a wave of the hand. He observed that "[t]he argument ha[d] not been much pressed in these
cases that the defendant's charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of
law, or that it denies to them the equal protection of the law." Id. at 80. As to the Due Process
Clause, he simply stated, without elaboration, that
under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem
admissible, can the restraint imposed by the state of Louisiana upon the exercise of
their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property
within the meaning of that provision.
Id. at 81. Turning to the Equal Protection Clause-seemingly the most natural provision under
which to attack a state statute that explicitly, and perhaps arbitrarily, discriminated between state
citizens-Justice Miller held that "[wle doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will
ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." Id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
29. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding, inter alia, that blacks
were not, and could not constitutionally become, citizens of the United States).
[Vol. 109: 643
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important" observation regarding the Citizenship Clause was "that the
distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a
state is clearly recognized and established." '  This distinction, Miller
reasoned, had profound significance for the proper interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, which "speaks only of privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of
citizens of the several States."'" Consequently, in the wake of the
Fourteenth Amendment there existed two distinct citizenships, state and
national, each with its own distinct set of concomitant rights.
In fleshing out the distinction between state and national rights, Miller
turned to the language of the "original" Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. ' 3- For
interpretive guidance, he referred to Corfield v. Coryell," the most
noteworthy contemporary construction of the Article IV provision, in which
Justice Bushrod Washington had given the original Privileges and
Immunities Clause an exceptionally broad construction. Quoting Corfield,
Miller observed that Article IV protected "those privileges and immunities
which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments. 9 34 These included "protection by the government," the
"right to acquire and possess property of every kind," and the right "to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety." 3 With respect to the broadly
defined privileges and immunities mentioned by Justice Washington in
Corfield, Miller concluded that
[t]hroughout his opinion, they are spoken of as rights belonging to
the individual as a citizen of a state. They are so spoken of in the
constitutional provision which he was construing. And they have
always been held to be the class of rights which the State
governments were created to establish and secure. 6
As commentators who subscribe to the orthodox account of Slaughter-
House correctly point out, in reaching this conclusion, Justice Miller
30. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73.
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 75 (quoting U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2. cl. 1). It is important to note that there are two
clauses in the Constitution that purport to protect "privileges" and - immunities." The first, found
in Article IV, Section 2 and directly at issue in Corfield %'. Coryell. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.ED. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230), is the Privileges and Immunities Clause; and the second, found in Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and more directly at issue in this Article. is the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The confusion is compounded by the fact that many commentators refer
inaccurately to the Fourteenth Amendment provision as the " Privileges and Immunities Clause."
33. 6 F. Cas. 546.
34. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76 (quoting Corfield. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52).
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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actually misquoted both Article IV, Section 2 and Justice Washington's
opinion in a way that would certainly appear to aid a state-rights reading.
Whereas Miller's quotations from both the constitutional text and
Washington's Corfield opinion refer to the privileges and immunities of
"citizens of the several states" -suggesting that it is by virtue of state
citizenship that Article IV rights are enjoyed-the original sources actually
refer instead to the privileges and immunities of "citizens in the several
states" -implying that the Article IV provision perhaps protects a uniform
set of national rights of United States citizens valid within any state.37
Justice Bradley, dissenting in Slaughter-House, actually flagged Miller's
error;38 nonetheless, the inaccuracy remained in the final version of the
opinion, raising the specter that Miller had "deliberately misquote[d]" the
provision in order to minimize the Fourteenth Amendment's impact on the
state-federal balance of power.39 In any event, Miller went on to hold that
his broadly conceived class of state privileges and immunities, as
distinguished from the national privileges and immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, "embraces nearly every civil right for the
establishment and protection of which organized government is
instituted." 40
Having concluded that the great mass of civil rights-including the
right to ply one's trade invoked by the butchers-depended for recognition
and protection on state law, Miller asked rhetorically:
Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment... to transfer the
security and protection of all the civil rights which we have
mentioned, from the States to the Federal government? And where
it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that
article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the
37. See, e.g., Aynes, supra note 12, at 98 n.265. Interestingly, there exists persuasive
evidence that a number of influential Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress involved
in framing the Fourteenth Amendment subscribed to this national-rights reading of the original
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. See id. at 69-70 (arguing that John Bingham
subscribed to this view); see also CURTIS, supra note 12, at 42-48, 60-68 (indicating that national-
rights theories of Article IV, Section 2 and Corfield enjoyed broad-based support among leading
Republicans). John Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
almost certainly held such a view, which he explained in 1859: "There is an ellipsis in the
language employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is 'the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States' that it guaranties." CONG.
GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
38. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 117 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("It is pertinent
to observe that both the clause of the Constitution referred to, and Justice Washington in his
comment on it, speak of the privileges and immunities of citizens in a State; not of citizens of a
state.").
39. Louis LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER
To REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 194 (1975); see also Aynes, supra note 18, at 644 ("Miller's
textual argument, distinguishing between the rights of national citizens and the rights of state
citizens, was based upon his deliberate misquotation of Article IV and of the Corfield case.").
40. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76.
[Vol. 109: 643
Setting Incorporationism Straight
entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the
States?"
For Miller, to ask the question was to answer it: "We are convinced that no
such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these
amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them."42
If, however, the privileges and immunities of state citizenship included
"nearly every civil right," as Miller had held, what, if anything, remained
of the "privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States"
specifically protected by the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment?
Although Miller concluded that the Court was "excused from defining the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" because the
right claimed by the butchers was among the privileges and immunities
"which belong to citizens of the states as such," 4 3 he nonetheless went on
to offer what the traditional interpretation of his opinion tells us was a
decidedly cramped explanation of national privileges and immunities.
According to Miller, the only privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment were those rights
"which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National
character, its Constitution, or its laws."" Elaborating on this standard,
Miller compiled a rather pitiful list of freedoms. Among those Miller
mentioned were the rights of the citizen
to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have
upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it,
to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in
administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its
seaports, through which all operations of foreign commerce are
conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice
in the several States."
Miller continued:
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the
care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty,
and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a
foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right
depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
41. Id. at77.
42. Id. at78.
43. Id at 78-79.
44. Id. at 79.
45. Id. (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the
navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate
the territory of the several States, all rights secured to our citizens
by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent upon citizenship of
the United States, and not citizenship of a State. One of these
privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is
that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become
a citizen of any state of the Union by a bondfide residence therein,
with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be
added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of
amendment, and by the [Due Process and Equal Protection]
clause[s] of the fourteenth ... 46
Having catalogued a handful of seemingly worthless rights that he was
prepared to place within the ambit of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Miller abruptly halted his investigation. It was "useless to pursue this
branch of the inquiry," Miller declared, "since we are of [the] opinion that
the rights claimed by these plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are
not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the
meaning of the clause of the fourteenth amendment under consideration." 7
C. The Dissents
Justices Field, Swayne, and Bradley each authored a keen dissent in
Slaughter-House. Of the three, the opinion of Justice Bradley, who while
riding circuit had ruled in favor of the New Orleans butchers on the
privileges-or-immunities issue in the lower federal courts, 8 addressed most
clearly the substantive content of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
particularly as it related to the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms.
"[W]e are not bound to resort to implication, or to the constitutional history
of England to find an authoritative declaration of some of the most
important privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,"
Bradley observed. "It is in the Constitution itself."49 Specifically
mentioning the rights of habeas corpus, trial by jury, free exercise of
religion, free speech, free press, peaceable assembly, and the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Bradley concluded: "These, and still
46. Id. at 79-80.
47. Id. at 80.
48. See Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408) ("But so far as relates to
the question in hand, we may safely say it is one of the privileges of every American citizen to
adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit-not injurious to the community-as he may see
fit .... ).
49. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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others are specified in the original Constitution, or in the early amendments
of it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States ... ."" Justice Field, whose opinion focused on the historic and
near-unanimous common-law condemnation of state-sanctioned
monopolies, emphasized the centralizing character of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5' He argued that the amendment had been adopted in order to
"place the common rights of American citizens under the protection of the
National government.15 2 The majority's unnecessarily narrow construction
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Field insisted, ignored this
fundamental purpose, and rendered that provision "a vain and idle
enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited
Congress and the people on its passage."53 Justice Swayne sounded a
similar lament, one often repeated by critics of Justice Miller's
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause:' "The construction
adopted by the majority... [is] much too narrow .... [lit turns, as it were,
what was meant for bread into a stone." 55
So what, precisely, is the upshot of the conventional reading of
Slaughter-House, the account to which we have all grown so accustomed?
It seems fairly clear: When one couples Justice Miller's conclusion that
state privileges and immunities "embrace[d] nearly every civil right for the
establishment and protection of which organized government is
instituted"56 with the brief list of obscure rights he mentioned as
representative of the class of federal privileges and immunities, the
Slaughter-House majority's opinion does indeed seem, as one conventional
commentator remarked, to "make [the] Privileges and Immunities Clause
completely nugatory and useless." 57 The opinion appears conclusively to
deny the Clause any independent role in the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the states-a denial seemingly made even more stark in light
of Justice Bradley's explicit invocation, in dissent, of several Bill of Rights
freedoms as among federal privileges and immunities.
For most, if not all, of us, this account is undoubtedly a familiar one.
But let us not forget, as John Hart Ely has remarked in an only slightly
50. Id. at 118-19.
51. See id. at 101-08 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field penned the principal Slaughter-
House dissent, in which Justices Bradley and Swayne, and Chief Justice Chase concurred.
52. Id. at 93.
53. Id. at 96.
54. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Transfornmation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections
from the Admission of Maryland's First Black Laityers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 1025 (1985):
Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application Against the States, 44
FLA. L. REV. 219, 223 n.12 (1992); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits
on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 8 (1987).
55. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne. J., dissenting).
56. ld. at76.
57. 2 WLiAm WiNsLow CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONsTrrrnoN IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 1119 (1953).
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different context, that "familiarity breeds inattention. ' 58 And it is
inattention to the Slaughter-House Cases-simple blind-faith acceptance of
the traditional, anti-incorporationist interpretation-that has for years
plagued the incorporation doctrine. In the remainder of this Article, I hope
to refocus our careful attention on Slaughter-House and to demonstrate how
a better understanding of it might go a long way toward restoring long-lost
textual and historical integrity to the incorporation doctrine.
III. THE SLA UGHTER-HOUSE CASES: A SECOND LOOK
A. The Butchers' Claims and the Dissenters' Response: A "Radical" View
of the Fourteenth Amendment
Although it is commonly said that the Court in Slaughter-House
"implicitly rejected.., the position that all the Bill of Rights guarantees
were made applicable to the states by the post-Civil War constitutional
changes,"59 it is important to remember that none of the rights set forth in
the first eight amendments was at issue in the case. Rather, the butchers'
claim, as articulated by their lead counsel, John Campbell (himself a retired
U.S. Supreme Court Justice), 60 was that "their investment of capital, their
locations for trade, their hopes and calculations in business ha[d] been
frustrated." 6' And although he made passing reference to the freedoms of
speech and of the press, the rights to trial by jury and to counsel, and the
privilege of habeas corpus as freedoms "incorporated in the bill of
rights,"62 Campbell did not rely on explicit textual guarantees in making the
butchers' argument. He knew it would be useless to do so. (There is, of
course, no right to pursue lawful employment specified in the text of either
the original Constitution or the Bill of Rights.) 63 Indeed, Campbell candidly
conceded to the Court at oral argument that there was no specific textual
58. ELY, supra note 12, at 18 ("Familiarity breeds inattention, and we apparently need
periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green
pastel redness."').
59. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410 (12th ed. 1991).
60. Campbell had resigned from the Court when his home state of Alabama seceded from the
Union. See William Gillette, John A. Campbell, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 927, 936 (Leon Friedman &
Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
61. Brief for Plaintiffs, Slaughter-House (Nos. 475-480), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535.
537-38 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
62. It at 559.
63. Interestingly, there were attempts to include an anti-monopoly provision in the Bill of
Rights; however, those efforts failed. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 59-60 (1965) (describing the




basis in the Constitution for the right he claimed on behalf of his clients.
"There is not," he admitted, "a grant of this right nor a prohibition of its
violation in direct terms." 6'
But Campbell did not see himself as being bound by constitutional text.
Instead, he maintained that it was a "general principle of the law" that
"every person has individually, and the public have collectively, a right to
require that the course of trade should be free from unreasonable
obstruction." ' Plying one's trade unhindered by government regulation,
Campbell insisted, was a "natural right of the person." 6 From where,
though, if not the Constitution's text, did Campbell derive this "general
principle," this "natural right," which he sought to read into the Privileges
or Immunities Clause? For starters, he acknowledged the writings of a
handful of political philosophers, including Alexis de Tocqueville, Sir
Walter Scott, Edmund Burke, Thomas Macaulay, Toussaint L'Ouverture,
and Adam Smith. Most prominently, however, Campbell staked his
constitutional argument on the common law's historical prohibition of
monopoly power. Time and again, Campbell referred to the right to pursue
an occupation as a "common right." 67 A "common right," legal
dictionaries and judicial decisions of the day confirm, was, as its name
implies, a right rooted in the common law. An early edition of Black's Law
Dictionary, for instance, defined "common right" to mean "(a] term
applied to rights, privileges, and immunities appertaining to and enjoyed by
all citizens equally and in common, and which have their foundation in the
common law."' An 1882 California state-court decision that Black's cited
for its definition of "common right" provided a more comprehensive
explanation-an explanation which, significantly, expressly inchded
common-law rights and expressly excluded constitutional and statutory
rights:
[Wihat is the "common right" here referred to? Is it not a right
which pertains to citizens by the coimmon law, the investiture of
which is not to be looked for in any special law, whether
established by a Constitution or an Act of the Legislature? Coke
says: "De commun droit-of common right-this is by the
common law, because the common law is the best and most
common birthright that the subject hath for the safeguard and
defense not only of his goods, lands, and revenues, but of his wife
64. Plaintiffs' Oral Argument, Slaughter-House (Nos. 475-480) (Feb. 3-4. 1873). in 6
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 61, at 733, 757.
65. Il
66. Id at758.
67. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 61, at 546-47, 557, 575; Plaintiffs' Brief upon the Re-
argument, Slaughter-House (Nos. 475-480), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 61, at
639,649,661.
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (2d ed. 1910) (emphasis added).
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and children .... This common law of England is sometimes called
right, sometimes common right, and sometimes communisjustitia.'"
We are of [the] opinion that the common right refers to the
right of citizens generally at common law.69
Campbell's usage of the phrase "common right" was not accidental.
His argument makes it clear that he appreciated the term's common-law
signification: "[The rights claimed] live in the consciousness of the
people," Campbell declared, "and are called the people's rights-the
common right-the common law, and are the product of the common mind
of the people, living and working in individuals, and which each individual
recognizes to be necessarily law, and conforms his daily practice to it." 70
Citing among other sources Lord Coke's report of the Case of
Monopolies,7 1 Campbell pointed out that "[t]he common law of England
recognized at a very early period as a common right, that of selecting and
following a vocation.,71 The common law of the United States, he insisted,
was "in the most important particulars in harmony with that of Great
Britain on the subject.", 73 Under the common law as inherited from
England, Campbell argued, "every person ha[d] a right as between him and
his fellow-citizen to full freedom in disposing of his labor or capital
according to his own will."'74 By the Louisiana Act, "[t]he common rights
of men ha[d] been taken away, and ha[d] become the sole and exclusive
privilege of a single corporation." 75
Standing alone, Campbell's emphasis on the common-law pedigree of
the fight to work was not particularly novel. What was novel was
Campbell's understanding of the relationship between the common-law
fights of contract and property and the newly ratified Fourteenth
Amendment. In essence, what Campbell urged was that the Fourteenth
Amendment had federalized-indeed, constitutionalized-the panoply of
economic common-law freedoms, including the fight to pursue an
occupation. The "relations of labor and the fights of laboring men," which
had traditionally been protected by the common law, were, Campbell
argued, "deserving a place in public law." 76 In other words, because the
common law safeguarded the fight to work claimed by the butchers, the
Fourteenth Amendment should do likewise. Campbell contended that
69. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 107 (1882) (citing SIR EDWARD
COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142a (1628)).
70. Plaintiffs' Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 67, at 660 (emphasis added).
71. 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (Q.B. 1602).
72. Plaintiffs' Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 67, at 661.
73. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 61, at 560.
74. Id. at 541.
75. Id. at 547 (emphasis omitted).
76. Id. at 571.
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the words [of the Privileges or Immunities Clause] are suitable, and
have been employed to describe the personal rights-the civil
rights which usage, tradition, habitudes of society, written law, and
the common sentiment of the people have recognized as forming
the basis of the institutions of the entire country."
Referring to his argument as a mere "exposition of the Constitutions of all
the States and of the American common law," Campbell declared:
It is not a discovery that life, liberty, property, protection, privilege,
and immunity are held by individual and personal titles. They were
claimed as the sacred inheritance of our people, brought to this
continent by the first colonists, and maintained with heroic and
magnanimous efforts.... What the 14th amendment was designed
to accomplish was to afford a permanent and powerful guarantee
to them. This consisted in the recognition of them as the assured
estate of the population, and the withdrawal from the States of any
power to abridge or to destroy them.7
Put simply, what were at common law "the unchartered prerogatives of
every individual man ... are now the constitutional inviolable rights of an
American citizen.""
Campbell's argument on behalf of the butchers was one of remarkable
breadth. What Campbell proposed was, in essence, a wholesale transfer of
authority over individual rights-including traditional, common-law rights
of contract and property-from the states to the federal government. "The
entire body of the personal rights of mnen that State governments ought not
to destroy or impair," Campbell insisted, "have been placed under the
guardianship of the government of the United States."' Charles Fairman, a
prominent scholar of Reconstruction-era constitutional history, accurately
described Campbell's proposal as a "tour-de-force." 8' Fairman summarized
Campbell's argument as follows: "[A]s the courts had shaped the common
law in accord with the needs of society, henceforth the Court should find
authority in the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize whatever was
'consequential' to national citizenship.""2 And clearly in Campbell's mind,
the most "consequential" rights were economic rights-business
freedoms-such as the rights to make and enforce contracts, to own
77. Plaintiffs' Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 67. at 659.
78. Id at 665 (emphasis added).
79. Id at 683.
80. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 61, at 552 (emphasis added).
81. Charles Fairman, Samuel F. Miller, Justice of the Supreme Court. 1862-1890, 10 VAND.
L. REV. 193, 198 (1957).
82. CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 1345 (Vol. VI of
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court (Paul A. Freund ed.)).
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property, and to pursue gainful employment. By emphasizing the common
law's historical condemnation of monopolies, Campbell had attempted "to
persuade the Court that it was part of the 'privileges and immunities,' the
'liberty and property' of the citizen to live under a system of economic
laissez faire." 83
Thomas Durant, who argued the case for the Crescent City Livestock
Company, objected that Campbell's emphasis on natural rights and
common-law freedoms rendered his construction of the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause virtually illimitable. Under Campbell's
reading, Durant warned, the Court would have to invalidate every law that
implicated economic freedom in any respect. Government charters of all
kinds-including those for canals, bridges, and railroads-would fall.
States would also be forbidden from regulating the manufacture and storage
of dangerous substances such as gunpowder and petroleum, from
prescribing working hours or labor conditions, and from imposing licensing
fees and taxes on professions.' Durant also balked at Campbell's
"historical and romantic illustrations of the evils of monopolies." 85 " What
is said of them as they figure in Great Britain is not strictly applicable to the
case before us," Durant argued.8 6 "The sole question.., for this court is
whether the State of Louisiana in granting this monopoly has deprived the
plaintiffs in error of any right, privilege, or title guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States."87 The right to work claimed by
Campbell on behalf of the butchers, Durant insisted, simply did not
"touch[] the relation of the individual to the Government in his character of
'citizen' of the United States," as required by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.88
Notwithstanding the breadth of his position and the freewheeling nature
of the inquiry he proposed, Campbell succeeded in persuading four
members of the Supreme Court that his view of the Fourteenth Amendment
was the correct one. As had Campbell, Justice Stephen Field, who authored
the principal dissent in Slaughter-House, expressly disavowed any reliance
on explicit constitutional provisions to support his position: "[G]rants of
exclusive privileges, such as is made by the act in question, are opposed to
the whole theory of free government, and it requires no aid from any bill of
83. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 181
(1939); see also FAIRMAN, supra note 82, at 1319 ("[Campbell's] effort made the Amendment
seem from the start to face toward economic liberty, 'laissez faire."').
84. See Brief for Defendants, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Nos.
475-480), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 61, at 731.
85. Id. at 722.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at731.
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rights to render them void." 89 Field turned instead to two extratextual
sources for an explanation of the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. First, he invoked the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 1866. He
concluded that the phrase "privileges or immunities" included the
freedoms catalogued in section 1 of the Act, namely, the rights "to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property." ' However, whereas the Civil Rights Act secured only an
equality of civil rights between whites and blacks,9' Justice Field sought to
provide absolute protection for those rights by way of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, which (unlike the Civil Rights Act) was framed in
categorical terms.
Following Campbell's lead, Justice Field also made frequent reference
to the common law. As had Campbell, Field continually mentioned the
right to pursue lawful employment as being one of the "common rights" of
citizens.92 He invoked the Case of Monopolies and a handful of state-court
decisions' in support of the proposition that "[a]il monopolies in any
known trade or manufacture... encroach upon the liberty of citizens to
acquire property and pursue happiness" and are therefore "void at common
law." ' And because they were void at common law, Justice Field posited,
they were also contrary to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Just as
Campbell had argued, Justice Field concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment had, in effect, constitutionalized common-law economic
rights:
If the trader in London could plead that he was a free citizen of that
city against the enforcement to his injury of monopolies, surely
under the fourteenth amendment every citizen of the United States
should be able to plead his citizenship of the republic as a
protection against any similar invasion of his privileges and
immunities. 95
89. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 (Field, J., dissenting).
90. Id at96 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27).
91. The Civil Rights Act provided that all United States citizens "shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens." Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1 (emphasis added).
92. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 89, 93, 97, 105 (Field, J., dissenting).
93. See if. at 106-09 (citing Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co.. 25 Conn. 19
(1856); City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 mL 90 (1867); Mayor of Hudson v. Thome, 7 Paige Ch.
261 (N.Y. Ch. 1838)).
94. Id. at 101-02.
95. Id at 105-06.
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
Justice Bradley concurred in Justice Field's dissenting opinion, but
wrote separately to express his own, slightly different, understanding of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. On the one hand, Justice Bradley's
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment was less untethered than Justice
Field's.96 Bradley specifically referred to several Bill of Rights freedoms as
"some of the most important privileges and immunities" of United States
citizens:
[Some privileges and immunities] of the greatest consequence were
enumerated, although they were only secured, in express terms,
from invasion by the Federal government; such as the right of
habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious
worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right
peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
above all, and including almost all the rest, the right of not being
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
These, and still others are specified in the original Constitution, or
in the early amendments of it, as among the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, or, what is still stronger
for the force of the argument, the rights of all persons, whether
citizens or not.97
Justice Bradley did not, however, stop with the Bill of Rights. Like
Campbell and Field, he knew that specific constitutional guarantees were of
no particular use to the butchers. He concluded, therefore, that
[i]t was not necessary to say in words that the citizens of United
States should have and exercise all the privileges of citizens; the
privilege of buying, selling and enjoying property; the privilege of
engaging in any lawful employment for a livelihood; the privilege
of resorting to the laws for redress of injuries, and the like. Their
very citizenship conferred these privileges .... 98
The right to choose and follow one's calling, whether specifically
enumerated or not, was "essential and fundamental" and hence, Justice
Bradley concluded, constitutional."
96. Cf FAIRMAN, supra note 82, at 1387 ("The 'liberty' and 'property' secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court came to give them content, were self-regarding rights,
serving the individual's material prosperity. Bradley's conception of the privileges of citizenship
embraced rights of a more humane order, according to the citizen an effective participation as a
member of the national community.").
97. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).




Taking their cue from Campbell, the Slaughter-House dissenters
"would have wielded the [Privileges or Immunities] clause as a powerful
weapon against state interference with laissez-faire economics."to They
saw the Fourteenth Amendment "as a substantive restraint on state power
to regulate the rights of property owners." ' To the Slaughter-House
dissenters, the Fourteenth Amendment was not (at least primarily) about
Bill of Rights freedoms at all; it was about the common-law rights of
contract and property. And although they came up one vote shy in
Slaughter-House, the dissenters' view of the Fourteenth Amendment as
absolutely protecting common-law economic freedoms would eventually, if
only temporarily, win out in practice. In Slaughter-House, Justices Field,
Bradley, and Swayne laid the intellectual foundation for the protection of
economic rights through substantive due process doctrine, an approach that
is most commonly associated with Lochner v. New Yorklr" and that
dominated Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence throughout the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Philip Kurland has remarked,
"What Justice Field and his minority failed to secure by way of the
privileges or immunities clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, Field and his
henchmen certainly accomplished by way of due process decisions in the
years immediately following the Slaughter-House decision." " Indeed,
remarkably, only a quarter century after the book was closed on the
Slaughter-House controversy, the Supreme Court in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana'04 recognized, under the guise of the Due Process Clause, a right
"of the citizen to be free... to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any livelihood or avocation." By the turn of the century,
Campbell's view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
constitutionalizing ordinary, common-law rights had prevailed, only under
another name: substantive due process. 1
6
100. Wilkinson, supra note 15, at 46.
101. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 686 (Kermit L Hall ed., 1992)
[hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION].
102. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103. Kurland, supra note 12, at 414; see also Wilkinson, supra note 15. at 49 ("What could
not be accomplished through the Privileges or Immunities Clause was soon achieved through the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the line of cases exemplified by
Lochner.").
104. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
105. Id. at589.
106. Both Lochner and the brand of constitutional thinking it has come to represent were
repudiated by the Supreme Court in 1937. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). For more on the relevance of Lochner, see infra text accompanying notes 478-481.
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B. Justice Miller's Majority Opinion: A "Compromise" View of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Proponents of the conventional, anti-incorporationist reading of
Slaughter-House maintain that, in view of Campbell's sweeping argument,
"Miller and his four assenting Brothers saw only two alternatives: to
restrict the Privileges or Immunities Clause to nearly nothing, or to interpret
it as the self-executing source of a full panoply of legal rights (including
business freedoms) to be enforced by the Court." "o Faced with a choice
between these two extremes, the argument continues, Miller "felt driven to
a construction that made the clause trivial." 108 I disagree. The majority's
rejection of the revolutionary view of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused
by Campbell and endorsed by the dissenters does not in any way render the
Privileges or Immunities Clause "trivial." There is nothing in Miller's
opinion, for instance, that forecloses the decidedly nontrivial notion that the
Clause incorporated Bill of Rights freedoms. In fact, there is an eminently
reasonable reading of Miller's opinion-a reading explored in this
Section-that suggests quite the opposite. According to this alternative
reading of Slaughter-House, Miller steered a middle course between radical
and trivializing interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
opted for a "compromise" interpretation of sorts. As Miller saw things, the
Clause did not protect all personal rights (including the ordinary common-
law interests invoked by the butchers); rather, it protected only "uniquely
federal" rights-a class of rights that included many of the freedoms
contained in the federal Bill of Rights.
What follows in this Section is a detailed examination of Miller's
opinion for the Court. Ordinarily, of course, the views of a single Justice-
even one writing for the Court-would not warrant such careful scrutiny.
Justice Miller, however, was not just the author of the Court's opinion in
Slaughter-House; he was also the critical fifth vote in favor of the theory of
the Fourteenth Amendment adopted by the Court. Hence, Miller's opinion
is doubly significant to the subsequent course of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. The importance of Miller's opinion is captured in the
following statement by a commentator who subscribes to the conventional
account of Slaughter-House: "In 1873, in the Slaughter-House
Cases... the Supreme Court said that the phrase 'privileges and
immunities' had nothing to do with applying the Bill of Rights to the states.
The vote was a narrow 5-4-one vote switch might have changed the
course of history." '9 Clearly, Miller's words-as well as the ideas and
107. LUSKY, supra note 39, at 199.
108. FAIRMAN, supra note 82, at 1354.
109. Wermiel, supra note 1, at 124 (emphasis added).
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philosophies behind his words-are vitally important to a proper
understanding of the Court's Slaughter-House decision.
In dissecting Miller's majority opinion, it is important to keep in mind
both the identity of the Slaughter-House plaintiffs and the nature of their
claim. These were white butchers (not recently freed slaves) seeking
absolute protection (not a mere equality of protection) for an unenumerated
economic freedom (not a right catalogued in the Bill of Rights). There is no
doubt that Miller rejected both the butchers' claim that the monopoly
constituted an "invasion of private right" " and Campbell's theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment on which the butchers' argument rested. But in so
doing, he did not reject the notion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
incorporated the Bill of Rights against state governments. Nothing Miller
said gives rise to the inference that he sought to preclude the incorporation
of Bill of Rights freedoms. In fact, a more reasonable reading of Miller's
Slaughter-House opinion suggests a distinction between the common-law
economic rights claimed by the butchers, which the Fourteenth Amendment
did not safeguard against state interference, and core Bill of Rights
freedoms, which it did.
Miller's majority opinion comprises three fairly distinct parts. In the
first,"' Miller recounted the immediate history of the Reconstruction
Amendments-a history "fresh within the memory of us all" "2 -and
emphasized that, above all else, the amendments were aimed at ensuring the
"freedom of the slave race." "13 In the second," 4 he identified the personal
rights that remained under the control of state governments, even after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, in the third,"5 Miller
offered a brief exposition of the freedoms that did indeed fit within the
phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" and were
therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state intrusion. In
explaining Miller's opinion, I begin with his discussion of state privileges
and immunities, then go on to his examination of the federal rights
protected by Privileges or Immunities Clause, and conclude with his
analysis of the "immediate history" of the Reconstruction Amendments.
After carefully considering all three parts against the background of the
sweeping interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment advanced by the
butchers and adopted by the dissenters, I believe that a sophisticated,
nuanced, "compromise" theory of the Fourteenth Amendment will
emerge-one that is neither radical nor trivial.
110. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 61 (1873).
111. The first part of Justice Miller's opinion spans roughly pages 67-72.
112. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68.
113. Id. at 71.
114. The second part spans pages 72-79.
115. The third part spans pages 79-80.
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1. Which Rights Remained Subject to State Definition and Control?
Recall that Justice Miller began by observing that in the Fourteenth
Amendment, "the distinction between citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established." 116 The
distinction was significant, Miller reasoned, because the Fourteenth
Amendment "speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the several
States." "7 Only the former were placed "under the protection of the
Federal Constitution";' 8 the latter were "not intended to have any
additional protection" under the Fourteenth Amendment." 9
But what were the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
states-those that "belong[ed] to the citizen of the State as such" and that
"rest[ed] for their security and protection" on state law? 2 ' And, most
significantly for our purposes, were the rights set forth in the first eight
amendments among them?
Miller initiated his inquiry by quoting the original privileges and
immunities provision of the old Articles of Confederation:
[T]hat, the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union,
the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people
of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions
as the inhabitants thereof respectively.' 2
In this provision, Miller remarked, the Articles "specifically mentioned"
some of the privileges and immunities of state citizens. By this, Miller must
have meant the guarantee of "free ingress and regress" and the "privileges
of trade and commerce," the only two rights expressly enumerated in the
Articles' provision. These, he concluded, "glaive some general idea of the
class of civil rights" guaranteed to state citizens under the Constitution. 22
Miller then turned his attention to the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
116. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73.
117. Id. at 74.
118. Id.
119. Id.





Citizens in the several States." '" There could be no doubt, Miller
maintained, that the Article IV provision and its forebear from the Articles
of Confederation covered the same class of rights. To "free ingress and
regress" and the "privileges of trade and commerce," Miller added as state
privileges and immunities the categories of rights described by Justice
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,'2 the "first and leading case"
interpreting Article IV, Section 2. Miller quoted Washington's language at
length:
"The inquiry," [Washington] says, "is, what are the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States? We feel no hesitation
in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities
which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all
free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by
citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What
these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended
under the following general heads: protection by the government,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to
such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general
good of the whole."'2
Washington's description in Corfield, Miller declared, "when taken to
include others not named, but which are of the same general character,
embraces nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of
which organized government is instituted." '2 And all of these rights, Miller
stated, "belong[ed] to the individual as a citizen of a State." ' ' With the
exception of the very few restrictions set out in Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution-the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder,
and laws impairing the obligation of contracts-" the entire domain of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay
within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without
that of the Federal government."28 It simply was not the purpose of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Miller concluded, "to transfer the security
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the
123. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
124. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230): see also supra text accompanying notes
33-37 (discussing the emphasis placed by Miller on Corfield).
125. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 75-76 (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52).
126. Id at 76.
127. hd (emphasis added).
128. lI at 77.
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
States to the Federal government." "29 Put slightly differently, the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not set out "to bring within the power of
Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively
to the States." 130 A contrary conclusion, Miller said, would "constitute [the
Supreme Court] a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the
civil rights of their own citizens." 131 Miller concluded that "no such results
were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by
the legislatures of the States which ratified them." 132
a. "Civil Rights"
Justice Miller almost invariably referred to the class of rights that
remained subject to the control of state governments as "civil rights." What
did he mean? Today, the term "civil rights" might well be used to refer
specifically to Bill of Rights freedoms; at the very least, it would be
understood to include those rights. The current edition of Black's Law
Dictionary, for instance, ties the definition of "civil rights" to the definition
of "civil liberties," which, in turn, it defines as " [p]ersonal, natural rights
guaranteed and protected by the Constitution; e.g. freedom of speech, press,
freedom from discrimination, etc." 133 Hence, under most modern
definitions, Miller's statement that "civil rights" were not among the
freedoms protected against state interference by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would seem to raise serious questions about any
incorporationist reading of his opinion.
Legal historians, however, have uniformly concluded that in the
Reconstruction era, the phrase "civil rights" had an altogether different
meaning from the one that we attach to it today. Herman Beiz, for instance,
has noted that whereas nowadays any "interference with a person's attempt
to exercise free speech or to vote is a violation of civil rights," in the post-
Civil War years the term had a decidedly less "political connotation." 13.
Among the freedoms Belz counted as "civil rights" of the late nineteenth
century were the rights to "work and enjoy the rewards of labor," to "own
or rent property," and to "make contracts and participate in the market





133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990); see also TRIBE, supra note 14. § 7-2. at
1299-1300 (counting among "civil rights" those rights "enumerated in the federal Bill of
Rights").
134. HERMAN BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 109 (1978).
135. Id.
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political in nature." 136 Herbert Hovenkamp has provided a similar
explanation of the term: "[I]n 1868 the concept of 'civil rights' included
two elements: (1) the right to equality of treatment in court trials and of
access to the agencies of the state; and (2) a set of distinctly economic civil
rights, namely, the right to make contracts and the right to own
property." 137 Civil rights, Hovenkamp concluded, "were fundamentally
defined as economic rights."'' 3' Even Charles Fairman, an avid anti-
incorporationist, has said, referring specifically to Miller's Slaughter-House
opinion:
"Civil rights" has come to have a particular connotation: the rights
of members of a racial minority to personal safety, to participation
in the political process, to opportunities for advancement. Justice
Miller was referring to something quite different-the vast field
wherein the State legislated on such matters as family relationships,
the acquisition and disposition of property, business associations,
and the regulation of occupations.'39
The language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 confirms that the term
"civil rights" referred, above all else, to a specific set of economic
freedoms. The Act provided that, within each state, all United States
citizens-black and white alike-should have the same rights "to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property ... ." t~ As Earl Maltz has observed, "the rights conferred by the
Civil Rights Act fall into two classes." "' A few of these are "essentially
elements of the rights to protection by and from government." 4- Most of
the rights set out in the Act, however, are "economic rights, such as the
right to contract and to own and dispose of property." "4 These are the
rights that are "essential to meaningful participation in a free labor-based
economy." 44 During debates on the Act, Senator Willard Saulsbury, an
136. Id.; see also id. (reporting that civil rights were "largely economic in character").
137. HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw. 1836-1937, at 94 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
138. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process. 40 STAN. L
REV. 379, 395 (1988) (footnote omitted).
139. FAiRMAN, supra note 82, at 1352-53.
140. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1. 14 Stat. 27, 27.
141. Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theor " in the
Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 HoUS. L. REV. 221. 250 (1987).
142. Id. (footnote omitted). For a detailed historical explanation of the right to government
protection, see Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical
Inquiry, 22 SAN DEmO L. REV. 499. 507-10 (1985). and Maltz. supra note 141. at 250
(suggesting that the right to government protection was included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
143. Maltz, supra note 141,at 250.
144. Id
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opponent of the bill, objected that "civil rights" was a "generic term which
in its most comprehensive signification includes every species of right." '45
However, the bill's Senate sponsor, Lyman Trumbull, advanced a more
restrained and more nuanced understanding of the term "civil rights," one
that accords with the explanations offered by modern commentators. Asked
for his interpretation of "civil rights," Trumbull simply pointed to the
particulars of the proposed Act:
The first section of the bill defines what I understand to be civil
rights: the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued,
and to give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit to
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property. 6
There is, therefore, much more to Miller's statement that the "civil
rights" of citizens were not among those protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment than meets the eye. Contrary to modern understanding, civil
rights were not the rights to free speech, free press, and free exercise of
religion; nor were they the procedural rights of criminal defendants. Rather,
civil rights were, by and large, economic rights that had their foundation in
the common law. They were in essence the very same rights that Campbell,
in his argument to the Slaughter-House Court, had called "common
rights": rights of contract, property, and employment. Moreover, these civil
rights were not creatures of national lawmaking bodies; instead, they were
traditionally "defined and regulated by state, county, and local law and
custom." 147 Indeed, an 1870 edition of Webster's Dictionary defined the
word "civil" to mean "[p]ertaining to a city or state, or to a citizen in his
relations to his fellow-citizens or to the state; as, civil rights; civil
government." "'
145. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (1866) (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 476.
147. BELZ, supra note 134, at 109.
148. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 234
(Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter eds., Springfield, Mass., G. & C. Merriam, 1870)
(emphasis on "city or state" added); see also WILLIAM C. COCHRAN, THE STUDENTS' LAW
LEXICON 58 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co., 1888) (defining "civil" to mean "pertaining to a
city or state"); 1 JOHN OGILVIE, THE IMPERIAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 480
(Charles Annandale ed., London, Century Co. 1883) (defining "civil" as "[rlelating to the
community, or to the policy and government of the citizens and subjects of a state...; as in the
phrase[] civil rights"); CHARLES RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONAJRY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 321 (London, William Pickering 1836) (defining "civil" to mean "[olf. or belonging,
or pertaining to a city, or state; to the policy or government of a city or state").
Justice Miller was assuredly aware of this ordinary meaning when he used the term "civil
rights." He was fond of invoking dictionary definitions in support of his opinions. See. e.g..
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884); United States v. Germaine,
99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874). He used
language precisely and urged others to do likewise. In an address he delivered in 1879 to the Iowa
State Bar Association, Justice Miller said that "[n]o lawyer's office should be without an
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So when Miller wrote that state-based privileges and immunities
"embrace[d] nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of
which organized government is instituted" '9 and scoffed at the idea that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended "to transfer the
security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned,
from the States to the Federal government," "5 he was not, as is commonly
assumed, in any way casting doubt on the notion that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause had incorporated Bill of Rights freedoms against the
states. He was merely emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment had not
federalized the common-law rules that governed the making of contracts,
the disposition of property, and the regulation of employment. In Slaughter-
House, Miller was faced with butchers claiming a right to pursue a lawful
employment, which was at most an ordinary common-law right, a "civil
right." The butchers' counsel, John Campbell, had invited the Court to hold
that the Fourteenth Amendment provided absolute constitutional protection
for all such "common rights." Justice Miller simply refused this invitation.
b. Corfield Rights
In describing the rights that remained subject to state definition and
control, Justice Miller relied heavily on a passage from Corfield v. Coryell
in which Justice Washington had, according to Miller, given the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 an expansive state-rights
interpretation. What the privileges and immunities of state citizenship were,
Miller wrote, "would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate." 1
However, quoting from Corfield, he observed that these state privileges and
immunities could "be comprehended under the following general heads:
protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject,
nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the
general good of the whole." 152 Significantly, Miller's list of "general
heads" was incomplete. He omitted one of the four heads that Justice
Washington had, in 1823, used to describe state privileges and immunities:
"the enjoyment of life and liberty." 153
unabridged Webster or Worcester dictionary, as well as a good law lexicon." Justice Samuel
Miller, Address Before the Iowa State Bar Association (May 13, 1879). in 20 ALB. L.J. 25, 28
(1879).
149. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 76 (1873) (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
151. 1d at 76 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230)).
15Z Id. at76 (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52).
153. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
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Miller's omission, I would argue, was neither accidental nor
insignificant. The three "heads" that remained in his quotation-the right
to government protection, the right to acquire and hold property, and the
right to pursue happiness-were all classes of interests that, even after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, citizens possessed vis-A-vis their
state governments. The fourth head, however-the "liberty" head-was
not so easily pigeonholed. As explored in greater detail below, Miller
understood that, in the wake of the Fourteenth Amendment, "liberty"
simply was no longer the exclusive province of the states. To be sure,
pieces of the liberty equation remained subject to state definition and
control-common-law contract rights, for instance.1" However, significant
chunks, Bill of Rights freedoms among them, had been placed by the
Fourteenth Amendment under the watchful eye of the federal government.
Recognizing that he could not accurately claim that "the enjoyment of life
and liberty" was, as a wholesale matter, still within the province of state
governments, Miller simply omitted from his quotation that component of
Washington's definition. He used the parts of Corfield's description of state
privileges and immunities-government protection, property rights, and the
pursuit of happiness-that he thought remained valid.
Miller's careful pruning of Corfield's definition is critical because he
referred back to it one page later in characterizing the scope of state
privileges and immunities: "[T he entire domain of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the
constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the
Federal government." 155 When Miller referred to the "above defin[ition],"
he could only have meant his (mis)quotation of Corfield, as it is the only
real "definition" that he had provided. Consequently, when Miller
confirmed that the "entire domain" of pre-Civil War state privileges and
immunities remained with the states, he referred only to that domain insofar
as he had explained it, namely, to exclude an across-the-board vesting of
authority over "liberty" with state governments.
Taken together and properly understood, Miller's repeated use of the
term "civil rights" and his excision of any reference to "liberty" from
Corfield's definition present a significantly different-and substantially
narrower-picture of Slaughter-House-defined state privileges and
immunities than the one to which we have grown so accustomed. True,
Miller's opinion makes clear that civil rights-ordinary common-law
interests-remained subject to state regulation and control. But there is
nothing in Miller's opinion to suggest that fundamental Bill of Rights
freedoms similarly remained within the jurisdiction of the individual states.
154. See supra notes 133-150 and accompanying text.
155. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77 (emphasis added).
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In fact, one interpretation of Miller's opinion, developed below, indicates
just the opposite.
2. Which Rights Were Transferred by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Government?
Having catalogued the personal rights that, despite the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, remained under the control of state governments
(including the rights claimed by the New Orleans butchers), Miller turned
his attention to the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States."' 56 Because the rights "relied on in the [butchers'] argument"-
contract rights, property rights, and the like-were "those which belong[ed]
to citizens of the States as such," and were not "placed under the special
care of the Federal government" 57 by the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller
saw neither a need nor a justification for a comprehensive explanation of
federal privileges and immunities. He nonetheless "venture[d] to suggest"
a few such rights. 5
a. Generally: Rights That "Owe Their Existence" to the
Constitution
Federal privileges and immunities, Miller wrote, were not the common-
law rights and "civil rights" claimed by the butchers. Those rights had their
source in state law and local custom. Rather, federal privileges and
immunities were uniquely federal rights. They were, in Miller's words,
those rights that "ow[ed] their existence to the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws." 1
59
As an initial matter, it is eminently sensible to number the freedoms
listed in the Bill of Rights as among those that "owe their existence to
the ... Constitution." Certainly, in modern parlance, when we speak of
"constitutional" freedoms, we mean to include (perhaps above all others)
those rights memorialized in the first eight amendments.'" Miller
156. Id. at78-79.
157. Id. at 78.
158. Id. at 79.
159. Id. Justice Miller proposed a similar definition in his famous, posthumously published
Lectures on the Constitution of the United States:
The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, are. indeed. protected by this
amendment; but those are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and
essential character of the National Government, and granted or secured by the
Constitution of the United States.
SAMUEL FREEMAN MELLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTrrTnON OF THE UNrITD STATEs 663
(New York, Banks & Bros. 1891).
160. Black's, for instance, defines -constitutional freedom" as a -[g]eneric term to describe
the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution such as the First Amendment freedoms of
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apparently saw matters no differently. When Miller used the word
"Constitution," he used it to mean not only the body of the original
document as ratified in 1789, but also the various amendments added to it
shortly after ratification. In fact, more than once in Slaughter-House itself,
Miller indicated that he believed that the Bill of Rights was indeed part of
the "Constitution." For instance, toward the beginning of his opinion, he
stated: "Twelve articles of amendment were added to the Federal
Constitution soon after the original organization of the government under it
in 1789. Of these all but the last were adopted so soon afterwards as to
justify the statement that they were practically contemporaneous with the
adoption of the original... ." 161 Moreover, referring briefly in his opinion
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller observed
that the identical provision had been "in the Constitution" since the
"adoption of the fifth amendment." 162
We need not rest on Justice Miller's intimations in Slaughter-House,
however. In other contexts, Miller made unmistakably clear his
understanding that the Bill of Rights was actually part of the
"Constitution." For instance, in his Lectures on the Constitution of the
United States, Miller expressly referred to a few of the specific restrictions
of the Bill of Rights as arising from the "Constitution" (the bracketed
references are Miller's footnotes):
For example, a person's property cannot be taken for public use
without due course of law and just compensation; his life or liberty
cannot be taken from him without a fair trial before a court of
competent jurisdiction [Constitution, Fifth Amendment]; he shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime was committed; he shall be
confronted with the witnesses against him, shall have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and shall also have the
assistance of counsel for his defence [Constitution, Sixth
Amendment]. 163
"These are some of the rights," Miller added, "defined and secured to
those who live under the protection of the Constitution of the United
States." 164 In another part of his Lectures, Miller was even more explicit.
religion, speech, press and assembly together with protection under due process clause of the 14th
Amendment." The definition of "constitutional freedom" also cross-references the definition of
"Bill of Rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 133, at 311.
161. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 67 (emphasis added); see also id. at 82 (referring
to "the first eleven amendments to the Constitution" as being adopted "so soon after the original
instrument was accepted").
162. Id. at 80.
163. MILLER, supra note 159, at 72.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
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Referring to the Bill of Rights, Miller observed that "within two years after
[the original Constitution] was ratified, Congress passed and referred to the
different States twelve amendments, ten of which were ratified finally by
the requisite number to make them a part of the Constitution."65 He made
a nearly identical comment in a speech he delivered at a centennial
constitutional celebration in Philadelphia in 1887:
[U]pon the recommendation of several of the States, made in the
act of ratifying the Constitution, or by legislatures at their first
meeting subsequently, twelve amendments were proposed by
Congress, ten of which were immediately ratified by the requisite
number of States, and became part of the Constitution within two
or three years of its adoption.' 66
Justice Miller's writings and public comments-and, indeed, his
opinion in Slaughter-House itself-make it clear that he viewed the Bill of
Rights as an integral part of the U.S. "Constitution." Hence, when he said
in Slaughter-House that rights that "owe[d] their existence to
the ... Constitution"' were federal privileges and immunities, it is most
reasonable to conclude that he meant to include freedoms enumerated in the
Bill of Rights.
b. Specifically: Miller's List of Federal Privileges and Immunities
The list of rights that Miller invoked as being among the "privileges
[and] immunities of citizens of the United States" sheds additional light on
the Slaughter-House Court's understanding of the relationship between the
Bill of Rights and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Recall that, as
examples of federal privileges and immunities, Miller offered the following
litany:
It is said to be the right of the citizen of this great country,
protected by implied guaranties of its Constitution, "to come to the
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that
government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek
its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its
functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, through
which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the
sub-treasuries, land-offices, and courts of justice in the several
States."
165. Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
166. Justice Samuel F. Miller, The Formation of the Constitution, Address at the Ceremonies
of "Memorial Day" in Independence Square, Philadelphia (Sept. 17. 1887). in CHARLES NOBLE
GREGORY, SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER app. a at 98 (1907) (emphasis added).
167. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the
care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty,
and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a
foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right
depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the
navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate
the territory of the several States, all rights secured to our citizens
by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent upon citizenship of
the United States, and not citizenship of a State. One of these
privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is
that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become
a citizen of any State of the Union by a bonafide residence therein,
with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be
added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of
amendment, and by the [Due Process and Equal Protection]
clause[s] of the fourteenth .... 
168
Admittedly, a number of the freedoms Miller mentioned-such as the
rights to access seaports and to use navigable waterways-have little, if
anything, to do with the "Constitution"; they are structural rights, rights
that "owe their existence to the Federal government [and] its National
character." 169 Several, however, are uniquely constitutional, protected by
the text of the Constitution itself. For instance, Miller included in his
catalogue the "rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of
amendment." 170 Of the three general categories of federal privileges and
immunities that Miller had set out-the federal government's "National
character," its "Constitution," and its "laws" 17 '-the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments could fit only within the "Constitution" category.
Certainly the rights to be free from involuntary servitude and to be free
from racial discrimination in voting were not structural rights that inhered
in the country's "National character"; nor were they mere statutory rights
dependent upon federal "laws." They were constitutional rights, rights
which "owe[d] their existence to the ... Constitution." 172 And if the rights
protected by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-ratified in 1865
and 1870, respectively-were part of the "Constitution," then it follows a
168. Id. at 79-80 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868)).
169. Id. at 79.
170. Id. at 80.




fortiori that the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments-ratified in
1791, "so soon after[]" the adoption of the original document as to be
"practically contemporaneous" with it'73-were similarly part of that
"Constitution."
Even more to the point, Miller listed as among the federal privileges
and immunities "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances." t This right, Miller expressly added, is a right "guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution." ' Of course, it is no mystery from what part
of "the Federal Constitution" Miller borrowed the right of assembly and
petition. The First Amendment specifically protects "the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." 176 Miller's list, therefore, seems to indicate that the "privileges
[and] immunities of citizens of the United States" include, at the very least,
the guarantees set forth in the First Amendment. (Miller also mentioned, as
a right "guaranteed by the Federal Constitution," the "privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus," which is set out separately in Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution." Akhil Amar has pointed out that, along with guaranteeing
Bill of Rights freedoms against state infringement, "[p]rotecting the self-
described 'privilege' of habeas corpus against wayward states was... of
central concern to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment." 17)
Of course, one might raise the objection that if Miller sought to provide
for the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms via the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, he should not have stopped with the right of assembly;
rather, he should have mentioned each and every one of the more than
twenty-five freedoms enumerated in the first eight amendments. Richard
Aynes, for instance, has argued that "the obvious omission of free speech"
renders an incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House untenable. 7 9 Not
necessarily. In this respect, Justice Miller's opinion is perhaps best
173. Id. at 67; see also id. at 82 (referring to "the first eleven amendments to the
Constitution" as being adopted "'so soon after the original instrument was accepted").
174. Id. at 79.
175. Id.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Richard Aynes has suggested that when Justice Miller referred to
the right of assembly and petition, he was invoking a "'structural" right of assembly, not the First
Amendment right. Aynes, supra note 18, at 654. Miller's explicit insistence that the right to which
he referred was "guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." however, undermines Aynes's
argument Remember, Miller laid out three distinct categories of federal privileges and
immunities: those that arose from the federal government's "national character." those that arose
from its "Constitution," and those that arose from its "laws." In no uncertain terms, Justice
Miller placed the rights of assembly and petition among those that arose from the " Constitution."
which, as I have shown, Miller understood to include the Bill of Rights.
177. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
178. AMAR, supra note 12, at 175. On the "incorporation" of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus more generally, see Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There
a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?. 92 MIcH. L REV. 862
(1994).
179. Aynes, supra note 18, at 654.
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understood as a response to Justice Bradley's dissent. Recall that Bradley
had expressed his belief that the concept of federal privileges and
immunities included both the common-law rights claimed by the Louisiana
butchers and the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 80 Bradley's list
of textual freedoms included
the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise
of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the
right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures,
the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and above all, and including almost all the rest, the right of not
being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.1
8 1
Miller agreed with Bradley in part and disagreed in part. He agreed
insofar as Bradley contended that many of the freedoms enumerated in the
Bill of Rights were federal privileges and immunities. He disagreed,
however, with Bradley's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment
absolutely protected the private, common-law rights of contract and
property. To signal his partial agreement, Miller referred in his opinion to a
couple of the textual rights that Bradley had mentioned, namely, habeas
corpus and assembly. And to mark out the contours of that agreement,
Miller reiterated his belief that it was not, as Bradley suggested, all personal
rights that had been clothed with federal constitutional protection; rather,
only uniquely federal rights-such as assembly and habeas corpus, which
were "guaranteed by the Federal Constitution" -enjoyed that distinction.
Having expressly invoked the right of assembly and the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, it is hard to imagine why Miller would have thought
that other textually specified freedoms (including many of those
enumerated in the Bill of Rights) should not follow as well. What logic, for
instance, would have justified the inclusion of the First Amendment right of
assembly, but not its sister rights of free speech, free press, and free
exercise of religion? Surely the rights of assembly and habeas corpus are no
more "uniquely federal" than others listed in the Bill of Rights and Article
I, Section 9. What's more, Miller's list was, by his own admission,
incomplete; he set out only to enumerate "some" of the privileges and
immunities that "owe[d] their existence to the ... Constitution." 182 Because
180. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118-19 (Bradley. J., dissenting); see also
supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
181. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphases added
and omitted). Interestingly, although it mentions only six of the more than 25 rights catalogued in
the first eight amendments, no one criticizes Justice Bradley's list as being too incomplete to
support the inference that he was referring generally to the Bill of Rights.
182. Id. at 79.
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he was "of [the] opinion that the rights claimed by the[] plaintiffs in error,
if they ha[d] any existence, [were] not privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, he
thought it "useless to pursue" an extended inquiry into the meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause."3
Miller's decision not to provide an exhaustive catalogue of federal
privileges and immunities is not surprising. Miller was not fond of reaching
out to decide questions not strictly necessary to the resolution of the case at
hand. Miller himself described his approach as one of isolating and
deciding "the main points, the controlling questions." " Miller biographer
Charles Fairman observed that Miller "had an instinct for the essential." 's
Miller's opinion in Bartemneyer v. Iowa.8 6 is characteristic. There, writing
for the Court, Miller acknowledged the existence of two "grave questions"
of constitutional law, but concluded that the Court was not at liberty to pass
upon them:
Both of these questions, whenever they may be presented to us, are
of an importance to require the most careful and serious
consideration. They are not to be lightly treated, nor are we
authorized to make airy advances to meet them until we are
required to do so by the duties of our position. "
Given Miller's general inclination to avoid unnecessary
pronouncements of constitutional law, it is most reasonable to read his
list-and particularly his reference to the right of assembly and the
privilege of habeas corpus-as merely illustrative of the sorts of rights that
he thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected, not as exhaustive
of those rights. In this respect, it is important to remember that the butchers'
case simply was not about the Bill of Rights; they had not put at issue a
single provision of the first eight amendments. Miller saw no reason,
therefore, to dwell on the particulars of the incorporation of Bill of Rights
freedoms. But what Miller did say in his opinion gives the distinct
impression that, at the very least, the Privileges or Immunities Clause has a
role to play in the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms against the
States.
Notably, two turn-of-the-century commentators clearly considered
Miller's reference to the rights of assembly and habeas corpus to be a
placeholder of sorts that merely represented the larger class of rights
183. Id. at 80.
184. Letter from Samuel F. Miller (July I. 1874), in FAIRMAN, supra note 83. at 415.
185. Fairman, supra note 81, at 194.
186. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1874).
187. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
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outlined in the Bill of Rights and the body of the original Constitution.
Explaining Miller's Slaughter-House opinion, Horace Stern stated:
He held, in an elaborate opinion which reviewed the history and
purpose of the then recent constitutional amendments, that by
privileges of citizenship of the United States, as distinguished from
citizenship of the state, were meant those only which arise out of
the nature and essential character of the National Government, the
provisions of its Constitution, or its laws and treaties made in
pursuance thereof,-such, for example, as the right to travel to the
seat of Government and the ports of the United States, as well as its
courts, sub-treasuries and land-offices, the right to protection when
on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government,
the rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the "Bill of Rights" or
original constitutional amendments, the right to use the navigable
waters of the United States, together with such rights as were
secured to our citizens by the provisions of treaties with other
nations.18
Stern's paraphrase methodically tracks Miller's list: When Stern
mentioned the protected rights that made up federal privileges and
immunities, he listed them in precisely the same order as had Miller: (1)
traveling to the seat of government, (2) using ports, courts, sub-treasuries,
and land-offices, (3) obtaining protection while on the high seas or in
foreign lands, and so on. The only difference-and it is a critical
difference-is that whereas Miller had referred to the "right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances" "' as one of the privileges
and immunities of United States citizens, Stem's catalogue referred to "the
rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the 'Bill of Rights' or original
constitutional amendments." 19' Stern quite clearly understood Miller's
assembly-and-petition reference to stand more generally for Bill of Rights
freedoms.
Writing in 1891, Charles Pence similarly described Justice Miller's
opinion:
The butchers of New Orleans, [Miller] argued, could point to no
definite right or privilege secured them by the constitution or laws
of the United States which had been invaded by the law they
assailed.
188. Horace Stem, Samuel Freeman Miller, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 539, 560-61
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1909) (emphasis added).
189. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
190. Stem, supra note 188, at 561.
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The constitution has no provision on the subject of monopolies
and the majority of the court thought the law was a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the State.
But the opinion in those cases does mention the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus as among the rights of the citizen guaranteed
by the Federal constitution and protected from State abridgment by
the fourteenth amendment. Now this privilege is granted in the
same way and by the same instrument as the immunity from cruel
and unusual punishments: The former is conferred by the original
constitution and the latter by one of the amendments.'91
Like Stem, Pence believed that Justice Miller's reference to textually
specified rights as national privileges and immunities signified Miller's
understanding that other similarly specified rights, the Eighth Amendment
among them, were also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
state interference.
To summarize, then, there is nothing in Slaughter-House that precludes
a reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as incorporating the Bill of
Rights. In fact, viewed in proper context, Miller's majority opinion in
Slaughter-House seems quite possibly to contemplate incorporation. A
group of New Orleans butchers who felt jilted by the grant of a monopoly
to a single slaughtering company had sued and had claimed that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause absolutely protected their common-law
right to work. But Miller subscribed to a narrower conception of federal
privileges and immunities. Only uniquely federal rights, not ordinary
common-law interests, were within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Among those uniquely federal rights were those that "owe[d]
their existence to the. . . Constitution." 92 And among those that owed their
existence to the Constitution was the right of assembly, which Miller
apparently used to represent Bill of Rights freedoms more generally.
3. Why Did Miller Emphasize the Fourteenth Amendment's
Relationship to the Recently Freed Slaves?
But what about Miller's emphasis in the first part of his opinion on the
"pervading purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment as ensuring "the
freedom of the slave race" ?'9' Some have argued that this emphasis
suggests an intention to limit the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
191. Charles R. Pence, The Construction of the Fourteenth Ainendnlent. 25 AM. L. REv. 536,
548 (1891).
192. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
193. Id. at 71. See generally TRIBE, supra note 14, § 7-3. at 1309 (puzzling over the
relationship between Justice Miller's construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and "his
understanding of the function of the Fourteenth Amendment, the protection of the newly freed
slaves").
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to blacks alone. Surely, the argument goes, if Miller thought that only
blacks were entitled to claim the Amendment's protections, he could not
have meant to construe the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
incorporating the Bill of Rights. Any attempt to derail an incorporationist
understanding of Miller's Slaughter-House opinion on this basis, I believe,
makes far too much of far too little.
For one thing, Miller did not state that only blacks were entitled to
claim the protections of the Reconstruction Amendments. In fact, he went
out of his way to make it clear that " [w]e do not say that no one else but the
negro can share in this protection." '9' Rather, Miller clarified, "if other
rights are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within
the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though the party
interested may not be of African descent." "g Indeed, the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment generally, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause
specifically, reached across racial lines is demonstrated even by the
supposedly pathetic list of rights Miller offered as being among the
privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens.'96 Even white citizens, for
instance, enjoyed the right of "free access to... seaports" and the freedom
to "use the navigable waters of the United States" by virtue of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.'97
So why all the fuss in Slaughter-House about the Fourteenth
Amendment as a vehicle specifically for protecting black citizens? It turns
out that, in the context of the case, Miller's emphasis on the protections
guaranteed to blacks under the Amendment is not out of place at all. This
portion of Miller's opinion, I believe, is best understood as a pointed
response to an element of the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause put forth by Justice Field in his dissent: specifically, that the Clause
provides absolute-as opposed to merely equal-protection for ordinary
common-law rights. Recall that Slaughter-House involved white plaintiffs
(not recently freed slaves) claiming absolute constitutional protection (not a
mere equality of protection) for an unenumerated common-law right (not a
right specified in the text of the Constitution). In his dissent, Justice Field
made it clear that he was prepared to extend the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment to just such a situation. In offering his own
description of "the privileges and immunities which are secured against
abridgement by state legislation," Field quoted the recently enacted Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and stated that federal privileges and immunities
"include the right 'to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
194. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72.
195. Id.
196. See discussion supra Subsection III.B.2.b.
197. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
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personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property."' 1' In other words, Field equated
the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act with the "privileges [and]
immunities" of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
There is, however, a fundamental problem with Justice Field's reliance
on the Civil Rights Act to give substance to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, and Justice Miller recognized it. As Field's opinion makes clear, he
read the Act to provide absolute protection to all citizens, white and black,
with respect to the rights to contract, to participate in the judicial process,
and to own property; after all, Field said that the Act guaranteed citizens
"the right" to do those things.' 99 The text of the Act, however, merely
provided that citizens "of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude" shall have "the
same right" to contract, to participate in the judicial process, and to own
property "as is enjoyed by white citizens."' Contrary to Field's
suggestion, the Civil Rights Act was exclusively an antidiscrimination
provision, placing blacks and whites on equal footing with respect to "civil
rights."
The rights claimed by the white butchers-the right to contract, the
right to pursue an occupation, and so on-were not rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution. They were "civil rights,"
ordinary common-law rights. In emphasizing that the "pervading purpose"
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the freedom of the recently freed slaves,
Miller simply sought to point out (most emphatically to Justice Field) that,
in the realm of "civil rights," the Fourteenth Amendment serves but one,
relatively narrow, purpose: It provides equal protection in civil rights to
black citizens; it does not provide absolute protection in those rights to all
citizens. Therefore, Miller's pointed reference to the slavery issue at the
outset of his opinion made perfect sense. It showed, in a very concrete way,
why the plaintiffs-white butchers claiming absolute constitutional
protection for ordinary common-law rights-could not prevail.
Miller was by no means alone in his view that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed only equality, and not absolute protection, with
respect to civil rights. Indeed, his equality-in-civil-rights interpretation was
consistent with the expressed intent of a number of leading Republicans of
198. Id. at96 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1. 14 Stat. 27,
27).
199. Justice Bradley had suggested a similar interpretation in his opinion for the butchers in
the circuit court. See Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing
& Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408) ('" IThe first section of
the [Civil Rights Act] covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment.").
200. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1.
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the Thirty-Ninth Congress.2"' Miller's understanding of the Amendment's
effect on civil rights was also in step with contemporaneous Supreme Court
precedent. In Ex parte Virginia,0 2 for instance, the Court (in an opinion
joined by Justice Miller) held that " [o]ne great purpose" of the Civil War
Amendments was to secure to blacks the "perfect equality of civil rights
with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States." 203
Unlike his dissenting brethren, who saw the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as absolutely protecting all personal rights-including common-law
interests-against state invasion, Miller subscribed to a more restrained
view of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to uniquely federal rights, such as
those catalogued in the Bill of Rights, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
provided absolute protection; as to "civil rights" of the sort claimed by the
butchers, however, the Amendment provided only equal protection between
whites and blacks.2 4
4. Second Look: A Summary
It is relatively easy to see why for years constitutional lawyers and
historians have read Justice Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House as
reducing the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a virtual nullity. After all,
in the first part of his opinion, Miller emphasized the "one pervading
purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment as being the protection of black
citizens.0 5 In the second part, he went on to declare that state privileges and
immunities-as opposed to the national privileges and immunities protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment-" embrace [d] nearly every civil right for
the establishment and protection of which organized government is
201. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151-55 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Thayer); id. at 1293-94 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 1837 (statement of Rep.
Lawrence). See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 114-17 (1988) (cataloguing statements of
legislators).
202. I00 U.S. 339 (1879).
203. Id. at 344-45 (emphasis added); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 48 (1883)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of civil
rights among citizens of every race in the same State.").
204. In addition to what I believe are its other virtues, my reading of Justice Miller's opinion
serves to bridge a gap of sorts between Fourteenth Amendment scholars. One group. led by Raoul
Berger, argues that the primary purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to
"constitutionalize" the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-51 (1977). Another
group, led by Akhil Amar and Michael Kent Curtis, argues that the primary purpose of the Clause
was to incorporate the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 12; Amar, The Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12. In fact, according to Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment accomplished both purposes. It clothed Bill of Rights freedoms with absolute
protection against state interference and guaranteed equality in "civil rights" between whites and
blacks, as had the Civil Rights Act.
205. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71.
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instituted." 206 And finally, in the third part of his opinion, he described the
class of rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause by
referencing obscure and practically irrelevant rights, such as the right of
"free access to... seaports" and the freedom "to use the navigable waters
of the United States." 2 7
Hence, the conventional reading of Miller's Slaughter-House opinion
as "strangl[ing] the privileges-or-immunities clause in its crib"-'s is by no
means an unreasonable reading. But it is not, I argue, the best reading.
Instead, what I believe emerges from a careful consideration of Miller's
opinion is not an effort to construe the Privileges or Immunities Clause into
obsolescence but rather a nuanced, sophisticated, and coherent theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment. On the one hand, Miller's opinion held that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause provided absolute protection for a handful
of uniquely federal rights-most importantly, many of the rights
enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights. On the other hand, with respect to
more ordinary "civil rights" like the ones at issue in Slaughter-House itself,
the Fourteenth Amendment merely served to place blacks on equal footing
with whites. The Amendment, according to Miller, was neither radical nor
trivial. It was a measured response to the pressing constitutional issues
presented by the Civil War and Reconstruction.
IV. THE BIGGER PICTURE
A close reading of Slaughter-House reveals that the Court did not
intend to deny the Privileges or Immunities Clause its incorporationist
potential. On the contrary, what emerges from a careful consideration of the
majority opinion is a sophisticated, nuanced theory of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, an important element of which appears to have been the
incorporation of core Bill of Rights freedoms. In this Part, I seek to show
that, when viewed in light of broader considerations, an incorporationist
interpretation of Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion is not only
clever, but also correct. I explore two issues specifically: first, whether an
incorporationist interpretation of Slaughter-House is supported by Miller's
general jurisprudential philosophy; and second, whether such an
interpretation is consistent with Miller's voting patterns in other
Reconstruction-era cases.
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify precisely why it is that
evidence relating to Justice Miller's personal judicial philosophy and voting
record is relevant to our inquiry. In examining these issues, it is not
206. Id. at 76.
207. Id. at 79.
208. AMAR, supra note 12, at 305.
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necessarily my ultimate purpose to prove that Miller himself actually
believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights or some substantial portion thereof. It is, after all, the written
opinion of the Court, not any single Justice's "intention," that is the
governing law. Hence, a Justice's intention-even the intention of a Justice
writing for the Court-is relevant only insofar as it sheds light on the
proper understanding of the text of the Court's opinion. It is in this spirit
that I offer the following discussion. I have argued that there is nothing in
the Court's Slaughter-House opinion that forecloses the incorporation of
Bill of Rights freedoms through the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
that, in fact, a careful reading of the text of the Court's opinion strongly
suggests that Bill of Rights freedoms are among the "privileges [and]
immunities of citizens of the United States." Would Justice Miller have
authored such an opinion? Other scholars seem to say no. I say quite
possibly-indeed, very probably. The evidence with respect to these issues
is certainly somewhat ambiguous, but, on balance, big-picture
considerations seem to confirm, rather than to undermine, the reading of
Slaughter-House that I have advanced.
A. Justice Miller's Jurisprudential Philosophy
In this Section, I show that the interpretation of Justice Miller's
Slaughter-House opinion that I have put forward-that is, as contemplating
the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms against the states but refusing
the nationalization of all common-law interests-is not simply a clever
reading, but rather a reading that is grounded in, and indeed a natural result
of, Miller's general judicial philosophy. Of course, defining a judge's
"philosophy" is a complex task. However, there are, I believe, four distinct
jurisprudential principles to which Miller subscribed, principles that
animated his decisionmaking and that counsel a moderate incorporationist
understanding of Slaughter-House.
1. Preserving the Federal-State Balance
Perhaps above all else, Justice Miller was devoted to achieving and
preserving an appropriate balance of power between state and federal
governments in the wake of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Indeed, in
his opinion in Slaughter-House, Miller declared that it was the Court's duty
to "h[o]ld with a steady and an even hand, the balance between State and
Federal power. 209
209. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 82.
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Miller was a "staunch" Republican2 " and, by many accounts, an ardent
"nationalist." 21 But Miller's nationalism, unlike that of his dissenting
brethren in Slaughter-House, was tempered. One of Miller's principal
biographers, Charles Noble Gregory, observed that Miller "held the line
very steadily and firmly between State and Federal power and
competency."212 He was "determined to find for the national government
all that was necessary for its adequate maintenance, [but] was equally
resolved that the State governments should not be destroyed or
unnecessarily crippled."2 3 Miller's view, Gregory concluded, was "an
inestimable service if we value our frame of government." 2 4 In a memorial
delivered shortly after the death of Justice Miller in 1890, Attorney General
William Henry Harrison Miller similarly described Justice Miller's primary
objective during the turbulent Reconstruction years:
To safely guide this, the weakest and most sensitive branch of the
Government, amid the shocks and through all the troublous
times ... so that on the one hand, no just power of the General
Government should be lost, and, on the other, no just right of a
State or of a citizen should be sacrificed .... 5
Justice Miller recognized, of course, that the Civil War and
Reconstruction Amendments necessitated some centralization. In his
Lectures, he observed that "the experience of a century under the
Government ... has shown that the danger to its perpetuity and to the
people of this country did not lie in the aggrandizement of the central
authority, but rather in the power that remained in the several States.""1 6
But Miller believed that the centralizing force of Reconstruction-and
particularly the Fourteenth Amendment-was measured, not wholesale. In
an address at a bicentennial constitutional celebration in Philadelphia,
Miller remarked that, whereas the Reconstruction Amendments did indeed
"confer additional powers on the government of the Union, and place
additional restraints upon those of the States," they simultaneously "ke[pt]
in view the principles of our complex form of State and Federal
210. FAIRMAN, supra note 83, at 185.
211. HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 134 (1968): see also Charles
Fairman, Justice Samuel F. Miller, 50 POL. SCI. Q. 15. 22 (1935) ("No one upheld the authority
of the nation more ... than [Miller].").
212. GREGORY, supra note 166, at 20.
213. Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 ("Justice Miller ... held the field against all comers for the
doctrine that the Federal government should be maintained in vigor and efficiency, but that the
State government should neither perish nor sink into insignificance.").
214. ld. at29.
215. PROCEEDINGS OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF TIE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, IN MEMORIAM SAMUEL F. MILLER 34 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office
1891) (remarks of Attorney General Miller).
216. MILLER, supra note 159, at 93.
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government, and s[ought] to disturb the distribution of powers among them
as little as was consistent with the wisdom acquired by a sorrowful
experience."217 In short, for Miller, the Constitution called for a "just and
equal observance of the rights of the States, and of the general
government." 
218
Miller's opinion for the Court in Murdock v. Memphis2t 9 epitomizes his
approach to federal-state relations. In Murdock, the Supreme Court was
asked to construe section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 1867. That statute, which
was the successor to section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the
forebear of the present-day 28 U.S.C. § 1257, delineated the Court's
jurisdiction over cases decided by the highest courts of the various states.
Section 2 provided for appellate jurisdiction in three discrete instances:
(1) where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of,
or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision
is against their validity, or (2) where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under any State, on
the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their
validity, or (3) where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is
claimed under the constitution, or any treaty or statute of or
commission held, or authority exercised under the United States,
and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity
specially set up or claimed by either party under such constitution,
treaty, statute, commission, or authority .... 220
217. Miller, supra note 166, at I 11.
218. Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 14, §§ 7-3 to 7-4, at 1309-12 (describing Justice Miller's
desire to "safeguard the autonomy of the federal and state governments within their respective
spheres of power").
In walking this fine line between "nationalism" and "federalism," Justice Miller was simply
following in the footsteps of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (of which more is said in
the next Part). See generally Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and
the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 47 ("Even as they set precedents for modern
nationalism... Republicans could not shake off their commitment to older notions of
federalism."). Although Congressman John Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, clearly envisioned that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would
incorporate Bill of Rights freedoms against state governments, see infra text accompanying notes
259-271, he certainly was no radical. Michael Kent Curtis has classified Bingham as "centrist"
and even "conservative." CURTIS, supra note 12, at 59 (referring to MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 350, 354 (1974)). In fact, immediately following his declaration on
the floor of Congress that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States... are
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States." Bingham
emphasized that "our dual system of government" -that is, our federalist system of
government-is "essential to our national existence." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 84
app. (1871) (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
219. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
220. Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (enumeration added) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994)).
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The question put to the Court in Murdock was this: Once one of the
three statutory conditions is met, does the Supreme Court assume
jurisdiction of the entire matter, or is its review instead limited to the
"federal" questions presented in the case? The statutory language provided
no clear answer. Counsel for the plaintiffs, J.B. Heiskell, contended that the
Court "should re-examine all the questions found in the record, though
some of them might be questions of general common law or equity, or
raised by State statutes, unaffected by any principle of Federal law,
constitutional or otherwise." * Significantly, Justices Swayne and Bradley,
two of the Justices who had staked out radically nationalist positions in
Slaughter-House, agreed with Heiskell. 2-" Writing for the Court, however,
Justice Miller endorsed a more restrained view of section 2. In view of the
stringent conditions placed on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over
appeals from state courts-namely, that a federal question must have been
raised and finally decided by the highest court of a state in a specific
manner-Miller refused to "suppose that Congress intended, when those
cases came here, that this court should not only examine [the federal]
questions, but all others found in the record[]-questions of common law,
of State statutes, of controverted facts, and conflicting evidence." ' The
state courts, Miller concluded, were "the appropriate tribunals... for the
decision of questions arising under local law, whether statutory or
otherwise." 4 The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over appeals from state-
court judgments was "limited to the correction of errors relating solely to
Federal law." 25
Miller's opinion in Murdock did not leave the Supreme Court
powerless. The Court retained the authority to reverse state-court judgments
that misconstrued federal statutes or treaties or that wrongly interpreted
federal constitutional provisions. However, the Court's review of state-
court judgments was not plenary (as Heiskell had argued and as Justices
Swayne and Bradley had concluded). In Miller's mind, the business of the
federal courts was, in the main, limited to the consideration of " uniquely
federal" issues-particularly those that touched upon the interpretation of
the federal Constitution, federal laws, and federal treaties. The rest-
common-law questions, state statutory questions, and the like-remained
the responsibility of individual state courts. It was important to Miller that
the federal courts have authority to speak to uniquely federal questions, but
221. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 615 (argument of John A. Campbell on behalf of
plaintiffs).
222. See id. at 638-42.
223. Id. at 626.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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he also saw an important role for state courts in the American scheme of
judicial federalism.
The very same concerns that animated Justice Miller's opinion in
Murdock, I would argue, also underlay his opinion in Slaughter-House. 6
Just as in Murdock Miller was reacting to the radically nationalist views
advanced by Heiskell and endorsed by Justices Swayne and Bradley-
views that threatened to "destroy the independence of the State
judiciary" 22-So in Slaughter-House Miller reacted to the radically
nationalist views advanced by John Campbell and endorsed by the same
Justices Swayne and Bradley and their dissenting colleagues Justice Field
and Chief Justice Chase. And just as Miller had concluded in Murdock that
the Supreme Court's review of state-court decisions was not plenary, so he
concluded in Slaughter-House that the transfer of authority over the
definition and protection of individual rights was not wholesale. As Charles
Warren observed, referring to Slaughter-House:
If every civil right possessed by a citizen of a State was to receive
the protection of the National Judiciary, and if every case involving
such a right was to be subject to its review, the States would be
placed in a hopelessly subordinate position .... The boundary lines
between the States and the National Government would be
practically abolished .... 228
That result simply did not square with Justice Miller's view of American
federalism. Thus, Miller concluded, not all personal rights qualified for
protection as federal privileges and immunities; only uniquely federal
rights, such as those enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights, were
"privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Observing Judicial Restraint and Honoring Original Intent
In addition to being what one might call a moderate federalist, Miller
was also a strict constructionist. He deplored " [a]ll loose methods of
226. Interestingly, Slaughter-House and Murdock were related temporally as well as
conceptually. As Charles Fairman observed:
Slaughter House and Murdock ... kept company on the [Supreme Court's] docket. The
latter had been filed a year after the former, and the first arguments had maintained that
separation. But then the reargument of Slaughter House came on February 3 to 5, 1873,
and that of Murdock only two months later. The decision in Slaughter House was
announced on April 14, just when the long cogitation over Murdock began.
CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION: 1864-88, at 410 (Vol. VII of Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds.)).
227. GREGORY, supra note 166, at 28.




construing authority," which he viewed as "dangerous," 2 and believed
that the task of constitutional interpretation was inextricably bound up with
discovering the intentions of the Framers of constitutional provisions. What
follows is a consideration, first, of Miller's general commitment to a policy
of judicial restraint and, second, of his more specific commitment to
original intent.
a. Judicial Restraint
Scholars agree that Miller consistently and vigorously pursued a policy
of judicial restraint. Howard Graham, for instance, called Miller "the beau
ideal of advocates of judicial self restraint." 2 Indeed, several
commentators have suggested Miller as a progenitor of James Bradley
Thayer, one of America's most famous proponents of judicial restraint.f'
Charles Fairman, a Miller biographer, dubbed the Justice "an exemplar of
judicial forbearance," 232 a jurist who "respected the distinction between
what is ultra vires and what is only unwise." 23 Miller, Fairman observed,
"thought that the Court ought not to invent constitutional limitations even
when it saw that for the moment political power was being exercised
recklessly." 2- ' In his own words, Miller "endeavored to bring to the
examination of the grave questions of constitutional law... those
principles alone which are calculated to assist in determining what the law
is, rather than what, in [his] private judgment, it ought to be." 23
Miller displayed his impatience with airy, justice-driven claims on
numerous occasions. In Davidson v. New Orleans,' for instance, he
complained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause's sister provision, the
Due Process Clause, had come to be "looked upon as a means of bringing
to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every
unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the decision against
him." 7 He sounded a similar lament in his dissenting opinion in Hepburn
v. Griswold.238 There, faced with the contention that a law was "in conflict
229. MILLER, supra note 159, at 100.
230. GRAHAM, supra note 211, at 296.
231. See Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter. and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1995) (noting that Miller's "opinions may have
been among those upon which Thayer built his theory of judicial restraint"); G. Edward White,
Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 48, 54 (1993) ("Thayer's 'rule of
administration' had been articulated by Justice Samuel Miller . .
232. FAIR.MAN, supra note 83, at 209.
233. Fairman, supra note 81, at 201.
234. FAIRMAN, supra note 83, at 67-68.
235. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 399 (1866) (Miller. J.. dissenting) (emphasis
added).
236. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
237. Id. at 104.
238. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
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with the spirit, if not the letter, of several provisions of the Constitution,"
Miller responded that "[t]he argument is too vague for my perception." 39
Continuing, Miller objected that
[t]his whole argument of the injustice of the law, an injustice which
if it ever existed will be repeated by now holding it wholly void;
and of its opposition to the spirit of the Constitution, is too abstract
and intangible for application to courts of justice, and is, above all,
dangerous as a ground on which to declare the legislation of
Congress void by the decision of a court. It would authorize this
court to enforce theoretical views of the genius of the government,
or vague notions of the spirit of the Constitution and of abstract
justice, by declaring void laws which did not square with those
views. It substitutes our ideas of policy for judicial construction, an
undefined code of ethics for the Constitution, and a court of justice
for the National legislature. 240
Quoting Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,24
Miller concluded that
where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect
any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to
inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretences to such a
power.242
Justice Miller's general philosophy of judicial restraint was summed up
nicely by two lawyers asked to comment on the occasion of Miller's death.
William Maury wrote that " [i]t cannot be said of Miller as has been said of
Mansfield and others, that they were prone to give law instead of applying
the law as they found it." 243 Attorney General Miller likewise observed that
239. Id. at 637 (Miller, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 638.
241. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
242. Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 639 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, Miller on occasion departed from his typical
"positivist[ic]" approach to judicial review. See Charles Fairman, Justice Samuel F. Miller, 50
POL. SCI. Q. 15, 28 (1935). Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875), is the most
often cited example of such a departure. See id. at 663 (invalidating a Kansas law levying taxes on
individuals for non-public purposes and observing that "[t]here are limitations on (governmentl
power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments"). In Miller's case, however.
Loan Ass'n is truly the exception that proves the rule.
243. PROCEEDINGS OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED




Undiscriminating eulogy has said that Judge Miller was wont to
sweep away the law in order that justice might prevail. * * * Such a
statement would not have been accepted by him as praise. He loved
justice, but he knew, as all men fit for judges know, that justice,
humanly speaking, can have its perfect work only through the law;
that obedience to law, by the magistrate as well as by the private
citizen, is essential to justice, as it is a condition of liberty.2"
In view of its open-ended language, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause provides a unique test of a judge's commitment to judicial restraint.
As D.O. McGovney reported in 1918, "in many .. cases counsel for the
proponent feeling that the State action complained of has invaded a 'right'
which he rightly or wrongly believes a constitution ought to have made
sacred and finding little consolation in the other constitutional limitations
[would fall] hopelessly back upon the glittering words 'privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.""' 4 Such, of course, was the
case in Slaughter-House. But Miller would have none of it. Given his
general predisposition toward restraint, he was unmoved when Campbell
pleaded that "the relations of labor and the rights of laboring men" were
"common rights" and were therefore "deserving [of] a place in public
law."' 2 Miller was uncomfortable with the view of Campbell and the
dissenters that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized "common
rights," "natural rights," "inalienable" rights, and "general principle[s] of
the law." Like the inquiries posed in Davidson and Hepburn, these
standards were "too vague," "too abstract," and "too intangible" to
provide courts with any meaningful guidance in divining the import of the
phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Miller
recognized that inherent in the "natural law approach to interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment was the danger that it was as vague as the language
of the amendment itself."247 Miller needed a theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment that did not rest on glittering generalities, one that grounded
the words "privileges [and] immunities" and thereby "restricted the
discretionary powers of the courts." 2" Consequently, in Slaughter-House,
Miller tied the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, by and
large, to the explicit textual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
244. Id. at 35 (remarks of Attorney General Miller).
245. D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Iminuities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L.
BULL. 219, 223 (1918) (emphasis added).
246. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 61, at 571.
247. PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO
THE GILDED AGE 125 (1997).
248. GRAHAM, supra note 211, at 134.
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b. Original Intent
In place of freewheeling, justice-driven inquiries, Miller regularly
turned to original intent as the lodestar of constitutional interpretation.
Nowhere was Miller's originalist approach to constitutional exegesis made
clearer than in Ex parte Bain.249 There, he declared that " [i]t is never to be
forgotten that, in the construction of the language of the Constitution ... as
indeed in all other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are
to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who
framed that instrument." 0 Miller expressed similar ideas in his Lectures,
in which he urged that " [t]he Constitution must be looked at in the light of
the ends it was designed to accomplish, having in view the evils it was
intended to remedy and the benefits it was to exert." 25'
Of course, that Miller often looked to original intent for interpretive
guidance raises an obvious question: What was the intention of the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment? Specifically, was it that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause incorporated freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights
against state governments? The answer, I think, is clearly yes. As I stated at
the outset, a full consideration of the historical evidence supporting the
incorporationist interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a comprehensive treatment of that
subject, I continue to defer to the important and incisive work of Laurence
Tribe, 2  Akhil Amar, 3 Michael Kent Curtis, 54 and Richard Aynes.5"
However, in light of the fact that Miller viewed original intent as
authoritative, it will be worthwhile to canvass several data on which these
incorporationist scholars persuasively rely.
Representative Thaddeus Stevens, acting chairman of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen (the committee that debated, framed, and reported the
Fourteenth Amendment), introduced Section 1 of the Fourteenth
249. 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
250. Id. at 12. Interestingly, Justice Hugo Black approvingly quoted this very language in his
dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), in
which he conducted a thorough investigation of the events surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and concluded that "one of the chief objects that the provisions of the
Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make
the Bill of Rights[] applicable to the states." Id. at 71-72.
251. MILLER, supra note 159, at 100 (emphasis added); see also id. at 82 (" A very useful key
to the construction of a statute or a constitution is to inquire what was the evil to be removed, and
what remedy did the new instrument propose; so that when any question arises requiring a judicial
construction of any of its clauses, it is important to go back and ascertain the evil that was
intended to be remedied.").
252. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 14, §§ 7-1 to 7-2, at 1293-1302.
253. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 12; Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 12; Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights
Against the States?, supra note 12.
254. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 12.
255. See, e.g., Aynes, supra note 12.
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Amendment before the House of Representatives. In so doing, he stated that
it "supplied th[e] defect" that, in its pre-Civil War form, "the Constitution
limit[ed] only the action of Congress, and [was] not a limitation on the
States." 6 Senator Jacob Howard, the amendment's sponsor in the upper
house, was even clearer in announcing his incorporationist intentions for
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. He expressly stated that among the
"privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States" were "thepersonal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution." ' Howard then proceeded to catalogue in detail a number of
the freedoms set forth in the Bill of Rights. Specifically, Howard mentioned
as being among federal privileges and immunities the First Amendment's
rights of free speech and free press and the right to assemble and petition
the government, the Second Amendment's right to bear arms, the Third
Amendment's protection against quartering, the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him and to be tried by an impartial jury, and the Eighth Amendment's
freedom from excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments. 8
The clearest and most forceful statements that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause would incorporate Bill of Rights liberties against the
states, however, came from Representative John Bingham, the principal
draftsman of Section 1. In a speech on the floor of the House on February
28, 1866, for instance, Bingham referred, by name, to Barron v.
Baltimore259 and Livingston v. Moore' as examples of antebellum cases in
which "the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the United
States courts the bill of rights.., had been denied." 26 In Barron, Bingham
observed, the Supreme Court had held that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights "must be understood as restraining the power of the General
Government, not as applicable to the States." 26 In Livingston, the Court
had likewise held it "settled" that the provisions of the first eight
amendments "do not extend to the States."2 63 His proposed Fourteenth
Amendment changed all that, Bingham declared, and gave Congress "the
power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today.""
According to Akhil Amar's tally, Bingham, in his February 28 speech
256. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
257. 1& at 2765.
258. See id.
259. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
260. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833).
261. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
262. 1d. at 1090 (quoting Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247).
263. Id. (quoting Livingston, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 551).
264. Id. at 1088.
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alone, used the phrase "bill of rights" more than twelve times in referring
to the freedoms protected by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. 265
If his February 1866 remarks left any doubt as to his intentions,
Bingham removed that doubt in a subsequent speech that he delivered to
Congress in 1871. There, he declared:
[T]hat the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first
section, Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution may be more
fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished
from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution of the United States .... These
eight articles I have shown never were limitations on the power of
the States, until made so by the Fourteenth Amendment.26
Bingham emphasized that Bill of Rights freedoms were protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment as federal privileges and immunities because they
were "guarantied by the amended Constitution and expressly enumerated in
the Constitution." 2 67
Responding to a question during the same exchange, Bingham
explained his choice of language for the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
and in so doing, further confirmed his incorporationist intentions:
In reexamining that case of Barron [v. Baltimore], I noted and
apprehended as I never did before, certain words in that opinion of
Marshall. Referring to the first eight articles of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, the Chief Justice said: "Had the
framers of these intended them to be limitations on the powers of
the state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the
original constitution, and have expressed that intention." Acting
upon this suggestion, I did imitate the framers of the original
Constitution. As they said, "No state shall emit bills of credit, pass
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts;" imitating their example and imitating it to
the letter, I prepared the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
as it stands in the Constitution, as follows: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States ....
265. See AMAR, supra note 12, at 182.
266. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 app. (1871).




Recent scholarship disputes Charles Fairman's contention that
Bingham's incorporationist views were "novel." 269 In fact, Akhil Amar has
reported that "there were about thirty speeches in the House and Senate"
expressing an incorporationist understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.270 Moreover, as Michael Kent Curtis has noted, "John
Bingham... and Senator Howard... clearly said that the amendment
would require the states to obey the Bill of Rights. Not a single senator or
congressman contradicted them."27,
Thus, it seems clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers thought
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected core Bill of Rights
freedoms against state interference. Equally important for our purposes is
the fact that these men apparently agreed that "civil rights" -ordinary
common-law freedoms like those claimed by the butchers in Slaughter-
House-were not protected by the Clause. In April 1866, the Joint
Committee of Fifteen was prepared to send to the floor of the House a
proposal framed and submitted to the Committee by English social reformer
and former U.S. Congressman Robert Dale Owen.' 2 Owen's proposed
Section 1 provided that " [n]o discrimination shall be made by any state, nor
by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude." 2 73 At the last moment, the Committee
scrapped Owen's prototype in favor of Bingham's "privileges or
immunities" formulation that remains in the Amendment today. In an
exhaustive study of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment inside the
Joint Committee, Earl Maltz concluded that there is only one explanation
for the near unanimous support among Democrats and moderate and
conservative Republicans for Bingham's proposal: "[V]hile extending
constitutional protection beyond the problem of racial discrimination, the
Bingham substitute must have been aimed at a narrower class of rights than
the Owen proposal. 274 In other words, notwithstanding the fact that
Owen's submission contemplated only an equality of rights between blacks
and whites, moderate committee members were frightened off by the
269. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REv. 5, 26 (1949).
270. Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against the
States?, supra note 12, at 447; see also CURTIS, supra note 12. at 112 (" I have found over thirty
examples of statements by Republicans during the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Congresses
indicating that they believed that at least some Bill of Rights liberties limited the states.").
271. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 91; see also AMAR, supra note 12. at 187 ("[Not a single
person in either house spoke up to deny [Bingham and Howard's] interpretation of section 1.
Surely, if the words of section I meant something different, this was the time to stand up and say
so.").
272. See HORACE FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH A.MENDMENT 69-70 (1908).
273. BENJAMIN KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT Co.itrrriEE OF FITEN oN
RECONSTRUCTION 83 (1914) (emphasis added).
274. Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933. 964 (1984).
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proposal's use of the phrase "civil rights"-which, Maltz correctly pointed
out, included "[t]he rights to contract and to own property."' 275 Hence,
whereas the final version of Section 1 did protect the "privileges [and]
immunities of citizens of the United States" (which Bingham, Howard, and
others had repeatedly said included many of the rights enumerated in the
first eight amendments), it expressly and conspicuously made no reference
to "civil rights." 276
Miller was almost certainly aware of the incorporationist conception of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause shared by Bingham, Howard, and their
Republican colleagues. Miller and Bingham traveled the Pacific coast
together in the summer of 1871, only several months after Bingham had
expressly reiterated his incorporationist intentions on the floor of the House
(and, incidentally, less than two years before the decision in Slaughter-
House was announced). During the trip, "Bingham was almost daily
expounding his views of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's scope and
purpose. ,27 An entry in the diary of Judge Matthew P. Deady of Oregon
recounted: "[In the] evening heard [J.A.] Bingham speak near an hour at
the Court House upon the relation and dependence of the States to the
Nation. He was logical, eloquent and grand.... Mr Justice Miller gave
thanks for what he had seen and received. 2 7 8 The Morning Oregonian
reported that in his speech Bingham had stated his hope that, as a result of
the Civil War and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, "no State
will attempt to set up an authority in opposition to human rights." 279
In addition to the first-hand knowledge of Bingham's views of the
Fourteenth Amendment that Justice Miller probably picked up during the
west-coast speaking tour of 1871, Miller was, as Richard Aynes has
observed, "a man who watched Congress closely." 280 Indeed, Miller could
275. Id. at 965.
276. It is also significant in this regard that although John Bingham clearly believed that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause made at least some Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the
states, he vehemently opposed the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 3 1, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
27, which provided that blacks should have the same rights as whites with respect to contracting,
holding and conveying real property, and participating in the judicial process. See CONG. GLOBE.
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (1866). In addition to believing that Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to pass the act, Bingham also objected that the act went too far-well
beyond his objective of incorporating Bill of Rights freedoms-and "would actually strip the
states of power to govern, centralizing all power in the Federal Government." Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 app. at 100 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing an exchange between
Bingham and James Wilson). Bingham's simultaneous endorsement of Bill of Rights
incorporation and opposition to the Civil Rights Act is merely one example of his simultaneous
commitment-shared by Justice Miller-to principles of both nationalism and federalism. See
supra note 218.
277. GRAHAM, supra note 211, at 134 n.90.
278. PHARISEE AMONG PHILISTINES: THE DIARY OF JUDGE MATrHEW P. DEADY, 1871-
1892, at 28 (Malcolm Clark, Jr. ed., 1975) (entry of July 18, 1871) (footnote omitted).
279. Our Visitors, MORNING OREGONIAN, July 19, 1871, at 3.
280. Aynes, supra note 18, at 660.
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barely have avoided knowing the contents of the congressional debates on
the Fourteenth Amendment had he wanted to, inasmuch as Washington,
D.C., newspapers covered the proceedings during the spring of 1866 in
painstaking detail. On February 28, 1866, for instance, the Evening Star
published a summary of congressional speeches relating to the Fourteenth
Amendment. "Mr. Bingham answered objections to the amendment," the
paper accurately reported, "contending that it simply armed Congress with
the power, with the consent of the people, to enforce the bill of rights, as it
stands in the Constitution.",_' Among the articles run by the Daily National
Intelligencer was a piece that reported in detail the substance of Senator
Howard's speech regarding the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Howard, the article read, "promise[d] to present .. . the views and
the motives which influenced [the Joint Committee of Fifteen], in so far as
he understood those views and motives."" Turning to the substance of
Howard's remarks, the article continued:
Mr. Howard, having read from [Corfield v. Coryell,] continued:
Such then is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken
of in the Constitution in the second section of the fourth article, I
believe. To these privileges and immunities may be added the
personal rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution of the United States: Such as freedom of speech and of
the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
Government for a redress of grievances, a right pertaining to each
and all of the people; the right to keep and bear arms; the right to be
exempt from the quartering of soldiers in a house without the
consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from unreasonable
searches and seizures, & c. 3
Similar pieces describing the incorporationist intentions of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers appeared both in Washington
newspapers'm and in other national publications?- 5 almost daily. Hence, if
281. XXXIXth Congress-First Session, EVENING STAR (Washington. D.C.). Feb. 28. 1866,
at 2.
282. Thirty-Ninrh Congress-First Session, DAILY NAT'L INTELtIGENCER (Washington.
D.C.), May 24, 1866, at 3.
283. lt
284. See, e.g., Thirty-Ninth Congress-First Session. DAILY NAT'L INrELUGENCER
(Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1, 1866, at 2 (noting Bingham's comment that -the proposed
amendment simply armed Congress, with the consent of the people, to enforce the Bill of Rights.
as now found in the Constitution"); Thirty-Ninth Congress-First Session. DAILY NAT'L
INTELLIGENCER (Washington, D.C.), Feb. 27, 1866. at 2 (noting Bingham's comment that "(tlhe
House and the civilized world knew that all the judicial officers of the South for the last five years
have acted in utter disregard of the Constitution" and that the Fourteenth Amendment was
"essential to the preservation of unity of the Government and people").
285. See AMAR, supra note 12, at 187 (describing news coverage of incorporationist speeches
by John Bingham, Thaddeus Stevens, and Jacob Howard).
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Miller paid even the slightest attention to original intent-which we know
he did-he must have been enlightened by the events that unfolded during
the spring of 1866.
Curiously, every commentator who has argued that Miller knew the
intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment has also concluded
that in Slaughter-House he simply ignored them. Howard Graham, for
instance, noted that "[i]t hardly seems possible.., that Justice Miller was
unfamiliar with the Framers' views; yet his reading of the Amendment in
the Slaughter-House Cases was certainly not that assumed by Bingham in
1866."286 William Nelson similarly concluded that what he viewed as
"Miller's approaches for narrowing the reach of section one were flatly
inconsistent with the history of its framing in Congress" and, therefore,
"constituted clear instances of judicial lawmaking of which Justice Miller
must have been quite aware." '287 Richard Aynes-one of the foremost
proponents of an incorporationist interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause-even went so far as to suggest that Miller might have
"deliberately attempted to defeat the force of the amendment" simply to
spite the Congress that had proposed it.288
But the suggestion that Miller either ignored or, even worse,
purposefully flouted, the expressed-and probably widely known-
intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers runs headlong into
Miller's self-described philosophy of deciding constitutional cases by
placing himself "as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who
framed that instrument." 289 Hence, Slaughter-House must leave critics like
Graham, Nelson, and Aynes perplexed. Why would Miller, who regularly
looked to original intent as the key to constitutional meaning, simply turn
his back on such powerful historical evidence? The answer, I think, is that
he did not. The problem with Graham's, Nelson's, and Aynes's critiques is
that they all depend on an erroneous premise-namely, that Miller's
construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Slaughter-House was
cramped and left no meaningful role for the Clause in the protection of
individual rights against state interference. In fact, Miller's opinion
reserved a very important role for the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Slaughter-House: the protection of uniquely federal rights, including many
Bill of Rights freedoms, against state interference. Thus, far from being at
odds with the incorporationist intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment's
286. GRAHAM, supra note 211, at 134 n.90.
287. NELSON, supra note 201, at 163.
288. Aynes, supra note 18, at 686 ("Miller was hostile to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Congress which proposed it. He had the personality to purposely negate an amendment he felt was
unwise.").
289. Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
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Framers, Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion is, according to a careful
reading, in almost perfect harmony with those intentions.
3. Resisting the Flooding of the Courts
As biographer Charles Fairman has noted, "always uppermost in
[Justice Miller's] mind" was the dramatic increase in federal-court
litigation spawned by the Civil War.290 In an article published in 1872, just
a year before the announcement of the decision in Slaughter-House, Miller
lamented what he called "the delay in administering justice between
individuals" in the federal court system." "[Ain average period of three
years," Miller reported, "elapse[d] in cases appealed to the Supreme Court,
between the time when the judgment [was] rendered in the court below and
the time when it reach[ed] that court again for execution."' Miller
concluded that "the only remedy that can be found for the present delay,
and for preventing its certain future increase, must be sought in
legislation."293 He thus suggested a number of reforms that Congress might
undertake to stem the tide of post-Civil War litigation and to ease the
burden on the already overburdened federal courts. Specifically with
respect to the Supreme Court-whose docket in 1872 would reach,
according to Miller, an astounding 800 cases'-he proposed, for instance,
that the amount-in-controversy requirement for civil appeals be increased
from $2000 to $5000.5 He also suggested limiting the Supreme Court's
admiralty jurisdiction and its jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and
the federal territories.' More generally, Miller suggested that Congress
create intermediate courts of appeals in each judicial circuit.27
By and large, however, Congress did not step in to alleviate the
pressure mounting in the federal court system."8 In fact, Congress seemed
to be marching in the opposite direction. In a series of statutes enacted
during the decade following the Civil War, Congress extended the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to encompass matters previously
committed exclusively to the state judiciary.2 Exasperated with Congress's
290. F 1RMAN, supra note 226, at 420.
291. Samuel F. Miller, Judicial Reforms, 2 U.S. JURISTI. 1I (1872).
292 Id. at 3.
293. Id. at4.
294. See Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (Mar. 9. 1872). in FAIRMAN.
supra note 226, at 423.
295. See Miller, supra note 291, at 8.
296. See id. at 5-7.
297. See Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger. supra note 294. at 423.
298. Some modest reforms along the lines Miller had proposed were achieved in the Act of
Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 315, 316, and, much later, in the Circuit Court of Appeals Act
of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
299. See William Wiecek, Murdock v. Memphis: Section 25 of tie 1789 Judiciary Act and
Judicial Federalism, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON ThE JUDICIARY ACT
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"persistent unwillingness to enact legislation to give the federal judiciary,
and especially the Supreme Court, relief adequate to the tremendous
expansion of judicial business after the Civil War, '' 300 Miller, in a handful
of Reconstruction-era decisions, seemed to take matters into his own hands
in an attempt to do what he could to alleviate that pressure himself. In the
State Railroad Tax Cases,3 °' for instance, Miller authored the opinion of a
unanimous Court establishing strict limits on the jurisdiction of federal
courts to enjoin ordinary state tax-collection proceedings.3"' Similarly, in
Hawes v. Oakland3°3 and Huntington v. Palmer,30 4 Miller-again for
unanimous Courts-set out rules limiting the ability of corporate
stockholders to bring suits against their own corporations in "the
overburdened courts of the United States. 30 5 Murdock v. Memphis,
306
discussed above as indicative of Miller's allegiance to a scheme of
moderate judicial federalism, can also be understood as an effort to prevent
the federal courts from being overwhelmed with relatively mundane state-
law suits. In Murdock, Miller warned that if the Supreme Court were
authorized by the Judiciary Act in appeals from state supreme courts to pass
on matters of purely state law,
there [would be] no conceivable case so insignificant in amount or
unimportant in principle that a perverse and obstinate man may not
bring it to this court by the aid of a sagacious lawyer raising a
Federal question in the record-a point.., which he may well
know will be decided the moment it is stated. But he obtains his
object, if this court, when the case is once open to re-examination
on account of that question, must decide all the others that are to be
found in the record.30 7
Slaughter-House is cut from the same cloth. Miller appreciated that,
unlike an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that was
limited to the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms, one that involved
the nationalization of common-law rights would, in the words of James
OF 1789, at 223, 232-33 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (listing numerous jurisdiction-creating and
jurisdiction-extending statutes of the Reconstruction era); see also FAIRMAN, supra note 226, at
366-99 (detailing the expansion of federal-court jurisdiction in the post-Civil War era).
300. Fairman, supra note 81, at 202.
301. 92 U.S. 575 (1876).
302. See id. at 612-18.
303. 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
304. 104 U.S. 482 (1882).
305. Haives, 104 U.S. at 453.
306. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
307. Id. at 629. Miller recognized that if the argument of the plaintiffs in Murdock were
accepted, "the Court... would take on a staggering work load of issues normally disposed of at
the state court level, cases that might involve no important problems of construing the federal




Bradley Thayer, "bring up a mass of cases." 3 If Fourteenth Amendment
privileges and immunities included "common rights" -the "civil rights"
of the nineteenth century-then disputes involving those rights would be
among the cases and controversies "arising under [the] Constitution" to
which federal judicial power extended under Article I, Section 2. Faced
with entertaining jurisdiction over every infringement of contract rights,
every property dispute, and every employment controversy, Miller likely
feared that the wheels of justice in the federal courts would grind to a halt.
The federal judicial power, Miller believed, should extend to uniquely
federal subjects-nothing less, nothing more. For Miller, the freedoms
enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights were uniquely federal; ordinary
common-law rights were not.
Thus, understood in context, Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House-
which limited federal privileges and immunities to those rights, like the
ones catalogued in the Bill of Rights, that "owe[d] their existence to
the... Constitution" -was fully consistent with, and indeed an integral
part of, his ongoing effort to maintain the jurisdiction of the federal courts
within historical, and workable, boundaries.
4. Opposing Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism
Unlike Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne, Justice Miller was not
particularly taken with the laissez-faire thinking that dominated late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century legal theory. In fact, he was
downright hostile to it. A product of his small-town Western upbringing,
Miller was "antagonistic toward expansionist Eastern railroads and
suspicious of finance capitalists.""09 In an 1878 letter to his brother-in-law,
Texas lawyer William P. Ballinger, Miller "opened with [an] indictment of
the new capitalism" :310
I have met with but few things of a character affecting the public
good of the whole country that has shaken my faith in human
nature as much as the united, vigorous, and selfish effort of the
capitalists,-the class of men who as a distinct class are but
recently known in this country-I mean those who live solely by
308. Henry Ware, Student Notes: Constitutional Law I, Prof. James Bradley Thayer, 1895-
1896, Box 1 (on file with the Houghton Library. Harvard University); see also Clarence Bunker.
Student Notes: Constitutional Law, Prof. James Bradley Thayer, 1891-1892, Box 2. at 44 (on file
with the Houghton Library, Harvard University) (" One grave reason wh. influenced ct. prob. was
the immense no. of cases wh. wld come into U.S. cts if these privil. were to come under protect of
U.S.").
309. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADMON: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 89 (expanded ed. 1988).
310. FAIRMAN, supra note 83, at 300.
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interest and dividends.... They engage in no commerce, no trade,
no manufactures, no agriculture. They produce nothing.
31'
In legal terms, Miller's antipathy toward the emerging philosophies of
laissez-faire capitalism translated into a refusal to tie the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to business freedoms. John
Campbell and the Slaughter-House dissenters (particularly Justice Field)
would have read into the Constitution a right to choose and follow a
profession-a right that "eventually evolved into an even more sweeping
theory called liberty of contract." ' Miller likely recognized that, while the
New Orleans butchers were not necessarily of the class of " new capitalists"
he so despised, the constitutional theory they were advancing would
eventually lead to what scholars today call "the Lochnerization of the
Fourteenth Amendment."3 3 Thus, in Slaughter-House, Miller "set his face
against making the Fourteenth Amendment the basis for a Naturrecht." 3
14
The Fourteenth Amendment was not, in Miller's view, about liberty of
contract or a natural right to property; it was about uniquely federal rights,
rights that inhere in national citizenship-rights, like the right of assembly
and other Bill of Rights freedoms, which "owe their existence to
the... Constitution."
5. Slaughter-House and Justice Miller's Jurisprudence: A Summary
The considerations of judicial philosophy that I have examined in this
Section seem to confirm what the text of Miller's Slaughter-House opinion
strongly suggests: that while the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not
federalize the bulk of ordinary common-law rights, it did incorporate many
Bill of Rights freedoms against state governments. Of course, I am not so
bold as to claim that, taken together, these philosophical considerations
actually compel an incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House-they are
considerations, not iron-clad rules. Nor am I foolish enough to claim that
the principles that animated Justice Miller's general judicial philosophy
always pointed in a single direction. 1 5 But it seems to me clear that, as a
311. Letter from Samuel F. Miller to William P. Ballinger (Apr. 28, 1878), quoted in
FAIRMAN, supra note 83, at 67.
312. KENS, supra note 247, at 124.
313. Horwitz, supra note 15, at 84.
314. FAIRMAN, supra note 83, at 425.
315. Some have argued, for instance, that Miller's opinion in Murdock actually contravened,
rather than followed, the best evidence of Congress's intent with respect to the amended Judiciary
Act. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 881, 920-21 & nn.180-181 (1986); Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural
Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1317-20 (1986). Even assuming that this view
of Murdock is correct (and it is far from clear that it is), Miller's opinion for the Court in Murdock
is appropriately understood as a function of his commitment to preserving an appropriate state-
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general matter, Miller subscribed to a core set of jurisprudential principles
that included (1) respect for the state-federal balance, (2) deference to
original intent, (3) concern for the overburdening of the federal courts, and
(4) disdain for laissez-faire constitutional theory. And I would argue that,
while not decisive, it is certainly not insignificant that in Slaughter-House
all of these principles were pointing in a single direction: namely, toward
recognizing a distinction between the sorts of common-law economic rights
urged by the butchers, which the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not
protect against state interference, and the uniquely federal rights like those
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, which it did.
First, Miller appreciated that the Reconstruction Amendments had
brought about some centralization of authority; however, he sought to
maintain some semblance of a federal-state balance of power. Hence, his
opinion in Slaughter-House acknowledged the incorporation of the most
uniquely federal of individual rights, including many of those enumerated
in the first eight amendments, but refused the federalization of common-law
rights. Second, Miller detested freewheeling legal inquiries; he preferred to
link the interpretation of a constitutional provision to the intentions of its
federal balance of power, see supra text accompanying notes 219-225, and his desire to resist the
flooding of the federal court system with ordinary state-law claims, see supra notes 306-307 and
accompanying text.
Most of the arguments claiming that, in Murdock, Miller ignored congressional intent in
favor of some other policy ultimately rest upon Charles Warren's (with all due respect)
conclusory observation that, given "the whole trend of the legislation of the period" it is "highly
probable" that Miller misread Congress's intent. 2 WARREN, supra note 228, at 682; see also
Field, supra, at 920 n.180 (citing 2 WARREN, supra note 228, at 682); Matasar & Bruch. supra, at
1319 n.11l (citing Field, supra, at 920 & n.180). The most exhaustive study of the 1867
amendment to the Judiciary Act draws altogether different conclusions. See Wiecek, supra note
299, at 223. Wiecek observes that (1) William Lawrence, the House sponsor of the amendment,
never gave any indication that he envisioned plenary Supreme Court review of state-law
questions; (2) the House and Senate debates were "unenlightening" and "murk[yJ" on the
question of legislative intent; (3) the evidence suggests that "none of the bill's Senate sponsors
thought they were enacting any major change" in the Judiciary Act that would have allowed
plenary Supreme Court review; and (4) President Johnson was "oblivious" to the fact that the
amended Judiciary Act might be read to confer such broad Supreme Court authority. Wiecek
ultimately concludes that Congress "might well" have approved the 1867 Judiciary Act
amendment "without knowing what it was doing." Id. at 230-31.
Given this ambiguity, I would think it difficult to say that Miller's opinion in Murdock was
clearly contrary to Congress's intention. And there is certainly nothing in Murdock itself to
suggest that Miller had forsaken congressional intent in favor of some other guiding principle. On
the contrary, Miller's opinion makes it clear that he did view congressional intent as controlling
but that he found "no sufficient reason for holding that Congress ... intended" to authorize
Supreme Court review of state-court decisions on matters of state law. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590, 619 (1874). Miller used what we today might call a "clear-statement rule": Had
"Congress, or the framers of the bill, had a clear purpose" to sanction such broad Supreme Court
review, "it is reasonably to be expected that Congress would use plain, unmistakable language in
giving expression to such intention." Id. Such reliance on clear-statement rules is in no way
inconsistent with a commitment to original intent. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft. 501 U.S. 452,
460-61 (1991) (employing a clear-statement rule in flushing out Congress's true intention). It is of
course also not insignificant that Congress never saw fit to amend the Judiciary Act to overturn
the Murdock Court's construction.
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framers. The incorporationist understanding of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause that he advanced on behalf of the Court in Slaughter-House was a
natural outgrowth of his commitment to judicial restraint in general and to
originalism in particular. Third, Miller feared that, in the post-Civil War
era, the federal courts were in danger of being inundated by litigation. By
distinguishing in Slaughter-House between Bill of Rights freedoms on the
one hand, and ordinary common-law freedoms on the other, he took a step
toward stemming the tide. Finally, Miller was suspicious of those, like
Campbell and Field, who sought to read into the Fourteenth Amendment a
charter of economic freedom. By tying the Privileges or Immunities Clause
to the Bill of Rights, Miller avoided (albeit only temporarily) the
constitutionalization of laissez-faire economic theory.
Thus, the orthodox understanding of Miller's opinion in Slaughter-
House-specifically, that it "strangled the privileges-or-immunities clause
in its crib" 316 and "nullified the intent to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states', 17--is in tension with important aspects of Miller's judicial
philosophy. Miller's philosophy actually supports an alternative reading of
Slaughter-House, whereby the Privileges or Immunities Clause clothed core
Bill of Rights freedoms with constitutional protection but left the definition
and regulation of ordinary common-law rights to state control.
B. Justice Miller's Voting Record
The text and context of Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion
confirm that there is nothing in the decision that forecloses the
incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Indeed, it may be most reasonable to read the opinion
as suggesting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause does incorporate
core Bill of Rights freedoms. Evidence relating to Miller's judicial
philosophy certainly supports such a reading. But, can an incorporationist
interpretation of Slaughter-House be squared with other Reconstruction-era
decisions that Miller either wrote or joined? Some have argued that it
cannot. Richard Aynes,1" for instance, has said that if Miller had really
written the opinion in Slaughter-House that I claim he wrote (an opinion
construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause to incorporate Bill of
Rights freedoms), he would have dissented in both United States v.
Cruikshank"9 and Hurtado v. California.32 ' Aynes's objection, I must
admit, has superficial appeal. In truth, there are other decisions like
316. AMAR, supra note 12, at 305.
317. CURIS, supra note 12, at 175.
318. See Aynes, supra note 18, at 654-55.
319. 92U.S. 542(1876).
320. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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Cruikshank and Hurtado that, at least at first glance, would appear to raise
questions about the reading of Slaughter-House that I have advanced. Upon
close inspection, however, none of these cases casts serious doubt on what I
argue was Miller's general commitment, expressed in Slaughter-House, to
the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that, during Miller's
twenty-eight-year tenure, the Supreme Court was presented with what one
might call a "true" incorporation argument only once-not in Crikshank
or Hurtado, as one might suspect from Aynes's critique, but rather, in Spies
v. Illinois.321 In Spies, J. Randolph Tucker, a Virginia lawyer and
congressman representing a group of anarchists convicted and sentenced to
death in connection with Chicago's infamous "Haymarket" affair,
advanced a forceful and cogent argument that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights bound the states by virtue of their incorporation through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Spies is worth pausing over-both for
what Tucker said and for what the Supreme Court did not say.
According to Tucker, the "privilege[s] and immunit[ies]
of... citizen[s] of the United States" were those that " have their
recognition in or guaranty from the Constitution of the United States." "
The resemblance between Tucker's conception of federal privileges and
immunities and the formulation that Justice Miller had earlier introduced in
Slaughter-House-rights that "owe their existence to the...
Constitution"-is striking. As will become clear, the likeness is not
coincidental.
In articulating his incorporation argument, Tucker did not challenge the
orthodoxy of Barron v. Baltimore, -3 in which the Supreme Court had held
that the protections of the Bill of Rights in and of themselves bound only
the federal government. Rather, he said:
The position I take is this: Though originally the first ten
Amendments were adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in
so far as they secure and recognize fundamental rights-common
law rights-of the man, they make them privileges and immunities
of the man as citizen of the United States, and cannot now be
abridged by a State under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other
words, while the [first] ten Amendments, as limitations on power,
only apply to the Federal government, and not to the States, yet in
so far as they declare or recognize rights of persons, these rights are
theirs, as citizens of the United States, and the Fourteenth
321. 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
322. Id. at 150 (oral argument of J. Randolph Tucker).
323. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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Amendment as to such rights limits state power; as the ten
Amendments had limited Federal power.324
As specific examples of federal privileges or immunities, Tucker cited a
handful from what he called "the Declaration of Rights": "the privilege of
freedom of speech and press-of peaceable assemblages of the people-of
keeping and bearing arms-of immunity from search and seizure-
immunity from self-accusation, from second trial-and privilege of trial by
due process of law."" In these provisions, Tucker insisted, "we find the
privileges and immunities secured to the citizen by the Constitution." 26
Even more significant than the logical force of Tucker's incorporation
argument is the case law he called upon for support. With respect to the
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, Tucker declared: "[B]eing secured
by the Constitution of the United States to all, when they were not, and
were not required to be, secured by every State, they are, as said in the
Slaughter-House Cases, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States."3 27 In other words, Bill of Rights freedoms applied to state
governments through the Privileges or Immunities Clause because the
Court in Slaughter-House had said they did. In making what modem
scholars deem the most "celebrated" 28 and "powerful" 329 argument for
incorporation since 1866, Tucker was not distinguishing Slaughter-
House-he was invoking it! In fact, Tucker cited and relied upon Slaughter-
House several times in his careful analysis of the incorporation issue.3 '
Interestingly, Tucker's citations show that he premised his
incorporation argument on both the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Slaughter-House. From Justice Miller's opinion, Tucker referred
specifically to page 79. At page 79, Miller, writing for the Court, had stated
that federal privileges and immunities are those rights that "owe their
existence to the ... Constitution," and had listed as among those federal
privileges and immunities the First Amendment right "to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances."33' Tucker also referred to
page 118 of Justice Bradley's dissent. There, Bradley, agreeing with Miller
324. Spies, 123 U.S. at 150 (oral argument of J. Randolph Tucker). Tucker's reference to the
"common law" does not suggest the sort of freewheeling, no-holds-barred argument that John
Campbell had made on behalf of the butchers in Slaughter-House. Whereas Campbell had
asserted that the mere fact that a right was protected at common law was alone a sufficient basis
for clothing that right with federal constitutional protection, Tucker simply contended that insofar
as common-law privileges were enumerated in and safeguarded by the Constitution, they
warranted Fourteenth Amendment protection against state interference.
325. Id. at 151 (emphasis omitted).
326. Id.
327. Id. (emphasis added).
328. AMAR, supra note 12, at 213.
329. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 185.
330. See, e.g., Spies, 123 U.S. at 150, 151, 152.
331. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
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(at least in part), had expressly mentioned as federal privileges and
immunities the First Amendment rights to free exercise, free speech, and
free press, as well as the right of assembly; the Fourth Amendment freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment right to
due process.332 Tucker argued that "[t]hese declarations of the court" in
Slaughter-House-that is, the statements contained in Miller's and
Bradley's opinions-" show that the rights declared in the first ten
Amendments are to be regarded as privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, which... are protected as such by the Fourteenth
Amendment."333 Thus, arguing in 1887, Tucker seemed to recognize (as I
have argued) that, while they did not agree about everything, the majority
and dissenting Justices in Slaughter-House did agree that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause incorporated core Bill of Rights freedoms.
Tucker's oral argument, delivered to a Court on which Justices Miller,
Bradley, and Field still sat, is potent evidence of the way late-nineteenth-
century lawyers and judges read and understood Slaughter-House-
specifically, as confirming that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
incorporated core Bill of Rights freedoms. Unfortunately, unlike Tucker's
argument, which tells us a great deal, the Court's decision in Spies is
unenlightening with respect to the incorporation issue. In a unanimous
decision, the Court disposed of the case on procedural grounds, and thus
never had the occasion to address Tucker's Slaughter-House-based
incorporation argument.
Spies was the first time that the Supreme Court (and the only time that
Justice Miller) was squarely faced with what I would call a "true"
incorporation argument-and, far from rejecting that argument, the Court
simply passed over the issue without comment.3  What do I mean, then, by
a "true" incorporation argument? In Spies, Tucker argued that states were
forbidden by the Privileges or Immunities Clause to abridge certain
freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights for the very reason that those
freedoms were enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In other words, according
to Tucker, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments were not "privileges
[and] immunities of citizens of the United States" because they were
"important" or "fundamental" in some abstract sense; rather, they were
332. Seeid. at ll8.
333. Spies, 123 U.S. at 152. Significantly, alongside Slaughter-House, Tucker also cited
Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1874). another Miller opinion, and United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). For an in-depth discussion of Cndkshank, see infra notes 338-
380.
334. See AMAR, supra note 12, at 227-28 (" [In Spies] for the first time an attorney before the
Court clearly argued for incorporation on the basis of the privileges-or-immunities clause.");
Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial
Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140, 147 (1949) ("Finally in 1887 we reach the first case in
which the incorporation argument seems squarely to have been presented to the Supreme Court.
This was Spies v. Illinois.").
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privileges and immunities because they were spelled out among the original
amendments to the Constitution. Contrast Tucker's "true" incorporation
argument with the arguments put forth in several of the cases discussed
below (most notably, Hurtado, Edwards v. Elliott,35 and Walker v.
Sauvine 3 6). In these latter cases, the contention "was not that the
Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated the Bill of Rights as such," as
Tucker had argued, but rather "that specific items in the Bill of Rights were
inherently a part of either due process or of privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."337
Thus, the first and most obvious response to those who would question
Justice Miller's commitment to incorporation on the basis of his voting
record in other Reconstruction-era cases is relatively straightforward: Miller
simply never faced, and thus certainly never rejected, a true incorporation
argument. But that, I suppose, is too easy. As I mentioned above, there are
cases-including the ones Aynes has pointed out-that, while not true
incorporation cases, at least seem to be sufficiently within the incorporation
ballpark (or, more accurately, the anti-incorporation ballpark) that one
might expect Miller to have spoken up. Again, though, upon close
inspection, none of these supposedly anti-incorporationist decisions turns
out to be very anti-incorporationist at all.
1. Cruikshank: The Two Rights of Assembly and the Problem of
"State Action"
In 1875, the Supreme Court considered the case of United States v.
Cruikshank,338 which arose out of the so-called "Colfax massacre" in
Louisiana. William Cruikshank and about a hundred other whites had
attacked and killed a group of more than sixty black citizens. Cruikshank
and his co-conspirators were arrested, indicted, and convicted under the
Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870339 for interfering with the black
citizens' rights to assemble and to bear arms. Section 6 of the Enforcement
Act made it a felony for two or more persons to
band or conspire together ... with intent to... injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder
his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or
335. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).
336. 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
337. Morrison, supra note 334, at 147.
338. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
339. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
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secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
because of his having exercised the same.34
In an opinion by Chief Justice Waite (which Justice Miller joined), the
Court reversed the convictions and ordered the defendants released. As a
number of commentators have pointed out, there is language in Waite's
opinion that might seem to suggest that neither the First Amendment right
of assembly nor the Second Amendment right to bear arms is among the
"privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States." A careful
reading, however, reveals that Waite's opinion in Cruikshank-and, more
importantly, Miller's acquiescence in that opinion-is fully consistent with
(and, indeed, generally supportive of) an incorporationist understanding of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
a. An Overview
The question before the Court, Waite observed, was "whether the
several rights, which it is alleged the defendants intended to interfere with,
are such as had been in law and in fact granted or secured by the
constitution or laws of the United States" within the meaning of the
Enforcement Act.342 Waite concluded that they were not. The "right of the
people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes," he found, "existed long
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States" and, hence,
could not be said to have been "granted or secured" by the Constitution
within the meaning of the Act. 3 And because "no direct power over [the
right to assemble for lawful purposes] was granted to Congress, it
remain[ed] ... subject to State jurisdiction." ' Thus, for their protection in
the enjoyment of the right to assemble for lawful purposes, "the people
must look to the States," not the federal government. 5
The First Amendment, Waite acknowledged, prohibits Congress from
abridging the right of the people to assemble and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances. However, citing Barron v. Baltimore,3 Waite
pointed out that the First Amendment, "like the other amendments
proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the
powers of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to
340. 1& § 6, 16 Stat. at 141 (emphasis added).
341. See, e.g., CuRTIs, supra note 12, at 170 (" [The [Cruikshank] Court held that the right
of peaceable assembly and the right to bear arms were not privileges secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
342. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551.
343. I. at551, 548.
344. Id. at551-52.
345. Id. at 552.
346. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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operate upon the National government alone." 7 In 1876, Waite concluded,
it was "too late to question the correctness of this construction."34
b. An Analysis
At first glance, Chief Justice Waite's analysis would seem to undermine
my argument that Miller's acquiescence in Cruikshank does not indicate
that he subscribed to an anti-incorporationist interpretation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. After all, it would certainly appear that Waite had
flatly contradicted what I say was Miller's conclusion, voiced in Slaughter-
House, that the First Amendment right of assembly was among the federal
privileges and immunities subject to federal protection. However, I believe
that, for two reasons, Miller's concurrence in Cruikshank is consistent with
the incorporationist reading of his opinion for the Court in Slaughter-
House.
i. The Two Rights of Assembly
The indictments at issue in Cruikshank charged that the defendants had
banded together with the intent of depriving black citizens of their "lawful
right and privilege to peaceably assemble together with each other and with
other citizens of the United States for a peaceful and lawful purpose." "
Although the right alleged in the indictment might look like the First
Amendment right of assembly, it is in fact different in two critical respects.
For one thing, the First Amendment does not speak generically and broadly
of a right to assemble "for lawful purposes"; rather, it speaks more
specifically and narrowly of a right "to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."350 The generic right to assemble
for lawful purposes at issue in Cruikshank, Chief Justice Waite correctly
pointed out, existed at common law, "long before the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States." 35' The First Amendment simply
provided constitutional protection for a particular aspect of the common-
law right, specifically, the right to assemble for the purpose of petitioning
the government. Miller clearly recognized and emphasized this distinction
in Slaughter-House, where he observed that one of the rights "guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution" was "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and
347. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted).
350. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
351. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 55 1.
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petition for redress of grievances." 35 2 Significantly, Waite stressed the same
distinction in Cruikshank:
If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the
defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose [that is, the
purpose of petitioning the government for a redress of grievances],
the case would have been within the statute, and within the scope of
the sovereignty of the United States. Such, however, is not the case.
The offence, as stated in the indictment, will be made out, if it be
shown that the object of the conspiracy was to prevent a meeting
for any lawful purpose whatever.353
There is a second important distinction between the right of assembly
alleged in Cruikshank and the First Amendment right: The First
Amendment, by its terms, protects the right of assembly only against
government infringement (" Congress shall make no law... .").3 It does
not set up a positive right of assembly that is valid against all comers,
including individuals. Accordingly, because in Cruikshank it was not the
state, but rather a group of private persons, that had arguably deprived the
black victims of their constitutional rights, the indictment could not, by
definition, have alleged a First Amendment right.
Thus, on at least one level, Cruikshank was a very easy case. The
Enforcement Act required the defendants to have conspired to deny rights
"secured.. . by the constitution or laws of the United States." The right to
assemble "for lawful purposes," particularly when claimed as against
infringement by private persons, simply is not one of those rights.
But, one might reasonably reply, what about Waite's observation that
the First Amendment, like the other rights catalogued in the Bill of Rights,
"was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to
their own citizens, but to operate on the National government alone"?
Surely, had Miller truly envisioned the incorporation of the Bill of Rights
by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, would he not have balked at
that dictum? Not necessarily. Waite's statement that the First Amendment
"was not intended" as a limitation on the states is precisely accurate. None
of the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments was, when adopted
in 1789, intended by the Founders to restrict the actions of state
governments. Put slightly differently, the Bill of Rights did not of its own
force apply to the states. Barron v. Baltimore (which Waite cited) clinched
that issue. In Barron, Chief Justice Marshall had said that
352. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36. 79 (1873) (emphasis added).
353. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552-53.
354. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging ... the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
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[t]he constitution was ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for
the government of the individual states. Each state established a
constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such
limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular
government as its judgment dictated.... The powers [the people of
the United States] conferred on this government were to be
exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in
general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to
the government created by the instrument.355
No one in Cruikshank, however, made the broader argument that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6 Thus, the Court did not even face-much less
reject-the notion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had
incorporated Bill of Rights freedoms. In fact, indications in the Court's
opinion are to the contrary. Only one paragraph after observing that the Bill
of Rights did not apply of its own force to the states, Waite seemed frankly
to acknowledge the "incorporating" character of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There, he referred to "the right of the people peaceably to
assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievances.' 357 This reference stood in stark contrast to the non-
constitutional right to assemble "for lawful purposes" alleged in the
indictment and was clearly intended as an allusion to the First Amendment.
And, unlike the right alleged in the indictment, this First Amendment right
of assembly was, according to Waite, "an attribute of national citizenship,
and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United
States. ' 358 Hence, within what might at first have seemed an anti-
incorporationist opinion, we find a rather clear recognition that First
Amendment rights are uniquely federal rights and, as such, are among the
"privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the United States." From that,
there certainly would have been no reason for Miller to dissent: The
Cruikshank Court's treatment of the First Amendment issue is in perfect
harmony with his conclusion in Slaughter-House that the First Amendment
"right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances" is a
right "guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." 359
355. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,247 (1833).
356. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 334, at 145-46 (" [I]t does not seem to have been argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.").
357. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added).
358. Id.
359. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
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ii. The Problem of "State Action"
Beyond the precise nature of the rights allegedly at issue in Cruikshank,
there is a second, more fundamental, explanation for Miller's concurrence
in Chief Justice Waite's opinion, one hinted at above. At first blush,
Cruikshank seems on the surface to present an ordinary question of
statutory interpretation-namely, whether or not the rights alleged in the
indictment were rights "secured... by the constitution." But lurking just
beneath the surface of Waite's opinion is the distinct undercurrent of a
fundamental constitutional issue. Although today we generally view the
Civil Rights Cases360 as the fountainhead of the so-called "state action"
doctrine-the principle that "[n]early all of the Constitution's self-
executing, and therefore judicially enforceable, guarantees of individual
rights shield individuals only from government action," not private
action36 1-that distinction actually belongs to Cruikshank. In fact, when the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases held that "[i]t is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited" by the Fourteenth Amendment and observed
that "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment," it noted that " [a] quite full discussion of this aspect of the
amendment may be found in United States v. Cndikshank." 1 2
In the Enforcement Act, Congress had in essence attempted, under the
guise of the authority granted to it in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to make it a criminal offense for private individuals to band
together for the purpose of interfering with another's enjoyment of his
constitutional rights. Riding circuit in Cruikshank, Justice Bradley (who,
recall, had dissented in Slaughter-House) acknowledged that, by virtue of
Section 5, "congress has power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, every
right and privilege given or guarantied by the constitution." The question
was whether the Enforcement Act was an "appropriate" exercise of that
power. Bradley concluded that it was not. But Bradley's holding was not
based on the fact that the right of assembly was not a privilege or immunity
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; in fact, Bradley
expressly "[g]rant[ed]" that the Fourteenth Amendment "prevents the
states from interfering with the right to assemble, as being one of such
privileges and immunities." 3" Rather, Bradley's decision in the circuit
court was premised on a lack of state involvement:
360. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
361. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 (2d ed. 1988).
362. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
363. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707,710 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14.897).
364. Id. at714.
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When ... rights and privileges are secured in the constitution of the
United States only by a declaration that the state or the United
States shall not violate or abridge them, it is at once understood
that they are not created or conferred by the constitution, but that
the constitution only guaranties that they shall not be impaired by
the state, or the United States, as the case may be.365
In other words, it was not within Congress's Section 5 authority to pass the
Enforcement Act, because, in modem parlance, the Act did not target "state
action." Louisiana had not deprived the black victims of their constitutional
rights; an angry mob had. And, the Fourteenth Amendment simply did not
protect citizens against the actions of other citizens.
The Supreme Court agreed. In dismissing the indictments, the
Cruikshank Court echoed Justice Bradley's conclusion and observed (rather
unremarkably) that, for "violation[s] by their fellow-citizens," people had
to look to their state governments for protection.366 The Fourteenth
Amendment-which, as Bradley had pointed out, provides only that "[n]o
state shall" 3 67 abridge federal privileges or immunities, deny due process,
or refuse equal protection-" adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as
against another." 
368
Interestingly, with a few isolated exceptions,369 today the orthodox view
of Cruikshank appears to be that it (further) undermined the view that the
limitations of the Bill of Rights applied to the States.370 Contemporary
commentators saw the case very differently: They almost uniformly
understood Cruikshank solely as a state-action decision. For instance,
William Royall, writing in 1878 on the subject of the Fourteenth
Amendment, summed up Cruikshank in this way:
Let it be observed that the prohibition is, "no state shall make or
enforce any law abridging," etc. It is not, "the privileges and
immunities shall not be abridged," but no state shall make or
enforce any law. Now, unless a state makes or enforces some law
abridging the fundamental rights of citizens, no case has arisen in
which Congress is authorized to legislate under the amendment. It
365. Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
366. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
367. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 714 (emphasis added).
368. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.
369. See BELZ, supra note 134, at 132 (1978) ("Declaring the government's indictment of
the Colfax assailants invalid, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite invoked the state action theory of
the Fourteenth Amendment."); FAIRMAN, supra note 82, at 1371 ("[The Fourteenth
Amendment... proved to be a more profound disappointment to Negroes than it had to butchers.
Its protection to the Negro was only that no State could deny his rights; it did not 'add anything to
the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.' said Chief Justice
Waite.").
370. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 12, at 170; Tribe, supra note 3, at 182 n.326.
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is not sufficient, to authorize legislation by Congress, that the
privileges and immunities of a citizen are being abridged. They
must be abridged by reason of a state having made and being
actually engaged in enforcing a law, to authorize legislation by
Congress; and for that reason I have no criticism to make upon the
case of United States v. Cruikshank. In that case the parties were
not prevented from assembling together by any law of Louisiana,
but simply by unlawful and riotous interference of individuals, for
which they should have been punished in the courts of the state. 7"
Writing several years later, Charles Pence offered a similar analysis.
Discussing Cruikshank in an 1891 article for the American Law Review,
Pence noted that the issue presented "was upon the constitutionality of the
Enforcement act. Could it be sustained as appropriate legislation under the
fourteenth amendment?"31 2 Answering that question, Pence observed,
"made it necessary to inquire what rights are secured by that
amendment."373 Pence continued: "The court proceeds then to argue that it
was immunity from State action or legislation invading the privileges of a
citizen of the United States which was secured by that amendment. It
conferred no rights upon one citizen as against another." 
374
Shortly after the turn of the century, Charles Wallace Collins, in a book
entitled The Fourteenth Amendment and the States, likewise identified and
explained Cruikshank as a state-action decision:
[Cruikshank] involved an interpretation of the nature of the
Amendment in its relation to wrongs done by individuals to
individuals acting in their private and personal capacity. Here again
the conservative policy prevailed, the Court holding that the
Amendment offered no protection from individual invasion of
individual rights and that Congress had no power under the
Amendment to make positive and affirmative laws for its
enforcement.1
5
Walter Fleming, an early-twentieth-century historian of the Reconstruction
era, took the same position. He interpreted Cruikshank as having
"declare[d] that national legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
must be directed against violations by states, not by individuals." "'
371. William L. Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases. 4 S. L
REV. 558, 581-82 (1878).
372. Pence, supra note 191, at 544.
373. Id.
374. Ld.
375. CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 22
(1912).
376. 2 FLEMING, supra note 15, at 424. Then-student Zechariah Chafec's class notes indicate
that turn-of-the-century Harvard professor Eugene Wambaugh also understood (and taught)
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Hence, despite the now-prevailing view of Cruikshank as an anti-
incorporation decision, there was a substantial consensus among those
closer to the action that the case turned exclusively upon the absence of
state action. Indeed, only the state-action interpretation of Cruikshank can
account for Justice Bradley's concurrence in the Court's opinion. Recall
that, in his Slaughter-House dissent, Bradley had explicitly mentioned a
number of Bill of Rights freedoms (including the right of peaceable
assembly, purportedly at issue in Cruikshank) as being "among the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States."377 Then, only
months later, sitting on circuit in Cruikshank, Bradley had decided the case
exclusively on state-action grounds. 378 As discussed above, Bradley had not
so much as hinted in his circuit-court opinion that the rights alleged in the
government's indictment were not federal "privileges [and] immunities."
To the contrary, he had expressly assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment
"prevents the states from interfering with the right to assemble, as being
one of such privileges and immunities. ' 379 It would be strange indeed if,
within such a short time, Justice Bradley had repudiated his view that the
Bill of Rights applied to state governments through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and concurred in an opinion in diametric opposition to
the position he had expressed both in his Slaughter-House dissent and in his
opinion in the circuit court.
Perhaps, then, the lesson of Cruikshank is not, as some have suggested,
that those who advocate an incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House
must explain Miller's Cruikshank concurrence. Perhaps, in view of Miller's
statement in Slaughter-House that "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances" is a right "guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution" and, hence, a "privilege[]" of United States citizenship,
8 0
and Justice Bradley's very explicit defense of incorporation in his
Slaughter-House dissent, the lesson is that Cruikshank is not the anti-
incorporationist juggernaut it was once thought to be.
Cruikshank as a state-action case, not as a case that cast doubt on the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights: "U.S. v. Cruikshank... 'No State.' Dft. was individual: not State. Can't attack a Ku. klux
Conspiracy under 14th Am.... This statute does not apply to State at all or State officials."
Zechariah Chafee, Student Notes: Constitutional Law, Prof. Eugene Wambaugh, 1912-1913. at
207 (on file with the Houghton Library, Harvard University).
377. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118-19 (1873) (Bradley. J., dissenting).
378. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 710 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14, 897).
379. Id. at 714.
380. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79-80.
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2. Twitchell, Eilenbecker, and Hurtado: Cases in Which No Argument
Under the Privileges or Imnunities Clause Was Raised
There is a second group of decisions that might conceivably raise
questions about Justice Miller's commitment to the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause and, hence, about my
incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House. In Twitchell v.
Pennsylvania,8  Eilenbecker v. District Court, " and Hurtado v.
California,383 the Supreme Court concluded (apparently with Miller's
blessing) that several Bill of Rights freedoms-including rights under the
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments-did not apply to state governments.
There is, however, a common thread running through these three cases that,
I believe, explains Miller's complicity: In none of the cases did the
complaining party invoke the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Indeed, in
two of the three cases, the Fourteenth Amendment was never even
mentioned; rather, the complainants sought to apply the provisions of the
Bill of Rights to the states directly.
a. Cases Involving the Direct Application of the Bill of Rights to
the States
In both Twitchell and Eilenbecker, criminal defendants attempted to
apply rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to state governmental action,
and in each case the Supreme Court refused to do so in a unanimous
opinion. Significantly, though, in neither case was it alleged that Bill of
Rights restrictions as incorporated bound state governments; rather, in both
cases, the defendants sought to apply provisions of the federal Bill of
Rights to states directly.
In Twitchell, a capital defendant challenged a state statute that
provided, in relevant part, that "in any indictment for murder or
manslaughter it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or
the means by which the death of the deceased was caused." ' The
defendant argued that the statute contravened the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments-particularly the latter, which states that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation."3 5 Counsel for the defendant, however,
never once mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment; he apparently staked his
client's entire case on the notion that the provisions of the Bill of Rights
381. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
382. 134U.S. 31 (1890).
383. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
384. Twitchell, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 325.
385. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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applied to the states of their own force. Unfortunately for Mr. Twitchell, his
lawyer's argument was a clear loser. With little more than a wave of the
hand and a citation to Barron v. Baltimore,386 the Court unanimously
concluded (in less than three and a half pages) that, in and of themselves,
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied only to actions of the federal
government.
Eilenbecker is in all material respects identical. There, several Iowans
had been arrested for violating an injunction prohibiting the sale of alcohol.
The defendants were tried by a judge, not a jury; the evidence against them
was in the form of affidavits, not live-witness testimony; and upon
conviction, they were ordered to pay fines of $500 apiece and sentenced to
thirty days' imprisonment.387 The defendants contended that the procedures
afforded them in the state courts violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
of indictment by grand jury,38 the Sixth Amendment's provisions for jury
trial and for confrontation of witnesses,38 9 and the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments.39 As it
had done in Twitchell, the Court (in an opinion written by Justice Miller)
rejected the defendants' claims on the basis that "the first eight articles of
the amendments to the Constitution have reference to powers exercised by
the government of the United States and not to those of the States. ' '39
Significantly, however, as in Twitchell, the defendants did not argue that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated Bill of Rights freedoms-only that the
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments applied, of their own force, to state
governments.392
As nineteenth-century commentator Charles Pence observed, in
Twitchell and similar cases, "rights were asserted under the first [eight]
amendments only and without reference to the fourteenth."3 93 For that
reason alone, the cases may be "pass[ed] over without comment."3 94 They
simply do not bear on the question at hand, namely, whether Miller's
silence (or, in the case of Eilenbecker, his authorship) undermines what I
claim to be his incorporationist understanding of the Privileges or
386. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
387. See Eilenbecker, 134 U.S. at 32.
388. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... ").
389. See id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed... and ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ").
390. See id. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
391. Eilenbecker, 134 U.S. at 34.
392. The Eilenbecker defendants did contend in a separate assignment of error that their
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights had been violated. See id. at 35-36. However, their Bill
of Rights and due process arguments were wholly distinct.




Immunities Clause. Indeed, the votes of several of the other Justices
confirm that there was nothing particularly anti-incorporationist going on in
either Twitchell or Eilenbecker. Chief Justice Chase authored the opinion
for a unanimous Court in Twitchell, and, in addition to Miller, Justices Field
and Swayne joined Chase's opinion. Chase, Field, and Swayne, of course,
would all dissent in Slaughter-House only four years later. Even more
significantly, among those joining Miller's unanimous opinion in
Eilenbecker were Justices Bradley and Harlan, both of whom quite clearly
believed that Bill of Rights freedoms were among the "privileges [and]
immunities of citizens of the United States." (Bradley had clearly said so in
Slaughter-House, and Harlan would later clearly say so in Maxwell v.
DOW.395)
b. Cases Involving the Due Process Clause Alone
Hurtado is another decision to which naysayers of an incorporationist
reading of Slaughter-House often point. In the end, however, Hurtado is
really no different from Twitchell and Eilenbecker. In Hurtado, a man who
had discovered that his wife was having an affair and had killed her lover
was indicted for and convicted of murder. The California Constitution
provided for indictment of criminal defendants by information rather than
by grand jury. In the Supreme Court, Hurtado did not make what I have
called a true incorporation argument; that is, he did not contend that the
Fifth Amendment applied in state proceedings by dint of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, referencing English common-law sources-Magna
Carta, Coke, and the like-Hurtado insisted, as a more abstract matter, that
grand jury indictment was "an essential part of due process of law."' The
fact that the Fifth Amendment expressly protected the right to grand jury
indictment was perhaps relevant to Hurtado's argument-as evidence of
"essentiality," for instance-but it was not decisive.
The Court rejected Hurtado's common-law-based argument. Justice
Matthews, who authored the opinion for a seven-member majority, first
concluded that, contrary to Hurtado's assertions, the English common law
did not treat grand jury indictment as an "essential" element of due
process, but, rather, as only one particular form of due process.397 Matthews
next pointed out that, if the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
395. 176 U.S. 581, 612 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[flf prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment it was one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
that they should not be tried for crime... except by a jury composed of twelve persons, how can
it be that a citizen of the United States may be now tried in a state court for crime... by eight
jurors, when that amendment expressly declares that 'no State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States'T').
396. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,521 (1884).
397. See id. at 521-28.
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truly comprehended a grand jury guarantee, as Hurtado maintained, then the
Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause would be rendered superfluous
because the Fifth Amendment also provided a generic right to due
process.398 In other words, according to Matthews, if grand jury indictment
was indeed an "essential" component of due process, then the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment would by definition include that right,
making the Fifth Amendment's express reference to grand jury indictment
unnecessary. "The natural and obvious inference," Matthews concluded,
was "that in the sense of the Constitution, 'due process of law' was not
meant or intended to include ... the institution and procedure of a grand
jury in any case." 99
Only Justice Harlan dissented in Hurtado.4 ° In rejecting an
incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House, Richard Aynes has
complained that "Harlan's powerful dissent provided a unique opportunity
for Miller to explain Slaughter-House, but he did not do so.""'' In other
words, had Miller truly embraced incorporation in Slaughter-House, he
would have dissented alongside Harlan in Hurtado. But that is not
necessarily true. First, as demonstrated above, Hurtado had not really made
an incorporation argument at all. He had not claimed that the Fifth
Amendment applied to the states as such by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, he had simply argued that grand jury indictment was
inherent in the concept of due process as that concept was understood at
common law. Second, to the extent that Hurtado's argument might have
looked like an incorporation argument, his position rested exclusively on
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. He had not, as
contemporary legal commentator Charles Pence correctly observed, so
much as suggested that the Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed the
right to grand jury indictment:
[I]t plainly appears that the immunity of the prisoner from
answering to the charge of murder unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury was not asserted in his behalf as a
privilege of a citizen of the United States which is now by the
fourteenth amendment put beyond the power of any State to
abridge.402
Nor, interestingly, did Justice Harlan rely on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in his dissent;4 3 like Matthews, Harlan focused exclusively on the
398. See id. at 534-35.
399. Id.
400. Justice Field did not take part in Hurtado. See id. at 558.
401. Aynes, supra note 18, at 655.
402. Pence, supra note 191, at 545.
403. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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common-law heritage of the grand jury and on the Due Process Clause.
Harlan's decision not to mention the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
significant because we know from his dissenting opinion in Maxwell v.
Dow that he did embrace the notion that the Clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights.4  His choice not to invoke the Clause in Hurtado reflected his
recognition of the fact that, because the argument had not been raised and
fully considered, Hurtado simply was not the appropriate forum in which to
debate a privileges-or-immunities-based theory of incorporation.
All things considered, it is not at all surprising that Justice Miller opted
not to join Justice Harlan's due-process-based dissent. For one thing, unlike
what Slaughter-House tells us about Miller's view of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause (namely, that he likely understood the phrase
"privileges or immunities" to include many of the freedoms enumerated in
the Bill of Rights), it reveals very little about Miller's understanding of the
Due Process Clause. All Miller said in Slaughter-House regarding the Due
Process Clause was that "under no construction of that provision that we
have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed
by the state of Louisiana... be held to be a deprivation of property within
the meaning of that provision." ' 5 It might well be that Miller thought that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but not the Due Process Clause,
played a role in the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms. Such a view,
after all, would have accorded with the views expressed by many of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers." Moreover, the "nonsuperfluousness"
line of argument endorsed by Justice Matthews in Hurtado is a powerful
objection to any due-process-based theory of incorporation. According to
Matthews's critique (taken to its logical conclusion), the incorporation of
any Bill of Rights guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause would suggest the implicit inclusion of that guarantee in the Fifth
404. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 612 (1900) (Harlan, J.. dissenting); see also supra
note 395.
405. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.81 (1873).
406. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 84 app. (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham) (declaring that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. .. are
chiefly defined by the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States"); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (elaborating upon the
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and affirming that "the personal rights guaranteed
and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution" were among the privileges and
immunities of United States citizens, and only later noting that - [tlhe last two clauses of the first
section of the Amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States,
but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State"). See generally AMAR. supra
note 12, at 181-214 (discussing the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment); CURTIs. supra note
12, at 57-91 (same); TRIBE, supra note 14, § 8-1, at 1334 (" Reconstruction Republicans intended
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause. to be the centerpiece of their
civil rights revolution."); supra notes 256-271.
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Amendment's Due Process Clause and, hence, the superfluousness of that
specific guarantee wherever found in the Bill of Rights.
Finally and importantly, neither Justice Bradley nor Justice Woods
joined Harlan's dissent in Hurtado; like Miller, they both joined
Matthews's opinion for the Court. Given his recitation in Slaughter-House
of a number of Bill of Rights freedoms as being "among the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States," the significance of Bradley's
concurrence is immediately apparent. Justice Woods's agreement with
Matthews is, for similar reasons, also very telling. In 1871, in what was
perhaps the first federal-court decision interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment, then-Judge Woods had declared in no uncertain terms that the
"rights enumerated in the first eight articles of amendment to the
constitution of the United States, are the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."4 "7 Hence, both Bradley and Woods clearly
subscribed to an incorporationist interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause; yet, like Miller, they elected not to join Justice Harlan's
dissent. Apparently, in addition to Miller, neither Bradley nor Woods
believed that Hurtado was the "unique opportunity" that Aynes has argued.
Thus, in neither Twitchell, Eilenbecker, nor Hurtado did the Court face
an argument that the protections of the Bill of Rights applied to the states
by virtue of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Of course, it would have
been easy for Miller to dissent in any of those cases and to proclaim that the
Fifth Amendment-or the Sixth or the Eighth, as the case may have been-
was indeed among the "privileges [and] immunities of citizens of the
United States" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Less
discriminating jurists might have done just that. But that is not how Miller
operated; recall that Miller's philosophy was, in his own words, one of
deciding only "the main points, the controlling questions."4 8 He believed
that judges were not "authorized to make any advances to meet" important
constitutional questions until they were "required to do so by duties of
[their] position." '  Until the argument was put to him directly, Miller
simply was of no mind to speak up.4"'
407. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
408. Letter from Samuel F. Miller, supra note 184, at 415.
409. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1874).
410. To the inevitable objection of the modem reader that Miller's decision to abstain from
addressing a constitutional issue that neither party had raised or argued is wooden and legalistic,
there are two responses. First, it is worth noting that Miller was operating in an altogether
different era-the era of common-law pleading, the forms of action, the (in)famous Field Code,
and, in the Supreme Court, the writ of error. See generally JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 315-49 (2d ed. 1974); OXFORD COMPANION, supra note
101, at 260. Nineteenth-century pleading was "rigid and rarefied," Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 917 (1987), and "littered with arcana," and "often... pmduce[d
decisions entirely unrelated to the merits," Richard Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading
Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (1998).
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3. Edwards and Sauvinet: Cases Involving the Right to Civil Jury
Trial
There is a third set of cases upon which doubters of an incorporationist
reading of Slaughter-House might rely. This third set includes Edwards v.
Elliott.. and Walker v. Sauvinet. 2 In each case, a petitioner contended that
the right to trial by jury in civil cases (which the Seventh Amendment
Second, it is important to recognize that, in refusing to speculate about answers to questions
that had not been raised, Miller was, in fact, following established Supreme Court practice. From
Miller's day to present, the Court has consistently adhered to a policy of refusing to consider
issues that have not been specifically briefed or argued-even if such issues clearly arise on the
face of the record. See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925. 1930 n.4
(1998) (noting that "it would be improper for us sua sponte to raise and address [a] question" not
raised by the parties); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin. 293 U.S. 163, 168 (1934); Southeastern
Express Co. v. Robertson, 264 U.S. 541, 542 (1924); Home Benefit Ass'n v. Sargent. 142 U.S.
691, 694-95 (1892); Talty v. Freedman's Say. & Trust, 93 U.S. 321. 326 (1876). The Court's
tendency not to "reach out" is particularly pronounced when important constitutional questions
are potentially at issue, as they were in Twirchell, Eilenbecker. and Hurtado. See Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 206 n.5 (1954) ("We do not reach for constitutional questions not raised by the
parties.").
Even today-when courts are, if anything, too eager to reach out to decide questions not
squarely presented-Justice Miller's prudent approach to engaging and deciding constitutional
questions finds ample support in Supreme Court practice. Take Yee r. City of Escondido. 503 U.S.
519 (1992), for instance. There, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of a group of California
mobile-home-park owners that local housing laws effected a "physical taking" of property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 523-32. The Court candidly
acknowledged that the park owners' contention that the laws violated the Takings Clause because
they deprived the owners of the "ability to choose their incoming tenants" might well "be
relevant to a regulatory taking argument." Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Court
declined to consider the park owners' "regulatory taking" argument because it was not "fairly
included" in the question the park owners had presented in their petition for certiorari. See id. at
537-38 (applying SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a)).
The Court in Yee observed that the park owners' "physical taking" and "regulatory taking"
arguments were not separate claims, but rather separate arguments in support of a single Takings
Clause claim. See id. at 534-35. The park owners, the Court noted, "could have formulated any
argument they liked in support of [their Takings Clause] claim" because, on Supreme Court
review, "it is the petitioner.., who controls the scope of the question presented." Id. at 535. The
park owners' failure to include their regulatory taking argument in the "question presented" was
fatal, the Court held, because the Court "ordinarily will not consider questions outside those
presented in the petition for certiorari." Id.
The Yee Court's explanation for refusing to consider the regulatory taking argument
precisely parallels Justice Miller's decision to abstain in Twitchell, Eilenbecker. and Hurrado. Just
as the park owners in Yee could have raised a regulatory taking argument in support of their effort
to invalidate the rent-control provisions, Twitchell. Eilenbecker, and Hurtado could have made
incorporation arguments under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. And just as the Yee Court
upheld the challenged ordinance notwithstanding the fact that the park owners had a colorable
regulatory-taking argument, Justice Miller concurred in or wrote Twitchell, Eilenbecker, and
Hurtado notwithstanding the availability of a potentially valid argument under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The Supreme Court was not in the late 1800s and is not now in the business of
making parties' legal arguments for them. See generally Carducci v. Regan. 714 F.2d 171, 177
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) ("The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do
not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal
questions presented and argued by the parties before them."), cited in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180,224 (1997).
411. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).
412. 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
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protects against deprivation by the federal government) was a "privilege[]
or immunit[y]" of United States citizens within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although, technically speaking, in neither case
was the Court faced with what I have called a true incorporation argument,
there really is no doubt that something very much resembling a privileges-
or-immunities-based incorporation argument was before the Court. And in
both cases, the Court concluded (with Miller concurring) that the right to a
jury trial in civil cases was not among the rights protected by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. Of all the Reconstruction-era decisions either
authored or joined by Miller, Edwards and Sauvinet are, for obvious
reasons, the most difficult to explain. Ultimately, however, neither
substantially undermines what I argue was Miller's basic commitment to
the notion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated core Bill of
Rights freedoms.
Edwards is at least partially explained by the fact that the complaining
party there had failed to raise his civil-jury argument properly before the
state appellate court. The notion that the state had infringed anyone's right
to a jury trial was a mere "afterthought." 4 13 As even a cursory review of the
Court's opinion reveals, Edwards was about shipbuilding, maritime
contracts, and the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts-not civil
juries, and certainly not incorporation. Nonetheless, there is language in
Edwards that cannot be completely ignored. Specifically, although the
Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner's procedural default was
"decisive" and that it did not need to address the civil-jury issue because
the claim had not been properly preserved, 14 the Court found equally
"decisive" the fact that the Seventh Amendment "does not apply to trials
in the State courts." 
415
The Court's decision in Sauvinet is more categorical. There, the Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, acknowledged that " [b]y art[icle] 7 of
the amendments, it is provided, that 'in suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved,"' but held, in no uncertain terms, that "trial by jury in
suits at common law pending in the State courts is not... a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abridge. ' 416 Miller joined Waite's opinion.
Miller's silence in the face of the Court's seemingly anti-
incorporationist rhetoric in Sauvinet (and, to a slightly lesser degree, in
Edwards) would appear to raise questions about my alternative,
incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House. And while "the broad
413. Edwards, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 548 (argument of A.Q. Keasbey).
414. Id. at 557-58.
415. Id. at 557.
416. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. at 92.
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proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights
as such was not suggested in the case," 4"7 the question of the incorporation
of the Seventh Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was lurking just beneath the surface. Why, then, did Miller join? There are
two considerations that I believe help to explain Miller's vote.
First and foremost, it is entirely possible that Miller felt precluded by
his commitment to originalism from voting to incorporate the Seventh
Amendment. This "originalist bar" could have taken either of two slightly
different forms. First, Miller might have recognized that, given the original
understanding of the Seventh Amendment, the right to a civil jury simply
does not lend itself to mechanical incorporation against state governments.
Akhil Amar has recently pointed out that, as originally conceived by the
Framers, the Seventh Amendment was as much about federalism as
individual rights. In essence, the amendment required that "if a state court
entertaining a given common-law case would use a civil jury, a federal-
court hearing the same case (because, say, it involves diverse citizens or
raises a federal question) must follow-must 'preserve'-that state-law jury
right. 4 1 8 Put differently, "federal courts were obliged to provide a civil
jury whenever the state court across the street would do so.""" Read in this
"most sensible" way, the Seventh Amendment "becomes somewhat
awkward to incorporate against states"4 20 because to incorporate "would be
to redundantly insist that state courts provide civil juries whenever state law
said so." 421
In addition, an originalist conception of the Fourteenth Amendment
might also have led Miller to resist the incorporation of the right to a civil
jury. There is evidence to suggest that those who framed and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment might not have envisioned the incorporation of the
Seventh Amendment. For instance, as we have seen, during the debates on
the Fourteenth Amendment, Jacob Howard, the Amendment's Senate
sponsor, delivered a speech on the Senate floor in which he expressly stated
that among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens were "the
personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution."4"2 But, when Howard went on to specify those rights, he
conspicuously omitted any reference to the right to a civil jury.423 Miller
417. Morrison, supra note 334, at 145.
418. AMAR, supra note 12, at 89.
419. Id. at 276.
420. Id. at 92.
421. Id. at 276.
422. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
423. See id (specifically mentioning the rights to free speech. free press, assembly and
petition, the right to bear arms, the right against the quartering of soldiers, the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him and to a criminal jury trial, and the freedom from excessive bail and cruel
and unusual punishment).
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might also have thought it indicative of an original intention not to
incorporate the Seventh Amendment that at least a handful of states voting
to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment had procedures in place that would not
have complied with an incorporated Seventh Amendment.2 4 In any event,
because Miller was a Justice who took originalist arguments seriously, the
incorporation of the Seventh Amendment would have given him pause.
These originalism considerations might well have settled the matter for
Justice Miller. But Miller had another reason for resisting the incorporation
of the Seventh Amendment. In addition to the difficult jurisprudential
issues that would have attended the incorporation of the Seventh
Amendment, Miller had a somewhat idiosyncratic, but very firmly held,
belief that trial by jury in civil cases was simply a bad idea-and that trial
by jury in state civil cases was an even worse idea. Miller made no secret of
his aversion to the institution of the civil jury. Indeed, he devoted an entire
American Law Review article to the subject.425 Although he acknowledged
that the institution of trial by jury in criminal cases was "probably wise," 
426
he candidly "confess[ed] that [his] practice in the courts, before [he] came
to the bench, had left upon [his] mind the impression that as regards
contests in the courts in civil suits, the jury system was one of doubtful
utility." 42 7 Miller complained that the civil jury system
depends upon jurors who are not trained in the art of weighing
evidence, of discerning the truth or falsity of the testimony
produced before them as it comes from the mouths of witnesses,
and still less in the knowledge of the principles of law which must
be applied to the evidence in order to decide the case.428
As a result, Miller warned, "the jury is but too often the mere reflection of
popular impulse. ' 429 Taking into account the "many motives [that] may
influence men to inconsiderate action," the "many prejudices [that] enter
the jury box," and how often "stupidity may prevail over clear sense and
sound judgment," jury trial was simply not a preferred method of deciding
complex cases.430 Perhaps above all else, Miller feared what we in the post-
O.J. Simpson era call "jury nullification." As an empirical matter, Miller
424. See Fairman, supra note 269, at 81-132. There is, in fairness, some indication that at
least one Republican congressman, William Lawrence, thought that the Fourteenth Amendment
did incorporate the Seventh Amendment-although Lawrence seemed to rely on the Due Process
Clause, not the Privileges or Immunities Clause, for that conclusion. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
425. Justice Samuel F. Miller, The System of Trial by Jury, 21 AM. L. REV. 859 (1887).
426. Justice Samuel F. Miller, Address to the Annual Meeting of the Bar Association of the
State of New York (Nov. 1878), in 18 ALB. L.J. 405, 409 (1878).
427. Miller, supra note 425, at 861.
428. Id. at 862.
429. Miller, supra note 426, at 409.
430. Miller, supra note 425, at 864.
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contended, litigants who felt that they were legally in the right were
generally content to submit their cases to a judge for decision. Those whose
legal cases were shaky were the ones who sought a jury trial:
[Tihe party who fancies that, in appeals to the prejudices and
feelings of the tribunal which tries his case he may find something
which will induce them to depart from the strict law pertaining to it,
or to construe the evidence more favorably to his side of the case, is
generally the one who demands a jury.43" '
Significantly, Miller harbored particular suspicion of civil-jury trial in
state courts. In addition to the problems he saw with turning over complex
legal issues to those untrained in the law, Miller was convinced that state
judges were simply not up to the task of properly supervising civil jury
trials in their courts:
[Oiwing to popular and frequent elections of the State judges, and
insufficient salaries, the judges of those courts in which I mainly
practiced were neither very competent as to their learning, nor
sufficiently assured of their position, to exercise that control over
the proceedings in a jury case, and especially in instructing the jury
upon the law applicable to it, which is essential to a right result in a
jury trial.
4 32
Given Miller's distrust, it is not surprising that he might have sought to
avoid imposing on state courts a system that he genuinely believed they
were woefully ill-equipped to handle.
Miller was by no means alone in his resistance to the incorporation of
the Seventh Amendment. Of course, it is not insignificant that, despite the
modem Supreme Court's incorporation of virtually every other provision of
the Bill of Rights against state governments since the turn of the twentieth
century, the Seventh Amendment remains to this day a restraint only on the
federal government. More telling, however, is the fact that-for whatever
reason-many of Miller's most avidly incorporationist contemporaries
apparently agreed that the Seventh Amendment either could not or should
not be incorporated. For instance, even before the Civil War and the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Georgia's Chief Justice Joseph
Henry Lumpkin had held that the federal Bill of Rights applied to the
states-not of its own force (the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Barron
v. Baltimore would have precluded such a holding), but as declaratory of
"great principles of civil liberty" that no republican government, state or
431. Id. at 862.
432. Id.
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federal, could infringe.433 Significantly, however, in cataloguing the rights
that state governments were obliged to respect, Lumpkin mentioned-in
proper order-each and every freedom set forth in the first eight
Amendments except the right to a civil jury.a" Likewise, as I mentioned
above, in introducing the Fourteenth Amendment on the floor of the Senate,
Jacob Howard omitted any reference to the Seventh Amendment in his
otherwise ardently incorporationist explanation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Perhaps most significantly, Justice Bradley-who had
very expressly advocated the incorporation of a handful of Bill of Rights
freedoms in his Slaughter-House dissent-also concurred in both Edwards
and Sauvinet, rejecting the incorporation of the Seventh Amendment.435
In any event, Miller's belief that the Seventh Amendment either could
not for jurisprudential reasons or should not for practical reasons be
incorporated against the states appears to be sui generis. It does not cast
doubt on his broader commitment, manifested in Slaughter-House, to the
idea that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights should apply to state
governments through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
4. Miller's Voting Record: A Summary
The text and context of Justice Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House
certainly suggest that the core provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to the
states by virtue of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Miller's general
judicial philosophy appears to support that reading. Doubters of my
interpretation will no doubt point out that Miller failed to dissent in
Cruikshank, Twitchell, Eilenbecker, Hurtado, Edwards, and Sauvinet. As I
have shown, however, objections based on these cases fall short for several
reasons. First and most decisively, in none of these decisions did the Court
ever face a true incorporation argument; that is, in none did a party claim
that one of the original amendments actually applied to the states by virtue
of its absorption into the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, even putting to
one side the fact that none of these cases presented the Court with a true
incorporation argument, none of the decisions from which Miller
supposedly should have dissented squarely contradicts what I contend was
Miller's specifically expressed incorporationist understanding of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Third, and relatedly, just as Miller did not
speak up in any of the aforementioned cases, neither did Justice Bradley; in
433. Campbell v. State, I I Ga. 353, 368 (1852).
434. See id. at 366-67.
435. As further evidence that the Supreme Court was not, in Edwards and Sauvinet, pursuing
anything approaching a coherent, generally applicable anti-incorporation agenda, it is noteworthy
that Justice Clifford, one of only two Justices to dissent in Sauvinet. authored the unanimou
opinion for the Court in Edwards.
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fact, Justices Swayne, Harlan, Woods, and Bradley all failed to break from
the Court in key decisions. Yet no one doubts that these four Justices
believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated Bill of
Rights freedoms. Their silence, and particularly Bradley's, thus confirms
that there was nothing particularly anti-incorporationist about any of these
decisions. Finally, it is not insignificant that, by his own admission, Miller
was not particularly fond of dissenting, even to decisions he thought
incorrect as a matter of law. Indeed, by 187 1, Miller acknowledged that he
had grown "averse to dissents." 36
Hence, in the end, it is much less clear than many would have us
believe that Miller's pre- and post-Slaughter-House voting patterns
undermine the view-suggested by the text of the Slaughter-House opinion
and supported by broader considerations of judicial philosophy-that Miller
envisioned the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as one of the primary
purposes of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
V. GOING FORWARD: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
REINTERPRETING SLA UGHTER-HOUSE
For years, we have misunderstood Justice Miller's opinion in
Slaughter-House and have wrongly assumed that the Court in that case
meant to foreclose future reliance on the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
a basis for incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states. So what? Why
should anyone care? After all, the Supreme Court has, over the course of
the last century, incorporated virtually all of the freedoms enumerated in the
Bill of Rights by way of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Does it really matter whether the vehicle for incorporation is the Due
Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause? As it turns out, it
does.
It matters, as elegantly put by Justice Thomas in his dissent last Term in
Saenz v. Roe,437 because "the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of [the Supreme
Court's] Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.""'  The orthodox
understanding of Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House-as interpreting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in such a way as to "nullif[y] the intent to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states" 439-- has caused courts to rely on other
constitutional provisions, most notably the Due Process Clause, to
safeguard individual rights against state interference. As Justice Souter
remarked several years ago, "The Slaughter-House Cases are
436. Letter from Samuel F. Miller (May, 11871). quored in FAIRtAN. supra note 83. at 61.
437. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
438. Id. at 1538 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
439. CURTis, supra note 12, at 175.
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important ... for their holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was no source of any but a specific handful of substantive rights. To a
degree, then, that decision may have led the Court to look to the Due
Process Clause as a source of substantive rights."' 44' In other words,
according to conventional wisdom, we have Miller to thank for the much
and rightly maligned doctrine of "substantive due process." 441
Before exploring the implications of my reinterpretation of Slaughter-
House for substantive due process, let me clarify precisely what I mean by
the phrase "substantive due process." The modern doctrine of substantive
due process, of course, has more than one incarnation. On the one hand,
"necessarily... it is a variety of substantive due process through which
rights like freedom of speech" -and other substantive rights laid out in the
Bill of Rights-"are applied to the states whenever the textual vehicle
chosen for the purpose is the Due Process Clause."" 2 On the other hand,
substantive due process is also the name given to the isolation and
protection of supposedly "fundamental" rights-the right to privacy being
the most obvious example-that are not explicitly grounded in the text of
the Constitution. 43 As everything I have said up to this point should make
clear, I am concerned primarily with the former-that is, the protection of
substantive Bill of Rights freedoms by way of the Due Process Clause-
and not so much with the latter. Precisely what my reinterpretation of
Slaughter-House portends for the other, more controversial branch of
substantive due process jurisprudence-the protection of unenumerated
rights against state interference-is an issue for another day.
As an aside, however, it is worth noting that by reinterpreting
Slaughter-House along the lines suggested in this Article, the Supreme
440. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 759 n.6 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
441. See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 7-5, at 1316 (" Ironically, in his opinion in Slaughter-House,
Justice Miller may have unwittingly taken the first step toward the recognition-and subsequent
perpetuation-of the doctrine of substantive due process."). In the post-Slaughter-House years,
the shift in emphasis in the "incorporation" cases from the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the
Due Process Clause was, in many respects, self-perpetuating. As courts rejected Privileges-or-
Immunities-Clause-based incorporation arguments, litigants began more and more to assert their
claims under the Due Process Clause; and when courts slowly but surely began to credit due-
process-based arguments, parties lost the incentive to pursue the privileges-or-immunities issue.
See LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE 209 (1992) ("This
idea [that the Privileges or Immunities Clause limited legislative power] received such rough
handling by the majority in the Slaughterhouse Cases... that lawyers in general dropped it, only
to return to court with the argument that the limits [on the police power] resided in the due process
clause instead.").
442. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 8-8, at 1363; John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493, 499 (1997) ("One [subcategory of substantive due
process] is the rule that certain nonprocedural aspects of the first eight amendments apply to the
states as well as the federal government.").
443. See Harrison, supra note 442, at 500-01 (calling this "pure substantive due process" and
recognizing that "the most important fundamental right is the right to privacy, and [that] the most
important application of that right involves abortion").
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Court could avoid many of the pitfalls that might come with overruling
Slaughter-House outright and approaching the privileges-or-immunities
issue anew. Invoked in its "virgin state," there is the very real danger that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause "could invite judicial lawmaking
untethered by precedent and untamed by tested principle and might thereby
undermine the legitimacy both of the decisions relying upon it and of the
courts invoking it."' 44 Dissenting in Saenz, Justice Thomas expressed his
very legitimate fear that the Clause-if not handled with sufficient care-
might "become yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights,
limited solely by the 'predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of [the Supreme] Court.'"' 5 These are grave concerns. But they
are somewhat less grave if, rather than simply tossing Miller's Slaughter-
House opinion aside, we take Miller's opinion seriously and use it as the
lens through which we view and interpret the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
In Slaughter-House, as I have said, the Court articulated a fairly
comprehensive general theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. On
the one hand, the Court made it clear that the Clause does not protect
ordinary common-law interests against state deprivation. On the other hand,
the Clause does protect rights that "owe their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." ' At the
heart of this class of rights, I have argued, are many of the freedoms
enumerated in the Bill of Rights-rights, according to Miller, that are
"guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." 7 But the Slaughter-House
Court also made it clear that the protection of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause does not necessarily end with the first eight amendments and the
other rights specified in the text of the Constitution. Rather, the Clause also
safeguards rights proceeding, for instance, from the "National character" of
the federal government, such as the right to travel to Washington, D.C., the
rights to assert claims against and to transact business with the federal
government, and the rights to use seaports and to file suits in federal courts.
For confirmation that the Privileges or Immunities Clause as interpreted in
Slaughter-House protects such extratextual, "National character"-based
rights, one need look no further than the Court's decision last Term in
Saenz. There, the Court forthrightly acknowledged that the right to travel
"is not found in the text of the Constitution"' but nonetheless held,
expressly relying on Miller's opinion, that "one of the privileges conferred
444. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 7-6, at 1329.
445. Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1538 (1999) (Thomas. J.. dissenting) (quoting Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
446. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.79 (1873).
447. Id. at 79-80.
448. Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1524.
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by [the Privileges or Immunities] Clause 'is that a citizen of the United
States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union
by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of
that State.'" 449
The point here is that by engaging Slaughter-House rather than
overruling it, we gain valuable insight into the extent to which the
Privileges or Immunities Clause might replace substantive due process, not
only as a means for incorporating substantive Bill of Rights freedoms, but
also as a means for protecting rights not explicitly specified in the
constitutional text. With respect to the latter category, courts are by no
means given carte blanche to invent new individual rights and foist them
upon the states, as Justice Thomas feared; rather, the relevant question,
using Miller's terminology, becomes whether or not a given right "owe[s]
[its] existence" to "the Federal government, its National character ... or its
laws." 450
Having said all that, I reiterate that I am concerned here with the use of
substantive due process analysis to incorporate into the Due Process Clause
certain substantive Bill of Rights freedoms. The problems with substantive
due process even in this relatively limited incarnation are legion. Of course,
they are also well documented, so I need not provide anything more than a
brief sketch here. First, and most obviously, there is the pesky issue of
constitutional text: The Court's present policy of relying exclusively on the
Due Process Clause to protect substantive Bill of Rights freedoms
confounds the ordinary meaning of the term "due process." Indeed,
through the years, various members of the Supreme Court have explicitly
acknowledged the textual difficulties inherent in substantive due process,
only to overlook them. Justice Brandeis, for instance, concurring in Whitney
v. California,45 remarked that "[d]espite arguments to the contrary which
had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to
matters of procedure." 452 Justice White, writing for a majority in Bowers v.
Hardwick,453 made a similar observation: "It is true that despite the
language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
449. Id. at 1526 (quoting Slaughter-House. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80). In Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)-a forebear of sorts to Saenz-the Court had observed that the
right to travel proceeded, among other sources, from "the nature of our Federal Union." /i. at
629.
450. Given that this Article is addressed only to a single aspect of the Supreme Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence-the incorporation of Bill of Rights freedoms against state
governments-I leave for another day the question whether the Court's privacy decisions
(including, most infamously, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny) might find
support in a resurrected Privileges or Immunities Clause.
451. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
452. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
453. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
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Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by which life,
liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses
have been interpreted to have substantive content . . . ."" More recently
still, in their joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 55 Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated that "[a]lthough a literal reading of
the [Due Process] Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures
by which a State may deprive persons of liberty ... the Clause has been
understood to contain a substantive component as well." 45
Nonetheless, as John Hart Ely has colorfully stated, "[There is simply
no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is 'process.' ... [W]e
apparently need periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a
contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.""" Charles
Black has likewise argued that although substantive due process "now and
then works a little bit in practice," it "does not work intellectually."
458
Referring primarily to Ely and Black, Laurence Tribe has recognized that
"I f]or some distinguished students of the Constitution," the semantic
problems associated with substantive due process----"in particular, the
textual gymnastics arguably necessary to find protection of substantive
rights in a provision whose words seem most apparently concerned with
process-have become insuperable." '59 I must admit that I, too, find the
textual objection to substantive due process overwhelming, if not positively
conclusive. (Above all else, it seems to me, a legal doctrine that emerges
from a constitutional provision should not, at least absent the most
compelling historical evidence, patently contradict the plain meaning of the
text from which it emerges.)' What "process," for instance, is violated
when a state legislature duly enacts a law that, say, broadly prohibits people
from picketing on a downtown sidewalk? Presumably, the substance of
such a law would run afoul of the First Amendment's free speech
guarantee, but the law would in no way contravene the express mandate of
454. Id. at 191.
455. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
456. Id. at 846.
457. ELY, supra note 12, at 18.
458. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEw BiRTH OF FREEDo 106 (1997).
459. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 7-5, at 1317.
460. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constrctivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1196 (1987) ("More commonly, arguments from the
text achieve the... result of excluding one or more positions that might be argued for on
nontextual grounds."); Frederick Shauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language. 29 UCLA L
REV. 797, 828 (1982) ("Constitutional language can tell us when we have gone too far without
telling us anything else."). Professor Fallon points out, for instance, that "although the text of the
eighth amendment may not tell us precisely what 'cruel and unusual punishments' are, the
language does require that the amendment's prohibition apply only to actions that can plausibly be
described as 'punishments."' Fallon, supra, at 1196. (footnotes omitted). Ukewise, whereas we
may not learn from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment what, if anything, the term "due
process" really means, the text does teach that it may only apply to government action that can
plausibly be described as "process."
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the Due Process Clause that no state may "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." The legislature might have
deprived individuals of their "liberty"-the right to speak freely-but it
would have done so with due process of law; hence, no constitutional
violation. Indeed, given its equivocal, process-based language, the Due
Process Clause is positively incapable of providing absolute protection for
the substantive rights set out in the Bill of Rights-among them, freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, free exercise of religion, the right to bear
arms, the right not to have soldiers quartered in one's home, the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to receive just
compensation for private property taken by the government, and the right
not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. The Due Process
Clause therefore cannot-at least as a matter of constitutional text-
legitimately account for a number of the Supreme Court's most significant
incorporation decisions, including Gitlow v. New York,4 6' Near v.
Minnesota,462 De Jonge v. Oregon,4 63 Cantwell v. Connecticut,464 Wolf v.
Colorado, 5 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Chicago,466 and
Robinson v. California. 7
Second, not only is the Court's due-process-based theory of
incorporation inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's plain
language, it is also at loggerheads with the intentions of those who framed
the Amendment. There is every indication that John Bingham-the
principal draftsman of Section 1-understood the Due Process Clause to be
concerned exclusively with procedural fairness. Responding during the
floor debates on the Fourteenth Amendment to a question put to him by
fellow congressman Andrew Jackson Rogers regarding the meaning of the
Due Process Clause, Bingham answered: " [T]he courts have settled that
long ago, and the gentleman can go and read their decisions."468 Above all
others, the "decision[]" to which Bingham must have been referring was
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 46 9 which had been
decided by the Supreme Court in 1856 and which was, in 1866, the
definitive statement on the issue of "due process of law." Murray's Lessee
461. 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment's free speech guarantee).
462. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (incorporating the First Amendment's free press guarantee).
463. 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (incorporating the First Amendment's freedom-of-assembly
guarantee).
464. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the First Amendment's free exercise guarantee).
465. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures).
466. 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
guarantee).
467. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments).
468. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
469. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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involved a challenge to an act of Congress that established a summary
procedure for collecting public debts from federal customs officers. In
sustaining the act against constitutional challenge, a unanimous Supreme
Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-which
is, of course, in all material respects identical to the Fourteenth Amendment
provision-as a guarantee of fair procedures. Specifically, the Court stated:
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this
process, enacted by congress, is due process? To this the answer
must be twofold. We must examine the constitution itself, to see
whether the process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not
found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England,
before the emigration of our ancestors .... 470
Clearly, then, any interpretation of the Due Process Clause that reaches
beyond matters of procedure to embrace matters of substance contradicts
not only the text of the Fourteenth Amendment but also the expressed
intentions of the Due Process Clause's principal framer, John Bingham. The
470. Id. at 276-77. In a 1995 article, Laurence Tribe argued that. by 1868. "any state
legislature voting to ratify a constitutional rle banning government deprivations of 'life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law' would have understood that ban as having substantive as
well as procedural content." Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221. 1297-98 n.247
(1995). Interestingly, Tribe pointed to Murray's Lessee for support. In the Court's observation
that due process "is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of
the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due
process of law,' by its mere will," Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276. Tribe found
support for the proposition that legal thinkers of the mid-1850s would have viewed the concept of
"due process" as entailing a substantive component.
Tribe's argument (from which, in fairness, he has since backed away somewhat, see infra)
seems to me to make too much of too little. The issue before the Court in Murray's Lessee was
not whether Congress could--as a matter of substantive law-provide for the return of property
lawfully belonging to the United States; rather, the question was whether or not the method-the
process-Congress had chosen to accomplish that end comported with the Constitution. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Court's opinion is replete with language (including, notably, the
language quoted by Tribe) addressed to the procedural fairness of Congress's action. See, e.g., id.
at 275-77 (testing the "proceedings" authorized by Congress against the "processes" permitted
by the Constitution and the "modes of proceeding" existing at common law). Murray's Lessee
was, in short, the quintessential procedural due process case. See generally Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293-94 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contrasting Murray's
Lessee, as a procedural due process case, with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), as a substantive due process case); A.AR, supra note 12. at 173 (describing Murray's
Lessee as a "procedural due process" case); Harrison, supra note 442, at 554 (same).
While continuing to cite the above-quoted language from Murray's Lessee as evidence of a
"reasonable historical argument" that the term "due process" might entail substantive limitations,
Professor Tribe has backed off his more strident claim that legal actors in the Reconstruction era
would necessarily have understood it that way. In fact, Tribe has acknowledged that such a
construction "may not have been widely enough accepted in the late 1860s to render it the most
natural reading of the phrase for those who included it in the Fourteenth Amendment." TRIBE,
supra note 14, § 8-1, at 1334.
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Due Process Clause simply cannot, consistent with its history, be construed
to incorporate the substantive freedoms catalogued in the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
Third, there is the risk that the Supreme Court's stubborn adherence to
a doctrine that comports with neither text nor history will ultimately
undermine the integrity of both the Court and the institution of judicial
review. As Richard Aynes has written, "[I]t distorts our understanding of
the Constitution to reach a 'correct' result through a forced reading of the
Due Process Clause. It makes the Court engage in a decision-making
process it knows is wrong, and, thereby, teaches everyone disrespect for the
Court and the rule of law." 4 71 Ultimately, as David Richards has likewise
warned in detail, people come to suspect the whole enterprise of protecting
constitutional rights against state interference:
There is ... an interpretive integrity in the history, text, and
political theory associated with all the great normative clauses...
of the fourteenth amendment .... Clear interpretive mistake in one
of these areas is not adequately remedied by transporting the
correct interpretive analysis under one of these clauses (privileges
and immunities) to another (due process). The due process analysis
may be strained and for this reason muddy and even subvert public
understanding of the bases for the result in question.472
Continuing, Richards argues that "the cavalier transportation from [the
Privileges or Immunities Clause] to the due process clause of the
nationalization of human rights has discredited the very idea of the
nationalization of human rights." '473 The idea of incorporating substantive
Bill of Rights freedoms against the states, for instance, begins to look, like
substantive due process itself, "implausible and even bizarre., 474 In the
end, because "[t]he very vagueness of substantive due process analysis may
so invite.., ideological distortion of constitutional interpretation," there is
a very real risk that the courts, "like a cured drunk, [will] seek[] salvation
in total interpretive abstinence." 
475
Fourth and finally, there is the very thorny issue of pedigree. At least in
the Supreme Court, the doctrine of substantive due process traces its roots
to 1857-before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment-and the
Court's fateful Dred Scott decision.476 In striking down the Missouri
471. Aynes, supra note 18, at 687.
472. RICHARDS, supra note 14, at 199.
473. Id. at 201. While I am somewhat uncomfortable with Richards's framing of the issue as
the nationalization of" human rights," I believe that his basic interpretive point remains valid.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 203.
476. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally BORK, supra note
15, at 31 (" [Dred Scott] was the first appearance in American constitutional law of the concept of
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Compromise as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, Chief Justice Taney observed that
an Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought
his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and
who had committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law.4"
Taney voiced no particular objection to the procedures Congress had
employed in enacting the Missouri Compromise; rather, he was convinced
that, somehow or other, the substance of the act must have infringed the
"right" to own slaves.
Of course, in the post-Fourteenth-Amendment era, the doctrine of
substantive due process is most commonly associated with two other oft-
criticized decisions: Lochner v. New York"7 s and Roe v. Wade. 79 In
Lochner, the Court struck down a New York statute establishing maximum
ten-hour workdays and sixty-hour workweeks for bakers as violating the
"general right to make a contract in relation to ... business." The Court
observed that, under the Due Process Clause, "no State can deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," and went on
to hold that the "right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected" by the Clause."' Significantly, though, the Court never
questioned the process undertaken by the New York state legislature in
enacting the law; instead, the Court simply concluded that the law was
substantively unreasonable, and, therefore, that it was unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Roe, the Court premised its decision to invalidate state
laws criminalizing abortion on the Due Process Clause:
Th[e] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or... in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
'substantive due process,' and that concept has been used countless times since .. "): DAVID P.
CuRRIE, THE CONSTrruTiON IN THE SUPREME COURT THE FIRsT HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888,
at 271 (1985) ("[Dred Scott] was at least very possibly the first application of substantive due
process in the Supreme Court"); Harrison, supra note 442. at 499 (describing Dred Scott as the
,"most fateful substantive due process decision of all").
477. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
478. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
479. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
480. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
481. Id.
482. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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Although the majority in Roe was careful to avoid (or at least to minimize)
direct references to the language of "due process" -emphasizing instead
the Fourteenth Amendment's use of the word "liberty" -both Justice
Stewart in a concurring opinion483 and then-Justice Rehnquist in dissent4"
correctly identified the Court's opinion as resting on substantive due
process grounds. Rehnquist stressed that although he agreed that the term
"liberty" embraces "more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights,"
"liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against
deprivation without due process of law., 485 Constitutional scholars of
widely divergent jurisprudential persuasions have likewise lumped Roe in
with Dred Scott and Lochner as a cornerstone of substantive due process
doctrine. Robert Bork, for instance, has observed that, as substantive due
process cases, Lochner and Roe share "a very ugly common ancestor" in
Dred Scott. "Who says Roe," Bork argues, "must say Lochner and
Scott."486 Laurence Tribe has made what is in essence the same point, albeit
with greater caution. Responding to John Hart Ely's charge that "it is
impossible candidly to regard Roe as the product of anything" but
Lochner,487 Tribe acknowledges that "[e]ven if one disagrees with
Professor Ely about the constitutional indefensibility of Roe v. Wade...
one cannot lightly dismiss his interpretive concern that, in Roe as in
Lochner"-and, I would add, in Dred Scott-"the Supreme Court
identified a purely substantive right in a provision that appears, to the naked
eye, to speak solely to matters of procedure." 
488
The fact that neither Dred Scott nor Lochner nor Roe concerned a
specific provision of the Bill of Rights might mitigate the "pedigree"
problem somewhat (at least with respect to the relatively uncontroversial
use of substantive due process to incorporate textually specified rights).
Nonetheless, courts invoking substantive due process-the idea of
grounding protection for a substantive right in what is, by all accounts, a
purely procedural provision-would do well to remember that all roads lead
first to Roe, then on to Lochner, and ultimately to Dred Scott.
Which, in a way, brings us back to Slaughter-House. When it comes to
the constitutional irrelevance of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and
the consequent infusion of substantive constitutional guarantees into the
Due Process Clause, all roads inevitably lead to Justice Miller's opinion in
483. See id. at 167-71 (Stewart, J., concurring).
484. See id. at 171-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
485. Id. at 172-73.
486. BORK, supra note 15, at 32.
487. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 939 (1973).
488. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 7-5, at 1318.
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Slaughter-House. As Laurence Tribe recently put it, "Perhaps even more
devastating to the Privileges or Immunities Clause than Justice Miller's
restrictive reading itself has been the spell that the Slaughter-House
construction consistently cast... over subsequent courts addressing the
privileges or immunities issue." '
In the turn-of-the-century case of Maxwell v. Dow,49" for instance, the
Court addressed the argument that the Fifth Amendment's grand jury
indictment requirement and the Sixth Amendment's twelve-person petit
jury requirement were among the "privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the
claim, the Court relied principally-indeed, overwhelmingly-on Miller's
opinion in Slaughter-House. The Maxwell Court justified its "extended
reference to the case"-which consisted of huge chunks of verbatim
quotation and occupied the better part of five pages of the United States
Reports-on the basis of the Slaughter-House Cases' "great importance,
the thoroughness of the treatment of the subject [of federal privileges and
immunities], and the great ability displayed by the author of the opinion." 9"
Slaughter-House's "spell" was even more evident in Twining v. New
Jersey.492 There, the Court was asked to decide whether the Fifth
Amendment freedom from self-incrimination was protected against state
interference by virtue of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In concluding
that it was not, Justice Moody relied both on Slaughter-House directly and
on the Maxwell Court's treatment of Slaughter-House eight years earlier.
Moody acknowledged the controversy surrounding the Court's construction
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Slaughter-House and, after
quoting from the opinions of Justices Miller and Field, admitted that
"criticism of [Slaughter-House] has never entirely ceased, nor has it ever
received universal assent by members of this court. Undoubtedly, it gave
much less effect to the 14th Amendment than some of the public men active
in framing it intended, and disappointed many others."493
Continuing, Justice Moody acknowledged that the view that the
safeguards of the Bill of Rights "are among the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, which this clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against state action," had been, at various times,
"expressed by justices of this court, and was undoubtedly... entertained
by some of those who framed the Amendment."' 9 However, Moody
489. Id. § 7-5, at 1312.
490. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
491. Id at 591.
492. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
493. Id. at 96.
494. Id. at 98 (citations omitted).
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concluded, "[i]t is ... not profitable to examine the weighty arguments in
its favor, for the question is no longer open in this court." 495
The point here is that the modem-day assumption that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not incorporate the Bill of Rights-and,
significantly, that the Due Process Clause must therefore do so-is held
together by a single thread. That single thread-as Maxwell and Twining
plainly demonstrate-is Justice Miller's opinion for the Court in Slaughter-
House. Miller's opinion, however, simply cannot bear the weight of the
extreme anti-incorporationist interpretation with which courts and
commentators have almost uniformly saddled it. In fact, the best reading of
Slaughter-House, the reading that emerges from a careful consideration of
the opinion's text and context and is confirmed by larger jurisprudential
considerations, suggests that in 1873 the Court concluded that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did incorporate many Bill of Rights
freedoms against the states.
The Supreme Court's decision last Term in Saenz v. Roe indicates that
the Court might be poised to reevaluate the role of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in our constitutional system. I, for one, hope that it does.
I also hope that, if and when it does, it will not simply accept the
conventional wisdom about Slaughter-House, but will instead give Justice
Miller's opinion a close read. In that opinion lies the key to setting
incorporationism straight.
495. Id.
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